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Daily Report
East Europe

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Balkans: Greece's Simitis Hosts Yugoslav-Croatian Summit

NC0708115696 Athens Elliniki Radhiofonia Radio Network in Greek 1100 GMT 7 Aug 96

[FBIS Translated Text] A Yugoslav-Croatian summit meeting is now in progress at Vouliagmeni [an Athens suburb]. At the invitation of the Greek Government, New Yugoslavia leader Slobodan Milosevic and Croatian President Franjo Tudjman are meeting in the Astir Hotel, Vouliagmeni, to discuss the normalization of bilateral relations. This is the first private meeting between the two men since 1991, when Croatia declared its independence. The fact that this meeting is being held in Athens also testifies to the role Greece plays in the Balkans and the potential for Greece's wider policy.

The meeting between the two presidents opened at 1100 today in the presence of Prime Minister Konstandinos Simitis. In his statement, Mr. Simitis stressed: Following consultations with the presidents of Croatia and Serbia, this meeting is being held here in Athens. The meeting has been organized and is now being hosted by the Greek Government. The goal of the meeting is to discuss the problems concerning those two countries.

Greece is always willing to contribute to discussions of this nature because it believes that everyone's goal should be peace, stability in the Balkans, and friendship between peoples. I wish you success so that results may emerge that will contribute to improved cooperation of our peoples.

At 1430 today, Mr. Simitis will host a luncheon in honor of the two countries' leaders. In the event that there are not results by 1430, the talks will continue until evening.

Balkans: Croatian, Serbian Presidents Meet in Athens

LD0708151296 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1445 GMT 7 Aug 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Athens, 7 Aug (TANJUG)—A meeting was held today in the Athens resort of Vouliagmeni between Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic and Croatian President Franjo Tudjman.

The meeting was devoted to an agreement on the scope for improving overall relations between the FRY and Croatia.

Milosevic and Tudjman devoted special attention to economic and political questions relating to the scope for improving relations between the FRY and Croatia.

As for economic relations, the first, initial steps provided a good basis that has ensured a better climate in relations between the two countries. These steps are the opening of the Belgrade-Zagreb highway and the establishing of relations between oil industries.

In that context, possible other steps were discussed that would make possible some progress in the economic sphere in cooperation between interested businessmen on both sides, thus creating a better climate for overall negotiations about Serbian-Croatia relations.

As for the political part of the talks, discussion focused on preconditions Croatia must meet in line with the Dayton talks and later agreements, which would make possible a complete political normalization of relations between the FRY and Croatia.

In this respect, the two sides assessed as very positive the implementation of the Erdut Agreement on the Slavonia and Baranja region and the regulation of all issues relating to this topic.

It was also said that both sides would make efforts in the forthcoming period to achieve full normalization of relations and to resolve all contentious issues that exist between the two countries.

Balkans: Tudjman, Milosevic Agree on Refugees, Other Issues

LD0708162496 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1500 GMT 7 Aug 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Thanks to the good offices of Greek Prime Minister Kostas Simitis, talks have been held in Athens between Franjo Tudjman, president of the Republic of Croatia, and Slobodan Milosevic, president of the Republic of Serbia. The main issue was the normalization of relations between the Republic of Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Andjelko Perincic reports from Athens:

[Perincic] The talks between the two presidents, held in the coastal resort of Vouliagmeni, in the southeastern part of Athens, lasted four hours. A joint statement was issued after the talks. The statement was initialed by the Croatian and Yugoslav foreign ministers, Mate Granic and Milan Milutinovic. In the statement, the two presidents positively assessed the development so far of Croatian-Yugoslav relations, expressing a readiness to embark on full normalization of relations. Ministers Granic and Milutinovic will meet in Belgrade to confirm this and sign an agreement.

Readiness was also expressed to resolve without tension the issue of Prevlaka, in the spirit of the UN charter and good-neighborly relations, and to extend the mission of the Blue Helmets until such an agreement is signed. The problem must be solved by granting total security to Yugoslavia in Boka Kotorska and total security to Croatia in the Dubrovnik area.

The two sides also expressed a readiness to secure the free return of refugees and displaced persons, including a general amnesty. The protection of property belonging to their respective citizens in each other's countries was also agreed upon and readiness expressed to resolve the issue of citizens' rights with regard to pensions and social security.

From the economic point of view, support was given to the normalization of transport links and telecommunications, the promotion of trade relations and free flow of people, commodities, and capital.

Full support was also given to the peaceful reintegration of the Croatian Danubian area, while making an effort to prevent anything that could threaten this process.

After the talks, Presidents Tudjman and Milosevic had separate talks with Greek Prime Minister Simitis, briefing him on the results of their talks and thanking him for his hospitality.

Reports in Greek newspapers today say that their country is an important element in the peace process in the region, constantly seeking a peaceful settlement on the basis on its balanced foreign policy.

Balkans: Croat, Serb Presidents Ready for Normalization of Ties

LD0708173496 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1604 GMT 7 Aug 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Athens, 7 Aug (TANJUG)—Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic and Croatian President Franjo Tudjman held comprehensive talks in Athens today with regard to issues of interest aimed at promoting the peace process in the region and the normalization of relations between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia [FRY] and the Republic of Croatia.

In a joint statement issued in Athens this evening, the two presidents describe as positive the development to date of mutual relations and welcome the results reached in implementing specific agreements referring to economic relations, the linking of the infrastructure, and resolving complex humanitarian issues.

Taking into consideration the huge importance of Yugoslav-Croatian relations for the consolidation of the peace process, as well as for peace and stability in the region, the two sides express their readiness to embark on a complete normalization of relations. They stress the readiness of the FRY and the Republic of Croatia to establish and develop good relations between their citizens and peoples, to respect one another as independent and sovereign states, and, in line with the UN Charter, to work on strengthening mutual trust, and to cooperate in the promotion of peace, stability, and development in the region.

The readiness of the two sides to resolve the contentious Prevlaka question through negotiations is confirmed. The aim is to eliminate tension in this area on both sides—tensions over full security in part of the FRY in the Bay of Kotor area and in part of Croatia in the Dubrovnik area. The two sides will make efforts to resolve this important issue through negotiations in the spirit of the UN Charter and good-neighborliness. Pending an agreement on Prevlaka, the sides agree to respect the current security system set up with the help of UN monitors.

The two sides express their readiness to create the necessary conditions for the free and safe return of all refugees and displaced persons to their places of residence or to other places they might freely choose, and to facilitate the restoration of their property or make available fair compensation. In this connection, it is stated that safe return means a general amnesty.

The protection of private property belonging to their states' respective citizens and legal entities in each other's country was discussed, and it has been concluded that such property should enjoy the same protection as property belonging to nationals of the country in question. A readiness to conclude a special agreement on pensions and other work-related rights, welfare payments, and similar issues was expressed.

It is agreed that the issue of missing persons should be speedily resolved and that the two sides will immediately exchange all available information about such persons.

It is agreed that relevant departments should continue to have bilateral contacts in order to secure full normalization and an improvement in road, rail, air, and river traffic and postal links, as well as in telecommunication links between the two countries, which is of importance for the two countries and the entire region.

Special attention was paid to improving economic and commercial links in all areas, as well as cooperation in the sphere of environmental protection.

The two sides are committed to the principle of the freedom of movement of people, goods, and capital and will do everything to create the conditions to ensure this.

The two sides positively assessed the implementation of the Erdut Agreement on eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and western Srem. The need to further implement this agreement and to prevent—that is, to refrain from all acts and actions that could bring into question the full implementation of this agreement—was underscored. Support for the UN transitional administration in its efforts to secure all necessary conditions for the implementation of this agreement is given.

The two presidents express full support for the implementation of the Dayton Agreement, signed in Paris.

Special gratitude was expressed to Greek Prime Minister Konstadinos Simitis for his hospitality.

Yugoslav Federal Foreign Minister Milan Milutinovic and Mate Granic, Croatian deputy prime minister and foreign minister, took part in the talks.

It was agreed that the two ministers would meet in Belgrade this month in order to work out details and sign an agreement on the normalization of mutual relations in the spirit of the outlined approach.

Balkans: Milosevic Says Accord With Tudjman 'Big Step'

LD0708164596 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1623 GMT 7 Aug 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Athens, 7 Aug (TANJUG)—Following his talks with Croatian President Franjo Tudjman, Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic said in Athens today that today's meeting was a big step in the interest of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia [FRY] and the Republic of Croatia.

"I would first like to say that we held very constructive talks, which were certainly held in the spirit of mutually expressed responsibility for promoting Yugoslav-Croatian ties and deemed to be the most important factor for the stability of overall relations in the region," President Milosevic told TANJUG's special correspondent Zoran Jevdjovic.

"There is no need for me to interpret elements of the joint statement that has just been released, but I would like to say that I am convinced that today's meeting was a very big step in the interest of both the FRY and the Republic of Croatia because there is no doubt that an improvement in our relations means a big step not only for these two countries, but also for the whole region," President Milosevic stressed.

"I would especially like to thank Greek Prime Minister Konstandinos Simitis for the hospitality he offered for this meeting," President Milosevic said in conclusion.

Balkans: Tudjman on Normalization of Ties to Serbia

LD0708174396 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 7 Aug 96

[Statement by Croatian President Franjo Tudjman following his talks with Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic in Athens on 7 August—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] We discussed serious issues and agreed, as you can see, at the highest level, to embark seriously on the normalization of relations in the interest of resolving the existing problems, primarily the Danubian area, as far as we are concerned. But this will also influence the process of resolving problems in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Above all, this normalization of relations should serve not only the interests of the two countries at issue but also the interest of peace in the territory of the former Yugoslavia and, in fact, in all of southeastern Europe.

Albania: PD Reportedly Divided Over Relations With U.S.

AU0708194696 Tirana KOHA JONE in Albanian 7 Aug 96 p 5

[Commentary by Arban Hasani: "The United States Divides the Democratic Party?!"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The stands recently taken by senior State Department officials have almost entirely changed relations between the United States and the Democratic Party [PD]. The springtime of these relations began in February 1991, when Washington guaranteed its support for Mr. Berisha's PD, support which the then-leader of the Albanian opposition felt strongly in March of the following year. Mr. Ryerson, the then-U.S. ambassador in Tirana, participated directly in the PD's electoral campaign, in which Berisha's party won 65 percent of the parliamentary seats. Warm relations between the two sides then became the order of the day, evident not only in the reciprocal visits of senior officials, but in the United States' support for the PD's overall policy in many fields.

However, what was different about U.S.-PD relations in comparison to those with other political forces or Western governments was that they were not at party level. If the PD received support in Europe from its sister parties, the same could not be said of relations with the United States. Until 26 May, the U.S. Government, whether the Republicans or Democrats were in office, did its utmost for relations with President Berisha's administration, relations which Tirana officially called excellent. The disputed parliamentary elections, which were more strongly contested by the United States than by anybody else, created the most recent split in the PD. The relations of the PD leadership with Washington have initiated this split more than the elections.

At the very least, Prime Minister Meksi; his Defense Minister Zhulali; former Ministers Ruli, Uka, and Shehi; and Selami will not in any way be able to agree with Berisha's phrase, "violation of sovereignty," dropped after every declaration by the U.S. State Department in connection with the elections. It has been reported that this response was a matter for bitter argument in the senior offices of the PD, but was defended to the hilt by Tritan Shehu, Berisha's right-hand man. The present chairman of the ruling party won his post by a lead of only six votes over Aleksander Meksi, his opponent and at the same time his chief in the Council of Ministers.

The support of one wing of the PD for U.S. policy is very clear. Berisha's most opportune move following the open war he has declared against Washington has been to compromise by retaining in the government Meksi and Zhulali, two of the most pro-American figures in the PD. The failure of the U.S. diplomats to attend the opening session of the new parliament was accompanied by a declaration of "independence" by parliamentary speaker Arbnori, but Meksi's government passed over in silence all the reproaches of the State Department. In contrast, several combative statements over the U.S. standpoint were issued by the PD offices, the parliament, and the presidency.

This split is now clear to the United States, which, although it has not recognized Berisha's elections or Arbnori's parliament, has agreed to the plans in support of Partnership for Peace submitted by Zhulali. Immediately afterward, the Defense Ministry announced that relations with the United States are excellent. However, all this has meant that two lines diametrically opposed to traditional currents, which have generally been guided by the strength of the leadership, have appeared in the PD. For the first time, the "America file" has split the PD, dividing its leadership into clear pro- and Berisha himself.

Albania: Majko Denies Nano Intends To Create New Party

AU0708065496 Tirana KOHA JONE in Albanian 6 Aug 96 p 3

[Article by Enton Abilekaj: "Nano Has His Own Party"]

[FBIS Translated Text] "I am convinced that Nano has never sought to split the Socialist Party [PS] and still less create a new party," announced Pandeli Majko, member of the PS General Management Committee, in firmly denying the incessant accusations made recently against the imprisoned PS chairman that he will strive to create a new party if he is not elected chairman. These charges came first from the Democratic Party [PD] and subsequently from the PS offices, where Deputy Chairman Pellumbi had "discovered" Nano's famous plan.

Sabit Brokaj, deputy general secretary and member of the PS Presidium, said that this is "absurd news, spread by the PD or some weak-headed Socialist inclined to make prophecies." For Brokaj, the report can be refuted in a very few words: "Nano has his own party. He is the chairman of a large and powerful party with more than 100,000 members." Brokaj calls it madness for a party chairman to leave and to create a new party around which he would not be able to muster even a few thousand members.

However, Pellumbi's supporters are more than sure that a defeat in the congress will oblige Nano to create a new party. They have moreover tried to attach the label of "liberal-socialist" to the "party" that Nano wishes to create. Majko once again objects: "There can be no question of a new party even if Nano loses at the congress. The place that Nano occupies in the PS is not defined by his title or his seat. He symbolizes the four years of sacrifice of the Socialists in opposition." Majko is moreover certain that Nano will win at the 24 August congress, mainly because there is no figure that can match him. "There is nobody who can take Nano's place as an intellectual, even if he wished. I am sure that Nano will win at the congress." Majko yesterday rebutted all the accusations raised by the Socialist deputy chairmen who alleged that Nano's motion was an attempt to force a split. "Nano will win not as a divisive force, but as an alternative uniting the Socialists for the future," Nano's official representative in the PS said.

How then can Majko explain Pellumbi's accusation about a new party? "I have not heard about them, because no open, public statement has been made about this issue. I would in any case oppose such a thing out of duty to the truth and to the vigor of the PS," the Socialist politician replied.

Thus a new debate has begun in the PS over accusations leveled against the chairman, immediately after he had issued the appeal: "You have slung enough mud at me!" It has been reported that Nano recently mentioned Et'hem Ruka as one of the main men in whom he places his hopes for support for the reform. The confused PS organizations, in the wake of the untrue accusations against Nano, have started to display a prochairman attitude. However, according to some presidium members, the other deputy chairmen could become dangerous. Brokaj warns: "New parties are created out of the splinter groups of old parties when segments of the leadership, but never the chairman, try to take over the helm. When they cannot achieve this, these segments leave the party for various reasons and take the lead in these splinter groups."

Albania: Socialist Party's Meta: Enough of 'Old Guard'

AU0708131896 Tirana GAZETA SHQIPTARE in Albanian 7 Aug 96 p 3

[Interview with Socialist Party Deputy Chairman Ilir Meta by Rezear Xhaxhiu in Tirana on 6 August: "Meta: Let Us Free Ourselves From the Old Guard"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *"The Socialist Party [PS] must free itself from its 'ex'-es," says Ilir Meta, the party's 27-year-old deputy chairman. "Enough of the old guard. The PS needs more room for the future." Meta at the same time outlined the party's strategy for the future. Confident that the PS's membership is more forward-looking than a section of its leadership, Meta concludes that "the initiators of this scenario will turn out to be the losers in this game."*

[Xhaxhiu] At what level is the conflict within the PS taking place?

[Meta] It is taking place at levels that were not expected to favor this long-expected process of renewing the PS. More than anything else, it is taking place at a personal rather than a theoretical or political level.

[Xhaxhiu] Will this conflict be reflected in the structure of the party's hierarchy and in its parallel structures?

[Meta] I think so, because the present personal struggle of a few against the rest is not lending credibility to this process of change and renovation in the direction of the social-democratic standards that the party is already late in achieving.

[Xhaxhiu] How did personal strife arise in a party with proverbial unity?

[Meta] It appears that personal spite had been building up for a long time at the most senior levels of the party. Relations became even further embittered after victory was snatched from us on 26 May, so that a certain group could no longer contain themselves.

[Xhaxhiu] In this cockpit, was Nano's motion a stimulus for renewal, or the spark that lit the fuse?

[Meta] I would have wished Nano's proposals to have genuinely stimulated renewal rather than lighting the fuse of internecine warfare. However, the developments have been public and everybody can reach their own conclusion about the documents that have come from Bence Prison.

[Xhaxhiu] What relation does the internecine warfare bear to the conflict of ideas in the party's command staff?

[Meta] I am more aware of reciprocal accusations, sometimes direct, and sometimes through anonymous articles in the press inspired by personal passions and spite. It is now time for a political debate within the PS to finally crystallize the party as a social-democratic force.

[Xhaxhiu] Do you think this spite will be expressed in the congress hall, and which side will the membership support?

[Meta] I think that the party membership is much more forward-looking than a section of the leadership and I believe that the initiators of this scenario will turn out to be the losers in this game.

[Xhaxhiu] There have been insinuations in the daily press recently about the possible return of the 10 Socialist deputies to the parliament.

[Meta] Mr. Islami's article is a provocative diversion that attempts to cast doubt over the PS leaders or other comrades over a problem that was settled by the PS Management Committee on 26 May. We must replace this spirit of suspicion, which is typical of totalitarian parties, with the spirit of solidarity that is characteristic of social-democratic parties. We therefore still have a lot to do in this direction.

[Xhaxhiu] What specifically are the policies on which you would base a thorough renewal of the PS?

[Meta] A firm stand against the past, the Albanian Workers Party and its Central Committee. The "ex-"es should free us of the burden that links the PS with the Albanian Workers Party. Party officials must also be renewed at all levels, and the criteria of consistent work for the party and of educational and professional stature must be combined and used as a basis. Changes to the PS's economic and social program will be important, and will include new ideas for the social market economy toward which the reformed PS aspires.

[Xhaxhiu] Will the future PS also be reformed on the diplomatic front?

[Meta] This will be one of our priorities. I would single out Albania's membership in NATO and the EU, the principle of continuity in international relations, and membership in the Socialist Internationale. These things are missing from the PS's current program or are expressed evasively, even though they were decided long ago.

Albania: PS Official Calls President's Actions 'Arbitrary'

AU0608195496 Tirana ATA in English
0936 GMT 6 Aug 96

[Report by A. Frasheri]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Tirana, August 5 (ATA)—The Socialist Party [PS] does not approve the way President of Republic Sali Berisha has chosen to set up permanent Central Election Commission, which will be started with local elections of October 20, 1996.

"The way he (President) is acting, seem us arbitrary" voiced the PS disapproval its Deputy Chairman Servet Pellumbi, adding that, he calls it arbitrary because political forces should have been consulted before the appointment of permanent Central Election Commission.

Creation of a permanent Central Election Commission has been a continuous request of the PS after May 26 elections. This commission, according to them, should be made up by members of different political forces and should include even members of parties without an electorate like Ecological Party, Social Worker's Party, Right Wing Republican Party, and others, which were the PS's allies in its boycott of May 26 elections.

"These should be discussed and President alone cannot decide on them," Pellumbi said.

President of the Republic according to his competencies, on Point 19, Article 28 of Law Nr. 7,491, dated April 4, 1991 "On Main Constitutional Provisions," decreed Saturday [3 August], creation of Central Election Commission of the Republic of Albania, which will be a permanent body and will organise, monitor and control the conduct of elections in the Republic of Albania, in accordance with legal electoral provisions of the Albanian state.

"First we should agree on modalities on the round table of parties, and then should commission be decided," said Pellumbi.

Central Perm[illegible] Commission of Elections will be made up by a [illegible]airman, a vice chairman, a secretary, and 14 members. It is appointed by President of the Republic upon the proposals of the Council of Ministers and political parties.

Pellumbi said that "These issues have been discussed in no political table," referring to four recent meetings PS-PD [Democratic Party] which have discussed for two months on elections and other problems concerning them.

Albania: Court of Appeal Upholds Sentences for Ex-Communists

AU0608202496 Tirana ATA in English
1617 GMT 6 Aug 96

[Report by Atlant Frasheri]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Tirana, August 6 (ATA)—The Appeal Court today upheld the decision for three former senior officials of the communist regime in Albania, according to which the sentence for one of them was changed.

Pirro Kondi, Qirjako Mihali, and Sulejman Bushati have been accused of crimes against humanity in cooperation. The defendants, when they held the post of the PLA [Party of Labor of Albania] district first secretary, have approved the politically motivated proposals for external exile of nationals, opponents of the communist regime, proposals made by branches of the interior affairs in the districts where they had been leading.

The jury led by Lefter Jahja upheld the decision of the Tirana Court for Pirro Kondi and Qirjako Mihali and changed the sentence for Sulejman Bushati, who was granted a five year suspended sentence.

The three former senior communist officials of the PLA were accused of penal acts by the Prosecutor's Office according to a testimony by the Forum of Independent Intellectuals. It accused them of "genocide and crimes against mankind made in cooperation."

The trial in the Appeal Court was held on the basis of an appeal by the defendants. They opposed the decision by the Tirana Court which had declared them guilty and sentenced Pirro Kondi and Qirjako Mihali with 17 years in jail and Sulejman Bushati with 15 years.

Five former communist leaders, three of whom were sentenced with capital punishments in May this year, had their sentences reduced by the Appeal Court. Two former communist chiefs, sentenced with life in prison in May this year, were granted five year suspended sentences by the Appeal Court.

Six other former communist leader will be tried on August 12 for the same charge.

Albania: 4 Founders of Illegal Communist Party Put on Trial

AU3107160296 Tirana GAZETA SHQIPTARE in Albanian 31 Jul 96 p 5

[Article by Mentor Kikia: "Albanian Communists Sought Help From Cuba"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Tirana—The Albanian Communists sought help from Fidel Castro. Several telegrams they sent to the Cuban Embassy in Rome, seeking ties with the Cuban Communist Party, were made public for the first time at the start of their trial yesterday. Four founders of the Communist Party stood in the dock, accused of "having prepared to seize power by force, to overthrow democracy, and to reestablish the dictatorship of the proletariat." Procurator Kadri Skeraj described all the illegal activity of the Communist Party, its organization, its district branches, its international relations, and its ties with Cuba and with European communist parties, etc. The defendants admitted that they had formed the party, not to overthrow the state, but to complete the Albanian political spectrum.

Only six years after political pluralism was first allowed, a political party has been placed in the dock. The proceedings, chaired by Gjergj Pojani, started with a debate over the request of three of the defendants for a summary trial, because, having read the charges, they were not in agreement with some of them and rejected them. The court refused this demand and began its questioning. The lawyers asked for the case of Meta to be heard separately from the others, because they belonged to different factions. Meta is an adherent of Hysni Milloshi, while Mosko is a supporter of Razi Brahimi.

Timoshenko Pegmezi, age 54; Tare Isufi, age 73; and Kristaq Mosko, age 44, were the four founding members of the party based on new communist ideas, who were active for several years before being brought before the courts. In July 1992, the parliament had banned communist parties, dissolving Milloshi's party. However, since this time, according to investigations made public yesterday, individual communist cells has resumed their activities. In 1995, they united with the aim of creating a real party. The National Intelligence Service was able to lay its hands on all their documentation and on information about their activities. According to the documents, the most powerful branches were in Tirana, Elbasan, and Vlore, while activities had also spread to the districts of Gramsh and Lezhe. They had created a Management Committee for the party and the relevant sections. A great deal of material about their activities was seized during searches. Some telegrams testified to their efforts to make ties with Castro's Communist Party through the Cuban Embassy in Rome and with other Marxist-Leninist parties.

Searches had led to the discovery of minutes of meetings and plans. In December 1995, after an urgent and secret meeting, they had decided to summon a national conference as soon as possible, but did not succeed because they were arrested a few weeks later.

Bulgaria: Zhelev Rejects National Emblem, Flag Act

AU0608083096 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 0800 GMT 6 Aug 96

[FBIS Translated Text] By signing Decree No. 277, President Zhelyu Zhelev has returned to the National Assembly for reconsideration the Law on the National Emblem and Flag.

In his arguments in support of his decision, the head of state states that for six years, instead of seeking consensus on the issue of the national emblem, the problem has been increasingly politicized and has become an element of division, promoting confrontation in society. The Bulgarian president points out that one cannot regard the national emblem of the Republic of Bulgaria as a party badge, that it is one of the symbols of statehood that reflects the (?heart), continuity, and historical existence of our nation. By passing the Law on the National Emblem and Flag on 25 July, the parliament majority in the 37th National Assembly imposed by force a party decision on which consensus does not exist even in the party concerned, President Zhelev states in the arguments appended to his decree that returns the act to parliament for further debate.

Bulgaria: No Approval From Zhelev for Land Act Amendments

AU0708105096 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 0900 GMT 7 Aug 96

[Report by Silviya Velikova]

[FBIS Translated Text] President Zhelev has returned to parliament for further debate the Law on Amendments and Additions to the Farm Land Ownership and Use Act, which the National Assembly passed on 23 July. According to the head of state, the law represents yet another attempt to encroach upon the rights of owners of farm land and to delay the return of the land to its owners. In his arguments, President Zhelev states that some of the passages in the law allow an extremely broad and arbitrary interpretation, while others are unclear, disputable, or contravene the Constitution and laws already adopted.

Bulgaria: General Staff Chief on Use of Term 'Coup'

AU0708112896 Sofia STANDART NEWS in Bulgarian 7 Aug 96 p 3

[Report by Veselina Sedlarska from Sliven]

[FBIS Translated Text] "As long as I remain chief of the General Staff, the army will perform its duties in conformance with the Defense and Armed Forces Act and will not be drawn into carrying out assignments connected with domestic politics," Colonel General Tsvetan Totomirov, chief of the Bulgarian Army General Staff, told STANDART NEWS. He admitted that he is concerned and irritated by the introduction into use of the term "coup." Military men do not mention this word, because they know its meaning and the consequences, the general commented.

According to Gen. Totomirov, this word is used lightly by people who do not take into consideration that the problems that a coup creates are bigger and more dangerous that the ones that it is supposed to solve.

Gen. Totomirov is reportedly so unworried by the situation that he is planning to take his annual leave in September when, according to politicians' predictions, unrest is expected in the country.

Lieutenant General Ginyo Tonev, commander of the Ground Forces, is also of the opinion that one should not speculate with the military.

Frightened by rumors of plans to overthrow the government by force, last month Prime Minister Zhan Videnov called a meeting of the top commanders at the Charalitsa military rest center. He is reported to have asked the generals if they would support him in the event of a coup.

Gen. Totomirov also mentioned forthcoming changes in the army's top command staff. They are now being discussed, and are connected with the annual postings, the army reform, and the new intake of graduates from military academies at home and abroad. Over 70 Bulgarian officers are studying abroad. No staff shortages are envisioned in the army, Gen. Totomirov said.

The chief of General Staff visited the firing range at Novo Selo, in the Balkan Range near Kotel, to observe the final stage of the tactical exercise conducted by the 12th Motorized Rifle Regiment from Elkhovo. Yesterday, the regiment's First Battalion hit 416 targets with all types of weapons, artillery, aircraft, and mortars. Observers from Rumania, Turkey, Greece, and Belgium also attended the exercise.

Bulgaria: Wave of Migration to Turkey Reportedly Continues

AU0608103696 Sofia 24 CHASA in Bulgarian 6 Aug 96 p 3

[Article by Ilkhan Anday: "Erbakan Reportedly Does Not Want Elderly Migrants"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The new Turkish Government led by Necmettin Erbakan tolerates the migration of young people from Bulgaria. 24 CHASA learned this from sources acquainted with the tendencies in issuing visas at the Turkish consulates in Burgas, Plovdiv, and Sofia. In all three cities, the Turkish diplomats are reported to have refused without explanation to grant visas to elderly and middle-aged people.

The coalition government of the Welfare Party and the True Path Party has not yet made any statement on the serious problems connected with the seven-year-long wave of migration from Bulgaria. However, prior to the elections Erbakan and his people promised to help their compatriots only if they stay where they are.

On 2 August more than 2,000 people assembled outside the Turkish Consulate General in Plovdiv. Only 150 of their number will receive this week 15-day tourist visas valid for one month. This means that on average every municipality in the Kurdzhali region receives 15-20 visas per week.

"It is clear to everyone that these people are travelers with one-way tickets, but the Turks rarely grant visas to people over 40 years old," 44-year-old Seven Osman from Dzhebel explained.

The Turkish Consulate General in Plovdiv accepts passports once a week and returns them stamped with tourist visas the following week. A single visa to Turkey now costs 9,800 leva. A wave of migration is also said to exist in Burgas, but the situation in Sofia is somewhat more settled.

According to unofficial figures, since the last elections some 12,000 to 15,000 people have migrated to Turkey from the seven municipalities in the Kurdzhali region. About the same number are reported to have registered addresses in the interior of Turkey, where they work on construction sites and in agriculture.

Czech Republic: Daily on Zieleniec Appeal for ODS Diversity

AU0808104396 Prague LIDOVE NOVINY in Czech 7 Aug 96 p 8

[Commentary by Bohumil Pecinka: "Did the ODS Miss the Train?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] He surprised the majority of people and perhaps himself most. In an interview for MLADA FRONTA DNES on Monday [5 August], Josef Zieleniec, foreign minister and deputy chairman of the Civic Democratic Party [ODS], spoke unusually critically about the situation within the party that he cofounded five years ago. Is this the famous signal to start a revolution?

Let us begin with a short quotation: "The Civic Democratic Party does not yet lead a normal party life.... The existence of several currents of ideas competing for support before a convention is typical for West European political parties. On the Czech political scene, on the contrary, the idea of parties as homogeneous blocks is dominant, and any deviation is considered treason. This problem has an even more subtle dimension in the ODS. The emergence of any platform must begin with the question: What stand should be assumed with respect to Vaclav Klaus?... A much more important issue for the ODS is the obfuscated mechanism for the generation and implementation of politics.... The main topic of the coming months will be the long-term strategy of the ODS." Josef Zieleniec did not say this, though he could endorse it at any time. We quoted from an analysis entitled "The ODS at the Crossroads" (LIDOVE NOVINY, 6 September 1994), which really did not require much imagination to write. Even two years ago, any even slightly perceptive political observer could note that the atmosphere at the ODS reminds one of progressive sclerosis.

The tendency toward inertia in the party structure has been obvious since the fall of 1992. At the ODS congress then, Chairman Klaus tactically blocked the rise of his greatest rival, Jan Strasky, and Petr Cermak became the acting deputy chairman. A hedonist and successful sponsor-hunter, Cermak became almost a slave to Klaus, and co-introduced the current unbearable practice in ODS politics of having de facto three power centers (Executive Council, Deputies' Club, and Political Board), while the communication between them is poor, and the mechanism for forming political will is obfuscated. Next to this, as if in parallel, there is the ODS main office, which has long reminded one of the legendary Central Committee, where a struggle takes place for a stake in the sponsor booty instead of over political intrigues. This political style continued under Libor Novak Jr. The party stopped in the middle of the road: The party apparatus was not completed, and the unwritten habits that provided feedback did not work.

The indefatigable Vaclav Klaus, for whom no jurisdiction was too minor to take over, was best able to move in this chaotic mess. He acquired the position of a man who appears at a time of difficulties as a deus ex machina and solves the impasse, with the same bravura with which he once divided the state and pushed through the radical reform. In his person alone was the binding tie in the nonfunctional leadership mechanism in the ODS. While Klaus more or less successfully applied systemic approaches in society, the ODS represented more of an antisystem, which stood and fell with a single person. A similar practice is not an exception in other Czech parties, either, and they lack, in addition, the fundamental democratic principles (primaries, infrequent assemblies, expulsions, and so forth). There is just one condition necessary to continue in this style, and that is political success. However, the 1996 elections took away Prime Minister Klaus's carte blanche for free political action and in some ways also changed the situation within the ODS. Let us emphasize "in some ways" because the nine postelectoral weeks have demonstrated that the ODS leadership intends to continue its trend up to now, with some minor corrections.

The interview with Deputy Chairman Zieleniec penetrates into this slightly uneasy atmosphere of satisfaction like an arrow. The very method he chose indicates something about the situation within the ODS. The foreign minister attempts to motivate his fellow party members to action (creation of currents of ideas, clear leadership structure) by means of the media. He does not express, however, as one would expect, the opinion of a specific political group that intends to implement the reform in the ODS. Zieleniec again acts not like a politician but rather like the legendary Father Joe, who is trying to incite something positive from above. Politics is not diplomacy, however, and even the best statement cannot substitute for a political deed. It seems that Zieleniec is only running out of patience.

In his replies, Zieleniec appeals between the lines: Form different currents or the party will wither away. Nevertheless, he made a similar appeal in the fall of 1993 (let us create politics for every day) and in the fall of 1994 (let us prepare a long-term political program), and all this with only marginal effect. This not very political stand reminds one of a homeroom teacher who appeals to high school students to study because the senior graduation is just six months away. After all these years, one would expect from politician Zieleniec a declaration of this type: I formed a certain current of ideas that is supported by such and such regional organizations and has the following position in the Deputies' Club. And, most important, it intends to implement these changes.

We wrote that Josef Zieleniec is attempting not to attract the existing movement within the ODS but, rather, to stir up something. For this reason, the interview for MLADA FRONTA DNES may be the most important milestone in the history of the party, as well as just another typically Zileniec-like appeal, which after a few weeks no one will remember in the pragmatism of daily life.

Czech Republic: Reaction to Zieleniec Comments Reported

AU0808092896 Prague MLADA FRONTA DNES in Czech 7 Aug 96 p 1

[Article by "pan": "Zieleniec Incited a Surge of Agreement Within the ODS"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Prague—Many representatives of the Civic Democratic Party [ODS] are convinced that ideational currents should emerge within the strongest political party in the country. These demands were incited by the recent statement by ODS Deputy Chairman Josef Zieleniec, who said in an interview for MLADA FRONTA DNES that the ODS should stop talking in a single voice. "It is time to say that a large party that hopes to address most citizens does not have to have a uniform opinion on everything," Zieleniec said.

Another ODS deputy chairman, Ivan Pilip, supported Zileniec's view yesterday. "It was desirable before the elections for the party to stand united. Now, if it wants to be strong, it is necessary to formulate divergent views more clearly," he said.

Also, according to some representatives of the regional ODS associations, the time is ripe to change the system within the party. Some, for the first time, accused the leadership of insufficient communication with the regions.

Party Chairman Vaclav Klaus has not yet commented on Zieleniec's views, although, according to his secretariat, the daily press is sent daily to the location where he is spending his vacation.

Czech Republic: ODS Supports Call for More Debate in Party

AU0808102896 Prague MLADA FRONTA DNES in Czech 7 Aug 96 p 2

[Article by "pan, CTK": "A Lack of Discussion Within the ODS Is Felt by Both the Leadership and the People in the Regions"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Prague—Yesterday, representatives of the Civic Democratic Party [ODS], from regional managers through parliament deputies to leadership members, criticized the lack of internal communication in the party. They supported the demand of ODS Deputy Chairman Josef Zieleniec, who recently called for the creation of ideational currents within the party.

"In the political discussion within the party, I miss a joint reflection on the problems," Deputy Marek Benda said. He used bill drafting as an example, which, according to him, takes place at the ministries and is dealt with by experts. "We do not consult the new laws within the party. That would be good even if a mistake is made, is discussed, and can be avoided next time," he said. The ODS, according to Benda, has only dealt with topical issues so far, and it should begin also with the long-term view, which is missing at present. "I believe it is right for new ideational currents to emerge within the ODS, but I am not talking about factions," he added.

Zieleniec attacked the idea of a party talking always with a single voice. "I am convinced that the ODS politics can no longer be formulated from above but should grow out of plurality and political disputes at all levels," he said. Howver, he expressed the opinion that, if the Civic Democratic Party wants to continue to play the decisive role on the political scene, it must manage to address at least 40 percent of the voters. Otherwise, according to him, it may be in danger of decline. [passage omitted]

Slovakia: Foreign Ministry Statement on NATO Enlargement

AU0708134096 Bratislava SME in Slovak 7 Aug 96 p 4

["Extract" of statement issued by the Slovak Foreign Ministry on the U.S. bill on NATO enlargement: "The Steps Taken So Far by the Slovak Republic in the Process of NATO Affiliation"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Slovak Republic was one of the first countries to join the Partnership for Peace [PFP] program. Three individual Partnership programs between the Slovak Republic and NATO have been drawn up since that time. The Slovak Republic participates in and organizes military exercises for NATO member countries and the countries incorporated into PFP. It plays an active part in the various NATO programs, workshops, and other activities. The Slovak Republic was the first Partnership country to submit to NATO bodies (18 March 1996) an individual discussion document, which launched the phase of intensive consultations with NATO. Two individual and two collective meetings of experts from the Slovak Republic and NATO and the other Partnership countries have taken place within the framework of this dialogue.

The Slovak Republic is situated in the geographic center of Europe, in a region of transforming states. The countries of Central Europe form a single geopolitical unit that is characterized by a comparable state of economic and political transformation, the population's standard of living, and an acknowledgment of common values. It is also linked by its cultural similitude, common history, and appurtenance to Western European culture. These specific features are reflected in the Slovak Republic's foreign political orientation. One of the main components of this is integration into NATO.

The Foreign Ministry is convinced that this region has to be viewed as a whole and that the approach to it must be indiscriminate. The possible omission or suspension of the Slovak Republic from the integration process could act against the main jointly shared objective of the Slovak Republic and the United States, which is improving security in this region. The domestic legal code is being gradually adapted to the legislative standards of the NATO member countries. The Slovak Republic was the first country from Central and Eastern Europe to ratify the agreement on the status of non-PFP members, SOFA [Status of Forces Agreement], which regulates the stay of NATO troops on our territory. In 1995, a comprehensive program, "The Slovak Republic's Preparation for Membership in NATO," was drawn up. In it, the foreign political, military, legislative, and financial aspects of the Slovak Republic's membership in NATO are defined. Slovak diplomats in Brussels are in constant contact with NATO representatives. NATO Secretary General Javier Solana visited the Slovak Republic this spring. He emphasized several times during his visit that no one is excluded in advance from membership in NATO and that the specific modalities for enlarging the Alliance will be decided upon after the individual consultations with the partner countries of Central and Eastern Europe are assessed at the end of this or beginning of next year.

Slovakia: Kukan Criticizes Statement on U.S. NATO Bill

AU0708142896 Bratislava SME in Slovak 7 Aug 96 p 2

[Article by "(sp)": "E. Kukan: The Statement on the Vote in Congress Is a Sign That the MZV Is Not Looking at the Issue Properly"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Bratislava—According to former Foreign Minister E. Kukan (DU [Democratic Union]), the U.S. Congress has enough information on what is happening in Slovakia in connection with its decision to approve a bill on facilitating NATO enlargement. According to the wording of this bill, the countries best prepared for admission into NATO—the Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary, and Slovenia—will receive financial assistance. The bill, however, does not mention the Slovak Republic. "The decision made by the U.S. Congress cannot be assessed as a disappointment or a lack of understanding for what we have achieved in Slovakia. We have received many visits from senior U.S. officials who have said that the Slovak Republic is developing in the right direction in certain spheres. Nevertheless, they have referred to problems in the sphere of democracy," emphasized E. Kukan in reaction to the statement issued by the Foreign Ministry (MZV) in which it expressed its disappointment at the lack of understanding for the Slovak Republic's integrative and transformation endeavors. According to E. Kukan, this is more an attempt by the MZV to cover up the shortcomings in the Slovak Republic at any price. In reply to a question on what he thinks of the passage in the MZV's statement in which it says, among other things, that the ministry believes that the planned talks by Slovak officials in the United States will be answered on the U.S. side by the Slovak Republic's inclusion in the group of countries best prepared for membership in the alliance, E. Kukan said: "This is an expeditious verbal conjuring trick that is a sign that the MZV is not looking at this issue properly. Detailed talks were also held with the U.S. Administration in the past. The MZV state secretary, as he himself has said, eventually had an opportunity to talk with several U.S. officials. To claim that the talks between U.S. and Slovak officials will be answered by our inclusion in the first group of countries is very flippant."

Slovakia: 'Hypocritical' NATO Policy Viewed

AU0708150796 Bratislava SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA in Slovak 7 Aug 96 p 1

[Commentary by Viera Urbanova in the "Public Issue" editorial column]

[FBIS Translated Text] The law on facilitating NATO enlargement approved by the U.S. Congress was grist to the mill for the opposition. The indefatigable opponents of Meciar are adapting Washington's decision to their own political agenda and strategy. They are blaming the current ruling team for the Slovak Republic's noninclusion among the states that will receive $60 million in aid from the United States to ease their way into the Alliance. The level of democracy in our country is being given an airing again, the ruling coalition's "sins" are being embellished again, and those who do not want Slovakia to lose its politicoeconomic independence by dancing to the tune of the Western powers are being ridiculed. Politicians come to us from the West to criticize or supervise the state of public issues; they advise us on how to establish a solid democratic society. This is regardless of the fact that, thanks to these powers, we ended up in a tight communist embrace after World War II and, whereby the decades of the former regime cannot be forgotten from one day to the next, not everything being presented by the Western emissaries is in order.

Not surprisingly, they want a model democracy from our young state immediately and at once, but they circumvent the transgressions among their own ranks in silence or, at the most, in lukewarm commentaries (it is enough to recall Turkey's attitude toward the Kurds or the recent hunger strike in an Istanbul prison where the prisoners were treated worse than in a concentration camp or the freeing of the war criminal Priebke in Italy...). It is also obvious from this hypocritical policy that, in the enlargement of NATO and the EU to include the new "faces" from the Central European region, the level of maturity of the individual countries is not playing the main role; this goes to the power-wielding strategy of the global powers. Everything else is just a big umbrella under which the sum and substance of current global policy can be sheltered according to need.

And, certain Slovak opposition politicians are helping to hold the handle of this umbrella.

Slovakia: NATO Entry 'Pseudostrategists' Criticized

AU0808100096 Bratislava SME in Slovak 7 Aug 96 p 4

[Commentary by Ivan Horsky: "Only When Our Shoes Leak..."]

[FBIS Translated Text] Official Bratislava is behaving like a rejected old harlot in connection with Slovakia's noninclusion on the list of countries that will receive direct financial assistance from the United States for their incorporation into NATO. In the official statement released by the Foreign Ministry in response to this, however, apart from an account of everything the coalition government has done in favor of our admission into the Alliance, not one word is said about how it intends to deal with the issues that have resulted in Slovakia being struck off the list of the hottest candidates.

At the same time, for at least 12 months there have been more than enough warning signals that it could end this way. Unofficial circles in the United States and other NATO countries implied last year that V. Meciar and Co. should not rely on and bargain with Slovakia's important geostrategic position in the middle of Europe. At that time, it was suggested quietly that if Slovakia is not willing to comply with the stipulated conditions, other options would be sought.

But unfortunately our amateur politicians did not take these warnings seriously, and so what happened, happened—Congress adopted the aforementioned bill. Slovakia's replacement by Slovenia is not a consequence of a linguistic error or any other mistake, but is a consequence of the conduct of the ruling coalition, especially on the domestic political scene where the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS] in particular is attempting to reinforce itself in concrete in a not exactly exemplary democratic manner.

So the hazardous game that the strongest element of the coalition, the HZDS, kicked off in the interest of maintaining power at any price has borne its fruit. It is, however, to say the least half rotten, and there is a risk of its utter political putrefaction. If the Slovak pseudostrategists had thought that they could blackmail NATO with the geopolitical position of our small state, they were profoundly mistaken. Perhaps by their activity they were trying to prevent the admission of Slovakia and Hungary. They were proceeding from the hypothesis that the Alliance would not accept two squabbling cocks, or that without a geographic link across Slovakia, NATO would not consider admitting Hungary without Slovakia.

It has turned out, however, that this seemingly insoluble issue has been overcome because of the conflict in the former Yugoslavia, even in view of Italian resistance to Slovenia's Euro-Atlantic aspirations. From the point of view of the higher political principle, so to speak. This is also despite the fact that the situation at the top of the power-wielding pyramid in Ljubljana is not—viewed purely from a moral-political perspective—stable. But, to be fair, it has to be said that these are more manifestations of personal rivalry than rivalry in values. In Slovakia, there is an explosive mixture of both.

So, under the pressure of events, the government has decided to increase the diplomatic activity oriented toward the other side of the Atlantic. At the same time, however, certain circles are prattling that the reason for all of this is the ill-wishing opposition, the president, and most recently the lack of lobbying in the U.S. Congress. If we take the last reason into consideration, then this is only the fault of a government that has not fully appreciated this aspect of shaping political decisions on the banks of the Potomac.

This admittedly costs something, but it always pays off. Our people, however, as has long been the rule in Slovakia, prefer to pinch and scrape in the spirit of "A penny saved is a penny earned." They start to act only when they get themselves into a real predicament; not only when their shoes are leaking, but when the wind is quite literally taking the roof from over their heads, or the water is washing away the ground beneath their feet.

Slovakia: Russia Asked for Help in Freeing Kidnapped Slovak

LD0708195396 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 1600 GMT 7 Aug 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The Slovak Republic today officially asked the Russian government for help in freeing Slovak citizen Stefan Hajdin, kidnapped in Groznyy on 29 July. In this connection, our Moscow correspondent Maria Mikusova has asked Roman Paldan, extraordinary and plenipotentiary ambassador of the Slovak Republic to the Russian Federation, for more detailed information. [passage omitted]

[begin recording] [Mikusova] Ambassador, you asked Oleg Lobov, first deputy prime minister of the Russian Federation, to meet you today. Why?

[Paldan] The meeting was required by a considerable worsening of the situation in Chechnya yesterday—fighting has been renewed. Since we know that we have several Slovak employees there—even though they work for a Czech firm— and that one of them was kidnapped and has been missing for over a week now, I have asked the first deputy prime minister, Oleg Lobov, who is also the chairman of a government commission dealing with Chechnya, to meet me.

[Mikusova] Has he promised to take any specific steps?

[Paldan] Oleg Lobov told me that, unfortunately, there is no new information available. He again confirmed that all the necessary steps at the highest level have been taken to ensure a speedy return of the kidnap victim Stefan Hajdin.

Oleg Lobov also said that so far no information has been obtained about any demands on the part of the Chechen side. It was also confirmed that the OSCE representative in Groznyy will be asked for help in solving this case.

[Mikusova] After the secretariat of the Russian first deputy prime minister, Oleg Lobov, gave a statement on your meeting to INTERFAX, the agency wrote that Stefan Hajdin had been kidnapped by Chechen separatists. Has this report been confirmed?

[Paldan] It is not yet known who kidnapped Stefan Hajdin.

[Mikusova] INTERFAX also said that you assessed future prospects for the development of military and technical cooperation between the Russian Federation and Slovakia, and added that the preparation of an agreement is nearing conclusion. Could you explain this in view of Slovakia's stated interest in joining NATO?

[Paldan] In effect, we discussed the current state of affairs as far as the preparation of these agreements is concerned. The agreements have been under preparation for some time now. The last time they were discussed was on 25 and 26 June during the visit by Minister Ducky to Moscow. [passage omitted]

I must say that Oleg Lobov is now the first deputy prime minister and his responsibilities also include the military and industrial complex.

[Mikusova] Could one say that this is the first sign of Russia's interest in somehow making us dependent in this area?

[Paldan] Not at all. As far as this agreement is concerned, I would like to underline twice the word technical in this cooperation. [end recording]

Hungary: Finance Official Forecasts 'Modest Economic Growth'

LD0808111396 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 0445 GMT 8 Aug 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] It is entirely natural that the financial administration and experts from opposition parties are continuously debating data on the state of the economy. Former Finance Minister Ivan Szabo, who is also chairman of the opposition Hungarian Democratic People's Party [MDNP], said in a radio interview this week that he does not consider the current economic trends encouraging.

Now it is the turn of the Finance Ministry's State Secretary Tibor Draskovics to assess the state of the economy as promising, contrary to opposition views. Dora Adorjan has put questions to Tibor Draskovics:

[Begin recording] [Adorjan] According to Szabo, the rate of inflation is expected to be well above 20 percent, investments have fallen by at least nine percent over the first six months of the year, the volume of sales is way above the volume of production, and domestic demand has fallen by six percent. [passage omitted] How exact are these figures?

[Draskovics] The main aims of economic policy related to internal and external equilibrium seem to have been met so far and are very likely to be met for the entire year. This is extremely important, because the entire economic policy is based on the understanding that the target equilibrium—which has to be significantly different from the state of the economy at the end of 1995—is the basis for the start of economic growth. [passage omitted] It can also be seen that economic growth will certainly be modest.

[Adorjan] Is one percent growth a realistic forecast?

[Draskovics] At the moment, we cannot safely say that growth will be one or 1.5 or 1.7 percent. We have to say that there will be a modest economic growth, following the economic policy change we had to carry out last year. It was clear that several factors of economic growth—first of all I mean domestic demand—had to be deliberately restricted by economic policy. There is a need for an adjustment period, during which the economy realizes that only exports and investments can be the driving forces of growth. We think—and this is in line with our original plans—that the end of 1995 and the beginning of 1996 was the lowest point and since then indices show a certain improvement. [passage omitted]

It can also be seen that the rate of inflation we forecast for 1996 is not likely to be kept for the full year. However, we think that the aim of keeping the December 1996-December 1995 price index at around 20 percent can still be achieved. And what is very promising is that the monthly rate of inflation has continuously been improving. [passage omitted]

Company profits have been rising at an unbelievable rate, naturally with significant differences.

[Adorjan] If I am correct, you actually confirm the figures mentioned by Ivan Szabo and the only difference lies in the conclusions you draw from them. [passage omitted] Am I right?

[Draskovics] The way we look at the situation is that the tragedy looming as a result of a breakdown in the equilibrium in 1993-94 had to be avoided at any cost. [passage omitted]

We think we are over the worst now. However, we cannot say that dynamic growth has started. The conditions for this have been created for the most part. Economic growth is expected to start, perhaps not tomorrow, but during the second half of the year. [passage omitted]

Hungary: Official Views Reasons for Loss of Eastern Markets

AU0708085896 Budapest UJ MAGYARORSZAG in Hungarian 6 Aug 96 p 6

[Correspondent's report on interview with Robert Kassai, deputy chairman of the National Federation of Trade Organizations, in charge of international economic relations; place and date not given: "Only Export Financing Can Help"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Robert Kassai, the former advisor to the previous cabinet's minister of foreign economic relations, evaluated the various rumors about the loss of Eastern markets as a direct witness of the events. He said that, at the time of the CEMA [Council for Mutual Economic Assistance], the Soviet Union was Hungary's major foreign economic trade partner, together with the various Soviet republics. Before the change in the regime, in 1988 and 1989, 70 percent of Hungarian exports, worth some $6 billion and $4.2 billion, went to the Soviet market. However, restructuring took place almost simultaneously in Hungary and the former Soviet Union and, as a result, foreign trade conditions in this region have changed. Robert Kassai mentioned the fact that the Hungarian exports to the former Soviet Union were strongly subsidized before the change in the regime. The moment a trainload of goods left our aastern borders, the bill was paid up by the Hungarian banks to the exporters, irrespective of when the country itself saw any payment coming from the Eastern buyer. The end of this advantageous situation affected the Hungarian enterprises painfully, because the Russian firms struggling with crisis frequently delayed payments in the direct trade. Changing from ruble accounting to dollar accounting also made our foreign trade relations more difficult. On the one hand, this made the Hungarian exports more expensive; on the other hand, it made the partner countries' firms face serious problems.

According to Robert Kassai, nevertheless, this was not the main reason behind the drop in our foreign trade relations; instead, the main reason was the considerable change in the structure of our foreign trade. Large state enterprises closed down or were reorganized in both Hungary and Russia. Before the change in the regime, 400 enterprises organized all Hungarian foreign trade through its well-developed channels. In the course of economic restructuring, this task was taken over by some 70,000 firms that obtained export-import licenses. Robert Kassai added that the Hungarian economy went through an important restructuring. In the course of this restructuring and despite the firm opposition of the former Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations, the previous government eliminated the credit system that facilitated the prefinancing of exports. The strict bankruptcy law also led to contradictions, and this destroyed 25 percent of the Hungarian export base. In the current situation, there are still some 30,000 bankruptcy and 5,000 elimination procedures under way.

All in all, the drop in our foreign trade relations with the Eastern markets was caused by the insolvency of Russia and of the other post-Soviet states, as well as by the problems of shifting to market economy in Hungary. However, the Hungarian exports worth $4.2 billion did not disappear without a trace, because the former foreign trade ministry succeeded in redirecting 70 percent of these goods to the markets of industrially developed OECD countries. Some 20 percent of these goods appeared as Western goods on the CIS markets, by means of various Western payment arrangements, so Hungarian goods did not disappear from the markets of the former Soviet Union. Robert Kassai rejected the accusations of deliberately destroying the trade relations with Russia. He said that he had participated in several meetings of the delegation of the former Hungarian foreign trade ministry, but sending Hungarian goods to Russian markets is more a matter of export financing, rather than a mere desire. Robert Kassai mentioned his talks in Moscow in November 1990 in which the Russian deputy prime minister promised development zones, export-financing credit systems, and the creation of a circle of hundreds of thousands of entrepreneurs. For example, the aforementioned 20 percent of Hungarian goods made it back to the Soviet markets because the German insurance firm Hermes was able to provide credit guarantees for its firms, something that we have never been able to provide.

According to Robert Kassai, the government promises to regain the Eastern markets have unfortunately failed to materialize in the past two years. Statistics show that the annual Hungarian exports to CIS countries make up $2 billion, or barely half of our former exports. The Russian debt stood at $1.7 billion. To counterbalance the Russian debt, the former foreign trade minister signed an agreement on arms deliveries worth $800 million in 1992, but the fate of the remaining $900 million is still unsettled. According to Robert Kassai, the present government should accept the Russian side's metro construction offer, because there are not even faint chances of balancing the Russian debts in cash.

Robert Kassai sees institutional export financing as the only realistic chance of regaining the Eastern markets. However, in the course of the two years of activity of the present government, the 2.9 percent growth in GDP measured in 1994 dropped to 1.5 percent in 1995 as a result of the restrictions of the Bokros package. It is characteristic of the state of our economy today that the enterprises have used up their amortization and have failed to carry out their technological development, so their competitiveness has dropped as a whole. The Hungarian economy has bled to death, because the Bokros package restrictions aimed at balancing the economy reduced economic performance by 400 billion forints. The lack of financial means facilitating Hungarian exports to the West and East explains the fact that, with the exception of Poland, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia, our entire foreign trade with the East has declined. Under such circumstances, as long as the Hungarian enterprises lack the means to ensure a lasting presence on the Eastern markets, there are no chances of regaining these markets.

Robert Kassai said that one should nevertheless admit that, realizing the danger, certain steps have already been made, like the establishment of Hitelgarancia Ltd or Eximbank. We are racing against time, and it is still questionable who will win—Robert Kassai said in conclusion.

Hungary: Media Boards Object to Government Measures

AU0708123696 Budapest MAGYAR NEMZET in Hungarian 6 Aug 96 pp 1, 3

[Article by "locsei": "The Independence of the Public Media Is at Stake—The Boards of Trustees Are Worried"]

[FBIS Translated Text] At their joint meeting on 5 August, the executive committees of the boards of trustees of Hungarian Radio, Hungarian Television, and the Hungarian Television Public Foundation expressed their attitudes toward the government's decision published on 24 July.

The three executive committees consider unacceptable the government decision's stipulations, which would effectively eliminate budget support for program broadcasting costs, make the government collect subscription fees, and lift advertising and sponsorship limitations. They are also concerned about the government's intention to place the media bodies' economic management under its supervision. As the statement from the joint session explains, these measures would seriously endanger the implementation of the media law and the independence of public service radio and the two public service television stations. The executive committees of the boards of trustees expect everyone who has obligations according to the law to guarantee that the conditions exist for the public media to fulfill their mission.

Following their statement, the executive committees told journalists that not taking on the payment of the broadcasting fee (some 6 billion forints) as promised in the media law makes it doubtful whether Hungarian Television, Duna Television, and Hungarian Radio can perform their public service duties. This sort of measure would force the public media to function as commercial channels while still performing public service tasks and to make concessions in their program policies. It is also doubtful whether the commercial channels on offer can be sold alongside a Hungarian television, which survives from advertising, the executive committee members explained on 5 August.

Members of the executive committees—Gabor Gyorgy, Peter Szente, and Mihaly Galik—told journalists that no one had asked their committees before the government decision was made. Although the government decision raises financial rather than political issues, the effects are of political importance. They place the democratic transformation of the public media in question and make it impossible for the public service sphere to function or the commercial sphere to be established. The 24 July government decision is the beginning of a campaign, the members of the media supervisory bodies said. Placing the independent media under government supervision must be criticized and the process prevented by all means.

B-H: Federation President Interviewed on Mostar Agreement

LD0708190496 Mostar Croatian Radio Herceg-Bosna in Serbo-Croatian 1600 GMT 7 Aug 96

[Interview with Kresimir Zubak, president of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation, by Milan Vego on 7 August; place not given—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Vego] Mr. President, I would like to ask you, first of all, to comment on the Mostar agreement which was reached yesterday.

[Zubak] The position advocated by the [Bosnian] Croat people and by me, as their representative in the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation, is quite clear. We continue to repeat what we said earlier, that this solution concerning the constitutional-legal and political organization of Mostar, as defined by the Dayton and other peace agreements, is in keeping with the other solutions advocated by the Croat people, despite tendencies and aspirations on the part of our political partners and the authorized representatives of the international community, more specifically, the European Union administration in Mostar.

We wanted to organize Mostar as a city community of two or more municipalities. This solution was accepted. The Croat side had the least reasons to obstruct the process of establishing new city authorities. We are interested in it because it is the political option we have always advocated. We are particularly interested in the establishment of municipalities with a majority Croat population, in the territory of the former single municipality of Mostar.

On the other hand, we could not overlook the fact that certain provisions of the law on elections were violated in the process of voting. We insisted that competent bodies check the law on elections. The city election commission shared our view, but the decision of the commission, in my opinion, was annulled in an illegal way.

Even after this the Croats were prepared to accept a transitional solution which would acknowledge some of the election results and also the fact that results were disputed in one polling station. After a long discussion, a solution agreeable to all three sides was adopted, i.e., to the federal, Muslim-Bosniak side, the Croat side, and the European administration in Mostar which, I think, is very interested in all this. It is therefore one of the sides in the Mostar crisis.

[Vego] How do you comment on the decision by the Bosnia-Herzegovina Supreme Court in connection with the appeal submitted to the Supreme Court of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation?

[Zubak] This is just one in a series of events in connection with Mostar which shows that Croats were under various forms of pressure to accept the results of the Mostar elections. The decision was made by an incompetent body and we are not legally bound by the decisions reached by the Supreme Court of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The appeal was never submitted to this court. This is a transitional court and it will exist for another 10 days or so. I don't know who gave himself the right to adopt such a decision. We are only bound by the decisions of the Supreme Court of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation and we will respect these decisions, and not those of the Supreme Court of Bosnia-Herzegovina which, as I said, is about to cease functioning.

[Vego] At the last session of the Forum of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation, you adopted a number of decisions. Were they implemented or are they in the process of being implemented?

[Zubak] Conclusions, not decisions, were adopted to draw up a plan for transforming Herzeg-Bosnia into an institution with state powers and for transferring the powers from the still existing republican institutions to the federation. At the session of the forum and afterwards, I consistently claimed that the problems were not caused by the Croat side. The Croat Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia was not able to transfer its state powers to federal institutions because there was no one to transfer these powers to. Our political partner did not show sufficient desire or readiness to establish the institutions of the federation, especially in the key state spheres such as justice, defense, internal affairs, etc. We could not effect this transfer. We were also supposed to adopt appropriate changes to the organization of these ministries. Moreover, our political partners strongly opposed the transfer of the existing powers of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina to the federation. This is the main problem. The Croat side is preparing this information and will submit it to the partner [Muslim] side and to U.S. representatives.

This plan deals with the way of transferring authority both from the Croat Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia and from the republican institutions to the federal institutions. And I repeat that the problem will not be caused by our side. This is best illustrated by the fact that since the signing of the Dayton agreement on breathing life into the federation, in mid-November last year, we have cut down on the number of institutions in the Croat Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia, including a reduction in the number of ministries and in the government.

On the other hand, our political partners not only failed to carry out the transfer of powers from the republic to the federation, but in the meantime they set up new republican institutions and are setting up a system parallel to the system of federal institutions.

B-H: Commentary: 'New World Order' at Stake in Mostar

AU0708190796 Sarajevo DNEVNI AVAZ in Serbo-Croatian 7 Aug 96 p 3

[Commentary by Sead Numanovic: "The Voters' Will, the United States, and Europe"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The result of the marathon negotiations between the Croatian and the Bosniak sides in Mostar is known, but the problem of Mostar has not been entirely solved. The problem does not lie in the procedure alone, but rather in the essence, which can be explained by a single sentence: The Croatian Democratic Union [HDZ] in Bosnia-Herzegovina wants to keep Mostar for itself at any cost. The largest Herzegovinian city is supposed to be a Croatian capital city, which will house all the institutions of that nation and around which all the Bosnia-Herzegovina Croats will cluster, and consequently the entire Croatian diaspora. All actions taken by Grude [the administrative center of the Herzeg-Bosnia parastate] and also many of Zagreb's moves are oriented toward that goal.

The mistakes in procedure, which Peter Galbraith, U.S. ambassador to Zagreb, recently said were occurring in his country as well, entitle those who feel aggrieved to appeal to a court of law, but not to boycott the work of bodies that have been elected by the will of the voters. The situation, of course, would be far different if the results of the elections favored a divided, rather than a unified city.

Thus, it is not the HDZ that has been defeated, but rather the anachronistic idea of separation, which opposes any integration and the new world order. After all, there are many Croats in (west) Mostar who did not go to the polls, while some of those who did voted against the HDZ's expectations and it is their votes that tipped the scales. Therefore, the election results may have been unexpected, but the behavior of the HDZ was not.

Local analysts said that the HDZ would eventually accept the demands of the international community. Formally, perhaps, yes, but essentially no, and never will, as long as it is in power.

Therefore, one can easily predict the future course of events. Sooner or later, the City Council in Mostar will start functioning, but the Croatian deputies will boycott its work whenever it suits them. The case of Zagreb is the best example of their behavior.

The Mostar agreement was signed on behalf of the Bosniak side by Safet Orucevic, while on behalf of the Croatian side by four HDZ officials, which is more than indicative. The agreement has removed only one more in a series of obstacles on the path toward the unification of the city, the strengthening of the Federation and a reintegrated Bosnia-Herzegovina. There is still a long road to the final goal and it is paved with challenges and problems.

Over the past 10 days Bosnia-Herzegovina has started a strong diplomatic offensive—to use a military term—in Belgrade and Zagreb and has scored significant points. On one hand, the United States has again become involved in the Bosnian problem, supporting the arguments presented by the legal authorities, while the EU's face has been saved from total fiasco after the many humiliations and futile compromises that it brokered in and around Mostar.

To use incorrect military terminology, the war for Mostar and a unified Bosnia-Herzegovina will continue, but with political means and on its outcome depends not only the fate of a little European country, but also the stability of the international community in general and that of the new world order built by it. Much more is at stake than the mere makeup of an (ordinary) city council.

B-H: Croats Offer 'Comprehensive Plan' To Disband Herceg-Bosnia

LD0808140996 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 8 Aug 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Kresimir Zubak, president of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation, said that the Croat side offered a comprehensive plan for setting up federal institutions and transfering authority from the Croat Republic of Herceg-Bosnia to the federation. The plan was offered to the Bosniak [Muslim] side and will be discussed at a meeting of the Federation Forum in Sarajevo today in the presence of U.S. Assistant Secretary of State John Kornblum and Croatian Foreign Minister Mate Granic. Here is HINA's correspondent Ranko Mavrak with the story:

[Mavrak] We proposed a comprehensive plan which sets out precise deadlines for passing laws, setting up federal institutions, and employing new personnel, Zubak said. He stressed that this procedure was agreed in March 1995 in Petersberg [near Bonn], but has not been implemented until now because of various conditions set by the Bosniak side, which is motivated by political and social problems in the territory controlled by the Bosnia-Herzegovina army.

Zubak stressed today that the latest political, diplomatic, and media pressure aimed at putting an immediate end to all of Herceg-Bosnia's functions was a result of wrong interpretations of the Dayton agreement on the federation. The agreement specifies that the transfer of authority from Herceg-Bosnia to the federation would proceed simultaneously with the transfer of a large part of the republic's functions to the federal authorities, Zubak said. He explained that the main cause of delay is the Bosniak side's stubborn insistence on keeping as much authority as possible at the level of the republic. The federation president believes that the Bosniak side is trying to postpone the moment when it will have to face the truth, which is that many people employed in the republican authorities will effectively lose their jobs.

Zubak warned that, since the signing of the Dayton agreement on the federation, the republic's parliament adopted as many as 26 new laws which seriously impinge on the federation's constitutional competences. The latest example is the law on public health.

The transfer of authority from Herceg-Bosnia to the federation is only a technical job for the Croat side, and we are ready to complete it before the elections. But to achieve that the Bosniak side must make much more drastic moves in order to reduce the republic's competences, Zubak said. He stressed that John Kornblum was informed about this at the Federation Forum meeting last week. According to Zubak, the U.S. diplomat even said that only two ministries should remain at the level of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina—foreign affairs and foreign trade. If the federal institutions, including the existing Bosnia-Herzegovina Radio-Television, fail to take hold before the elections, the federation will find itself in a much less opportune position than the [Bosnian] Serb Republic which has already set up its infrastructure, Federation President Kresimir Zubak said today.

B-H: Zubak Comments on Elections, Croat 'Attitude'

AU0708182696 Zagreb HRVATSKI OBZOR in Serbo-Croatian 5 Aug 96 pp 18-21

[Interview with Kresimir Zubak, president of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, by Miljenko Karacic; place and date not given: "It Is Our Destiny To Share Bosnia-Herzegovina With Others"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Bosnia-Herzegovina is torn between the Mostar elections and the elections in September, and the Bosnian Croats are again pressured by the international community. They are not the only ones. The leadership of the Republic of Croatia is also accused—the world's emissaries hold it responsible for the attitude of the Mostar Croats. We asked Kresimir Zubak, president of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, whether their attitude really opposed the Dayton and all other agreements.

[Zubak] The Mostar Croats have been as cooperative as they could. They complied with the wish of the Muslim side and the international community to postpone the elections, which were scheduled for 31 May 1996, to 30 June. They also accepted voting abroad. We allowed that in hope that the elections would be fair. We actually wanted to prove ourselves cooperative. However, the world has reintroduced the thesis that the Croats do not want the town authorities in Mostar to be established. I do not know where that idea came from, especially as the accepted concept of the authorities was our suggestion. We had a hard time convincing the international community that it was the best concept and the only realistic one. Hans Koschnick, the former EU administrator, was the first person to stand up against that concept. He never would have accepted it without pressure from the United States.

[Karacic] Still, there were hardly any difficulties in the elections. The problem is the results. Substantial irregularities were discovered, but the Croats are nevertheless requested to accept the results. Will you comply?

[Zubak] The elections were particularly well-organized in western Mostar. There was not a trace of irregularities. Numerous reporters from all over the world, who came here looking for a sensation, could see that. On the other hand, the electoral results were obviously staged, especially in Bonn. We cannot neglect that. Every civilized country would annul such elections. The law explains it—although we were reluctant to accept that law, as it dates from the former Socialist Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina. There were many examples of one person voting in two different places, and we are sure that it was one person, not two. We are sure that there were many such cases. Besides, there were other irregularities. Still, we are supposed to accept the results!

[Karacic] Who is behind all that? Can you tell by the attitude of certain officials of the international community?

[Zubak] It is difficult to tell. However, certain facts are indisputable. First, the elections were staged in Bonn. Second, the elections in Bonn were supervised by Klaus Metscher, a close associate of Hans Koschnick, who holds the same views. Third, after everything that happened in Mostar, Michael Steiner, deputy high commissioner of the international community for the implementation of the civilian part of the Dayton agreement, suddenly came up with an idea how to solve the Mostar crisis. He came to Mostar and offered us his solution, although the official representative of the EU in Mostar is Sir Martin Garrod. Besides, there is Irish Ambassador Bolster, chairman of the Council of Europe. Steiner came and suggested that we form the town administration according to the electoral results and wait for the Supreme Court to decide whether the elections were regular. If that did not mean that we accept the results, what would?

[Karacic] Was Mr. Steiner invited to help resolve the misunderstandings?

[Zubak] I do not know whether he was invited. I did not invite him. The local Croats did not, either. Garrod and Bolster, the authorized representatives of the EU, never said that they invited him. When we consider all that, we come to the logical conclusion that every Croat has known for a long time. That is why we cannot be more complying than we are. It is difficult to persuade people that this is not a plot.... Especially after all the things that Mr. Koschnick has said about Croats in the German media lately.

[Karacic] Mr. Steiner even threatened that the EU would withdraw from Mostar if the Croats do not accept the election results. What would such an outcome mean for the future of Croats?

[Zubak] I have been in constant contact with Croatian Foreign Minister Granic. He informed me about the attitudes of the governments of the European countries on a regular basis. The Republic of Croatia even faced ultimatums. I asked openly what we, the Bosnian Croats, would lose if the EU left Mostar. I do not know what the consequences for the Republic of Croatia would be. Our attitude is that our actions must not entail negative consequences for Croatia. We actually would not lose anything at all, as the EU administration in Mostar has not removed the chasm between the nations here—on the contrary, it has deepened it. Many bad things happened here. Many more happened in other places, for instance in Bugojno. However, the tendency to satanize Croats has been very strong in Mostar. Consequently, the departure of the EU administration would remove the only center from which accusations have been coming to Bosnian Croats, to all Croats everywhere, and to the Croatian authorities in Zagreb.

[Karacic] Is there not a European concept of the solution of the Mostar crisis?

[Zubak] Europe has turned out to be ineffective. Mostar is an example of how incapable of finding solutions Europe is. Europe used to make all the rules before the Washington agreement was signed. The only score in that game was the deepening of the Bosnian crisis, and it led to the dirtiest war this world has ever seen. An abundance of petty schemes was made behind the scene, and that have made details almost impossible to reconstruct. It is difficult to define individual interests. The only sure thing is that Europe is jealous of the United States, if we can put it like that in politics. The United States has proved capable of solving problems.

[Karacic] Commentators have been almost unanimous in claiming that the Mostar elections are a model and a test for the September elections in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Can they really be a test after all, and can they have similar consequences?

[Zubak] Mostar certainly is a model, especially western Mostar. Western Mostar has denied the allegations that elections are impossible to organize in the region controlled by the HVO [Croatian Defense Council]. The Our Bosnia Party, chaired by former Prime Minister Haris Silajdzic, claimed openly in public that it was impossible to organize elections in the HVO-controlled regions. It turned out to be impossible in the regions controlled by the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army. His close associate Muhamed Cero was almost assassinated, and that did not happen in the region controlled by the HVO. Bosnian Muslim parties have always tended to put the blame on Croats. They do not really want the elections, but they do not want to prove uncooperative in the eyes of the international community, so they are trying to put the blame on Croats. The organization of the elections in western Mostar was the best denial of their allegations. Mostar is also a model of how the international community should not act. It was a bad precedent and that is why I am afraid of the elections in September. I am afraid of irregularities that might be ignored again.

[Karacic] Do we have the prerequisite conditions for the September election according to the Dayton agreement? The Muslim side thinks that it is impossible as long as war criminals are free.

[Zubak] I cannot see any difference between Karadzic and the new leadership of the SDS [Serbian Democratic Party]. Consequently, the Muslims are only trying to find an excuse to postpone the elections. It is quite uncertain whether the present Muslim leadership will stay in power after the elections. I tried to tell the international community representatives not to insist on the local elections, and everything else would be fine. We are not ready for the local elections, because electoral units have not been defined. How are we supposed to organize elections in municipalities divided in two or three parts? Many municipalities have not adjusted their statutes to the new Bosnian Constitution or to county constitutions, and we would end up in an absurd situation: Electing new authorities according to the old constitution.

[Karacic] What is the importance of the state elections scheduled for September?

[Zubak] First, quite a while has passed since the last elections were held. Many persons on our political scene have lost the right to be there for various reasons. Many officials have not been elected to their present positions, but were appointed according to some other criteria. Second, it is high time we checked whether the representatives of certain nations have the support of their nations. Third, if Dayton is a good solution and should stay, it is time we implemented the second part of the Dayton agreement and established the authorities as the agreement specifies. If the two entities—the Serb Republic and the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina—will remain, we must have legal structures for their establishing. Before bodies of the Federal authorities were established, Croats and Muslims discussed their relations abroad. After the establishment of the Federal authorities, the negotiations took place in the assembly, in the government, in ministries.... The same will happen with the relations between the Federation and the Serb Republic. At the moment, negotiations are going on abroad, but the process will be transferred to the Federal authorities as soon as they are formed.

[Karacic] Do you think that the international community, which organizes the September elections through the OSCE and supports opposition parties, wants to impose solutions that cannot be achieved by a consensus between the parties that are now in power?

[Zubak] That was evident in Mostar, too. One list was accepted although it was two days late. The head of that list, Josip Musa, was invited to the reception honoring the U.S. Independence Day. Mayor of the western Mostar, Mijo Brajkovic, was not invited. That proves that the international community really has the tendency that you have mentioned. I cannot tell whether it is actually a tendency to pluralize the situation. Perhaps it is a tendency to introduce new political forces that would lead Bosnia-Herzegovina into regional integrations that are now offered to us both openly and covertly.

[Karacic] What is your opinion on the present situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina? Is there a danger of new hostilities, and are those possible with the present distribution and mandate of IFOR? Alija Izetbegovic was alluding to Mostar when he said that the war "down there" was a matter of moments.

[Zubak] Izetbegovic's words are ambiguous, but also clear enough. I am absolutely sure that the Muslim leadership only pretends to support the Federation—they are actually trying to prolong and obstruct the process of its establishment. They want the present situation to last, so they can still have the chance to impose the solutions that they prefer. The anti-Croat campaign in Sarajevo is becoming hysterical. That is difficult to explain. When it comes to Izetbegovic's promises to the disabled war veterans in Sarajevo, that is clear. The Muslim political leadership has not managed to fulfill their obligations and promises, not even to the greatest sufferers in this war. The politicians are trying to draw their attention to something else to calm their social rebellion. I am very sorry that I was not in Sarajevo at that time. I would have spelled it out to them that Croats have nothing to do with their unsatisfactory social status. A social explosion threatens the part of the Federation controlled by the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Look at Tuzla, for instance. However, new hostilities will not happen as long as the IFOR is here. Individual incidents are possible, perhaps even local confrontations, but nothing more.

[Karacic] Is there an explanation for the attitude of our federal partner?

[Zubak] I think that the political solutions for Bosnia-Herzegovina brought by the Washington and Dayton agreements do not correspond to the political goals of the Muslim leadership. Their political goal is a civic Bosnia-Herzegovina. The agreements also specified the civic state. However, according to the agreements, important decisions are taken by the consensus of the nations, not by the parliamentary majority. That is contrary to the goals the Muslims had defined before the war broke out. Therefore, they would like to annul both agreements, but they cannot take the responsibility for that. They would actually like to blame the failure on somebody else. Anyway, Mr. Muhamed Filipovic recently commented on the destruction of the Catholic Church in Bugojno: "Why do we need the Federation if human rights are violated in it?" Although he is not a member of the SDA [Party of Democratic Action], he often puts the public to a test with similar statements and—as we have seen—paves the way for the SDA. His statement about the Federation is not naive. Its real meaning was: "Why do we need the Federation?" That is why I am sure that the Federation is not their political goal, but a way to reach another political goal. Anyway, Mr. Izetbegovic said in the Club of Muslim Intellectuals in late 1993 that he saw the future Bosnia-Herzegovina as a state inhabited 80 percent by Muslims and 20 percent by non-Muslims. He compared the relations in that state with the situation in France, with the position of Algerians in France. The president of France is always French, he said, and it is more than clear what he meant.

[Karacic] The Federal Defense Law was adopted recently, after a long haggle. According to that law, you and President Izetbegovic are in command of the Federal Army until the elections. Have you really obtained that duty and have you discussed the mutual obligations with Mr. Izetbegovic?

[Zubak] Nothing has changed. I have not discussed anything of that sort with Mr. Izetbegovic. The truth is that Mr. Soljic and I formulated one draft organization of joint command and the internal organization of the Defense Ministry. We have not received any response to that draft from the other side, and that is another confirmation of my thesis. Whenever a solution is at hand, the final step takes a long time, and certainly not because of us.

[Karacic] How do you see the future of Bosnia-Herzegovina in the light of the present situation and relations?

[Zubak] Everything that I have said leads to a pessimistic conclusion. We have little chance to end up well. However, we have to bear in mind that the political option that the Croats have chosen is more than a mere survival in Bosnia-Herzegovina. It is Bosnia-Herzegovina as a federal-confederal state. I am not saying that this solution is exactly what we wanted. Moreover, we are not happy with the borders between the entities, because a substantial part of the Bosnian Sava Valley has remained outside the Federation, but the Constitution grants us the status of an equal nation in the Federation. Of course, it will take a long political struggle and a lot of common sense to actualize all our rights. It will take a long time and a lot of patience. We cannot demand anything within the Federation that does not correspond to the attitudes of the international community. This project is now in the test period, as all new projects have to be—a new factory, for instance. The test period can reveal irregularities. If there are any, the project must be improved and accomplished. Our destiny is to share this region with others. It used to be just ours, and now it is only one-third ours. However, we cannot surrender Bosnia-Herzegovina to anyone. Bosnia-Herzegovina is a state that Croats created in the Middle Ages, the state that Croats chose in the referendum and for which they gave their lives. The present situation is not final. It is a stage in the process that only God knows how it will end.

[Karacic] Is it possible for Bosnia-Herzegovina to end up in an association or in a regional community that Croats would not like to find themselves in?

[Zubak] That is one of the crucial issues, both for us and for the international community: Where to put Bosnia-Herzegovina? Bosnia-Herzegovina certainly belongs in Europe. Still, where to put it? It is very important whether Bosnia-Herzegovina will be in the Balkans—with or without Croatia—or in a Central European integration. The Muslim leadership has not expressed its attitude toward that. However, it is quite obvious that they do not all share the same opinion. I have been informed about Haris Silajdzic's contacts with Mr. Vukobrat, a supporter of the idea of the economic structure of the region. He once explained the idea to Santerro and Dini in Sarajevo and faced the fierce reaction of Hasan Muratovic, president of the Bosnian Government. He said that Bosnia-Herzegovina cannot be a hostage of Serb politics. I am also aware that a part of the Muslim leadership wants Bosnia- Herzegovina to be included in the West European integrations.

[Karacic] The present border between the two entities in Bosnia-Herzegovina is not a state border, but it is nevertheless very strong. Will it become stronger in the future or will it gradually become vague?

[Zubak] Although that is an administrative border, it is actually more than a state border at this moment. It is more difficult to cross than, for instance, the borders between Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina and their neighboring states. That is as likely to change as the present status is likely to remain unchanged. The present Serb political leadership apparently wants the division of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the international recognition of the Serb Republic. The present situation does not allow them to talk about that openly. However, they are planning that outcome in the long run. Whether the international community will allow that is a different thing. I have said it, but that does not make me a supporter of that idea. I am just trying to explain that this is one of the possible outcomes. I must say that our present ties in Bosnia-Herzegovina are much looser than the ties that bound us together in the former Yugoslavia. Remember the joint army that Yugoslavia had, the police, the customs, the border.... Bosnia-Herzegovina lacks all that. It has two armies, the Federal customs and the Serb customs. The Muslim political leadership wants Bosnia-Herzegovina to remain integrated. However, the political steps that they have been making lead in the opposite direction. Their satanization of Serbs and Croats is a rejection, not an invitation to those nations to live together. Bosnia-Herzegovina cannot survive if it suits the Muslims only. It can only survive if it satisfies all three nations.

[Karacic] Let us return to the Federation. Bugojno has for months been the most painful issue in the

Federation—certainly the most painful for the Croats. Is there a solution?

[Zubak] That is certainly one of the most painful issues, besides the Sava Valley and Vares. The actions of the local authorities in Bugojno have been really radical. The representatives of the international community who mediated in the forming of the transitional municipal authorities made a dangerous precedent when they did not allow the party that won the local elections in 1990 to appoint its member the mayor of Bugojno. The international community and the SDA leadership simply cannot supervise the local authorities and their head, Dzevad Mlaco. Perhaps they can supervise him, but they do not want to. Anyway, Bugojno and other critical regions are included in our efforts to take back what has always been ours.

[Karacic] In the end, what awaits the Bosnian Croats?

[Zubak] In the end, I can say that Bosnia-Herzegovina is our destiny. Our interests do not correspond to the interests of other parties. However, we must persist in the political efforts that will ensure our legitimate status in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Our victims in this war and in previous wars have obliged us to persist. We need patience and wisdom. Many countries have been in the stage that Bosnia-Herzegovina is in now, and many countries will be. Accordingly, there must be a solution.

[Box, p 20]

Croats Will Not Accept Ultimatums

[Karacic] The Muslim side has alleged that Croats and the Croat Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia are impeding the process of the establishment of the Federation. Last week in Zagreb Ejup Ganic, vice president of the Federation, demanded that the Croatian president terminate Herzeg-Bosnia. However, he did not receive an answer that would satisfy him. What does that mean?

[Zubak] I was not informed about Ganic's visit to the Croatian president, which is quite unusual. Nobody told me—neither Ganic, nor the American Ambassador to Sarajevo John Menzies, nor Michael Steiner. Ganic said later that he was sent by the Presidency of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina to demand the termination of all functions of Herzeg-Bosnia. He threatened that Croatia would suffer substantial consequences if Herzeg-Bosnia were not terminated. Such a communication is quite irritating, and President Tudjman did not accept it. Peter Galbraith, the U.S. ambassador to Zagreb, did not expect such an approach, either. Although we had been warned that the Federation must be established and that the process should not be too exposed, Ganic felt free to pass certain unrealistic judgments at the news conference he held at the Bosnian Embassy in Zagreb. Prime Minister Hasan Muratovic did something similar at the contact group of Islamic countries in Geneva. However, Ganic was apparently wrong. He did not achieve the results he expected. He realized that he exposed himself too much. Croats never accepted ultimatums, not even in situations that were much more difficult than the present situation. His attitude became more elastic by the time the session of the Forum on the Federation was held in Sarajevo. John Kornblum, deputy U.S. secretary of state, supported the suggestion of the Croats that the Federation should be established through the simultaneous gradual transfer of legal capacities from the authorities of the Croat community of Herzeg-Bosnia and the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

B-H: Federation Minister Criticizes Republic on Health Law

AU0708191096 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 7 Aug 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Bozo Ljubic, health minister of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, has sent an open letter to Hasan Muratovic, prime minister of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Miro Lazovic, chairman of the Assembly of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, informing them that the passing of the Law on the Bosnia-Herzegovina Institute for Public Health, which has been passed by the Republic Assembly at the initiative of the Government of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, is unconstitutional and in contradiction to the existing law on health protection.

The passing of the law by urgent procedure on the formation of the Institute for Public Health as a health institution is neither within the jurisdiction of the Government of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina not the Assembly of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina. This act has no constitutional backing since the Dayton Constitution of Bosnia-Herzegovina hands over all the jurisdiction in the sphere of health to the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, that is, to the entities, says Minister Ljubic's letter.

B-H: Muslims, Croats Conduct Prisoner Exchange

AU0708180596 Paris AFP in English 1754 GMT 7 Aug 96

[Report by Tessa Fras]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Potoci, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Aug 7 (AFP)—The seven foreign Islamic fighters were sweltering in the heat inside a Bosnian Croat police van as they waited for the prisoner exchange in this southern Bosnian village, close to Mostar.

An eighth Moslem prisoner, a pilot of the former Yugoslav army who had been held in Croatia, was outside watching to see when the Moslem [Bosnia-Herzegovina Government] police would arrive on the other bank of the winding green Neretva River.

They were late. The prisoner exchange had been due to take place on an EU-built bridge at 3:00 p.m. (1300 GMT) and the minutes were ticking past.

The Moslems were bringing four Croats and a Swedish mercenary to be exchanged.

Swedish ambassador to Bosnia, Erik Pierre, paced anxiously and refused to talk to journalists. European Commission monitors and international police were also present.

About one hour after the arranged time, a Moslem police van drew up on the other side and tense last-minute negotiations started.

Shortly before 5:00 p.m. (1500 GMT), the prisoners started walking across the bridge to be met with hugs and tears on the other side.

One of the Croat prisoners, who identified himself as Vinko Vidovic, said he had been held for three and a half years in the Moslem-held town of Zenica. It was "good to be free" he said, adding his detention "was hard at first, particularly during the interrogation."

Another said he had been held for 38 months. "I had started to lose hope," he said.

Under the Dayton peace accords, all prisoners of war should have been freed in January, and although the release process dangerously overshot the deadline, reigniting tensions between the former warring factions, the vast majority of prisoners are now believed to have been released.

The head of the local Croat exchange commission, Berislav Pusic, told journalists there would be no further exchanges since there were no more people to exchange.

"There is no one in prison on either side any more. With this act, exchanges between Croats and Bosniaks are over," he said.

Back on the bridge across the Neretva, the foreign fighters did not want to be identified, but according to a list in the possession of the EC monitors, one was Algerian, two Jordanians, one Kuwaiti, one Moroccan, one Palestinian and one from the Gaza Strip.

Once on the Moslem side of the river, they headed straight for a water tap to cool off. Speaking in French, one of the bearded prisoners said he had been held for two years.

A spokeswoman for the International Committee of the Red Cross in Sarajevo, Anne-Sophie Bonefeld, said that the local authorities had arranged Wednesday's exchange.

She said the prisoners had been detainees from before the end of the war, but one of the Croat prisoners told AFP that he had been captured just four months ago.

Sources said that the foreign fighters had been held in a well-known prison only a few hundred yards (metres) from the EU headquarters in Mostar. EU spokesman Dragan Gasic told AFP he was unaware of this.

The EU has run Mostar for two years and on Tuesday was being congratulated for achieving a political agreement to end a Croat boycott of the city council, and averting an EU threat to withdraw.

Mostar is seen as a test case for relations between Moslems and Croats in the U.S.-backed Moslem-Croat federation.

B-H: Commentary Warns War Could Resume If NATO Leaves

AU0608181696 Sarajevo OSLOBODJENJE (Bosnian) in Serbo-Croatian 5 Aug 96 p 2

[Commentary by Zoran Pirolic: "A Gun on the Wall"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The statement by Patrick Hughes, chief of U.S. military intelligence, that a war in Bosnia is almost imminent if foreign forces withdraw, has provoked much comment in the United States, but no great surprise. Hughes was actually reiterating something that is common knowledge. In Bosnia there is no war because it is packed with adequately deployed and excellently armed NATO soldiers. Without them, the resumption of the war would be just a matter of days.

What this top military official said is perfectly well known by U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher. He is supposed to be visiting Sarajevo again by mid-August. The Dayton peace accord, being the major diplomatic success and trump card of President Clinton in the presidential elections, is in a serious crisis. It is not known what is in worse shape: the shaky and hardly existing Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation or the Serb Republic's miniscule level of commitment to the Bosnia-Herzegovina created in Dayton. The job with which Carl Bildt and his team are entrusted has not made any serious progress yet. When was the last time that the prime ministers of the Federation and of the two republics—one that is gradually disappearing and the other that believes that it has already separated from Bosnia-Herzegovina, without anybody being aware of it—met around the same table?

I still have not heard any politician in the Serb Republic deny that the main goal of his party is the separation of the western Serb state from Bosnia-Herzegovina and its addition to the eastern Serb state. None of them points out that such a thing would automatically pull down the house of cards called the Dayton accord. The situation in Bosnia would definitely revert to that of October 1995. Federation troops would instantly take up their positions 20 kilometers from Banja Luka. General Ratko Mladic would leave his asylum in Han Pijesak. The many Bosniak politicians who have recently been claiming that only the first half of the war is over would be able to exclaim triumphantly: "We were right!" The NATO troops stationed in Bosnia are part of the package called the Dayton accord, and without that package there are no foreign troops.

The operation "Train and Equip" could be renamed, for instance, "Mobilize and Go." It is still not clear whether arming the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina, according to American (and some other) scenarios will end up like a Chekhov play, in which a gun hanging from a wall goes off in the third act, that is, in the second half. Parallels drawn with the war in Croatia show that any unclear state of affairs cannot last long. A state such as the one concocted in the political laboratory of Dayton simply cannot exist or function. To make it function one needs to overcome obstacles such as the Bosnian elections, for which the participants are still warming up. Ambassador Robert Frowick admitted that for free and fair elections, as Western democracies envisage them, at least two more years are needed.

That is, in Bosnia elections are being prepared that will be neither free nor fair, whose final result should be the creation of a state not known to the world before and not able to function for a single day. The Americans have temporarily suspended the war in this country, but have not devised a solution. President Clinton cares very much to keep that impossible creation in one piece until the November presidential elections, but then he will have to seek a new solution for Bosnia. One of the possibilities is the continuation of the mission of international forces in this country, but nothing will be essentially resolved with that. Rather, the current status quo will be extended indefinitely into the future. The favorite scenario of some of his advisors—to let the Bosnians alone deal with the issue and find a solution—has no chance of success. Had the nationalist elite circles in this country (and even more outside it) been able to agree on any issue, the war would not have occurred in the first place.

The arrival of Warren Christopher in Bosnia has a different weight than the strategic activities in which Richard Holbrooke or John Kornblum have been engaged. The U.S. secretary of state wants to communicate by his visit that the United States will not be abandoning Bosnia, nor will it leave it to those who only messed up things in this country, namely the Europeans. This is at least some consolation for us. The bad news is that neither this country nor the United States knows what the American political leadership plans to do about Bosnia, or whether it has any plan at all.

B-H: Reasons for Milosevic, Tudjman Talks Questioned

AU0708160096 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 7 Aug 96

[Commentary by Dzevad Kucukalic]

[FBIS Translated Text] It cannot be ruled out that today's meeting between the Serbian and Croatian presidents is a result of the U.S. diplomatic game orchestrated by Clinton via Holbrooke in the Balkans. Its results have already been felt in Karadzic's removal from the political scene, in the agreement reached in Mostar, and the announced dissolution of Herzeg-Bosnia.

However, Dr. Tudjman's vanity might also be playing a part in it, following the recent visit by the Bosnia-Herzegovina delegation led by Dr. Ganic to Belgrade. The Zagreb presidential quarters cannot stomach any talks on Bosnia-Herzegovina without them having a say in the matter.

There is no doubt that Milosevic and Tudjman have plenty to talk about. If they want to establish diplomatic relations and have mutual recognition, then they first have to resolve a few issues concerning eastern Slavonia, the return of refugees, Prevlaka, and a series of economic and communication problems. The reemergence of Serbia and the rump Yugoslavia after the lifting of the sanctions has whet Slobo's appetite, while Croatia is willing to make a concession or two to open the door to the Council of Europe.

In this Balkan political dance, the less than charismatic Greek Prime Minister Simitis is trying to score a point or two, although his government has been causing serious obstructions to the promotion of the neighboring Republic of Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM]. All three of them, and particularly Milosevic and Tudjman, are now placing their bets on the peacemakers' card. Let us recall that Turkish President Demirel had spoken to Tudjman before the latter's departure to Athens and that U.S. Secretary of

State Warren Christopher is himself to visit this region in a few days.

One thing is sure: No one can deny Tudjman and Milosevic the right to meet wherever and whenever they want to discuss whatever they want. There is no doubt, therefore, that the two of them will also discuss Bosnia-Herzegovina in Greece, but will it be the Dayton Bosnia-Herzegovina that they will be discussing? Still, the talks about our country of the kind held in Karadjordjevo before the war on the partition of Bosnia-Herzegovina will never lead anywhere. Are Slobo and Franjo aware of this or will they again have to be dragged back to reality by Bosnia-Herzegovina patriots, with the help of some new Holbrooke?

B-H: OSCE: Registration of Displaced Voters 'Nearly Complete'

AU0508173996 Paris AFP in English
1701 GMT 5 Aug 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Sarajevo, Aug 5 (AFP)—The international agency supervising Bosnia's first post-war election said Monday [5 August] that the registration of displaced voters inside the country was nearly complete, as preparations for the September polls entered the final stage.

Around half a million people in Bosnia displaced by the fighting have completed registration forms for the vote, officials from the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) said. Some 340,000 applications have already been approved with the remainder due for completion by the end of the week, the OSCE's Christian Christensen told reporters.

Registration of voters for Bosnia's September 14 poll, the first post-war general election, has been greatly complicated by the upheaval of the country's nearly four-year conflict.

According to the OSCE, which is overseeing the election and collating voter data, Bosnia's estimated 3 million eligible voters are divided into three roughly equal groups. Approximately one third are abroad as refugees. Another third have been displaced by the fighting and are living in a different part of the country, while the remainder are still on the electoral list registered at their pre-war location.

Bosnia's complex election rules allow voters to cast their ballots either in their pre-war home municipality or where they are currently living or intend to live. Furthermore, they can do this "in absentia" from abroad or another part of Bosnia. Others however, will make the trip on election day to their former home towns and villages.

Registration is a hot issue for the OSCE as well as the political parties contesting the election.

The conflict which ended last December with the signing of the Dayton peace accord has radically altered Bosnia's pre-war ethnic patchwork into a picture of mono-ethnic blocks.

While those wishing to vote where they now live can be counted on by Bosnia's three ruling ethnic cliques to vote for them, other electors who will vote in absentia or by travelling to their pre-war homes on the day are an unknown quantity. But it is on this last group which most attention is focused because of the potential for conflict when people travel back to areas held by those authorities responsible for their expulsion. Thus far, there are no official figures or accurate estimates for this latter group, though Christensen said it might number in the tens of thousands.

Of those applications from displaced voters that have been approved, some 200,000 have asked to vote in their new homes. An additional 5,000 have requested to vote in a municipality where they will live in the future.

Tens of thousands of new names have been added to the list but some 85,000 have been deleted because of death. There are 15,000 applications to change a voter's name, while 25,000 people have asked to cast their votes in absentia in the municipality where they lived in 1991.

Outside the country, international efforts continue to register the estimated 800,000-900,000 refugees spread across the world. Of these, roughly 250-300,000 voters, mainly absentee ballot requests, have applied to vote, OSCE officials said.

B-H: Institute Issues Data on Voter Registration

AU0708100896 Sarajevo ONASA in English
5 Aug 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Sarajevo, 5 Aug (ONASA)—A total of 360,337 voting applications of Bosnian citizens have been processed in the Bosnian Statistics Institute by July 27, the institute said on Monday.

According to the institute, out of 150,000 registered voters, 124,678 of them have said they wanted to vote in municipalities they had lived before the war, whereas 23,311 in municipalities in which they now reside.

Only 36,668 registered voters from the Republic of Srpska have opted to vote in municipalities in which they lived before the war, while 170,208, or 80 percent, said they wanted to vote in their new towns.

According to data valid on July 26, a total of 524,978 Bosnian refugees have been registered abroad, of which

269,433 in Germany, 150,000 in rump Yugoslavia, 40,000 in Sweden, 9,699 in Austria, 8,843 in Norway, 8,500 in Denmark, 8,000 in Switzerland, while numbers in other countries are well below 5,000.

B-H: Commentary Ponders U.S. Priorities in Balkans

AU0708131696 Sarajevo OSLOBODJENJE (Bosnian Serb) in Serbo-Croatian 6 Aug 96 p 1

[Commentary by Zija Dizdarevic: "The American Choice"]

[FBIS Translated Text] U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher is coming next week. First his assistant, John Kornblum, will again become involved in Sarajevo-Zagreb-Belgrade relations. The peace process is in a serious crisis and decisive intervention is once again required.

What is Christopher's primary intention this time? Is the head of diplomacy of the main sponsor of the peace agreement coming to save the Dayton project as it is? That would be expected, but there is fear of a blatant or tacit revision of the Dayton agreement. Washington has already made a number of concessions for Belgrade and Zagreb concerning their responsibilities for the peace process.

Maybe after this visit the strategic intentions of the United States in this region will be somewhat clearer. The Americans obviously intend to remain installed in the Balkans for a longer period, but the question is how and where. It is still not clear which problem and which country the White House considers a priority. The Bosnian, Albanian, and Macedonian problems are competing for that status. There is also a question as to which country the United States considers most important in terms of stabilization. For us it seems logical that it is Bosnia-Herzegovina, but Washington is also building its own positions in Croatia and Serbia.

Everything the White House does in the Balkans must be carried out in a delicate balance with the EU and Russia. The political incapabilities of the key European countries concerning Bosnia-Herzegovina once again leave room for further penetration by the Americans here.

Everything America does, of course, has strong ideological overtones. Following its obsession with anticommunism, the United States is plagued by the threat of Islamic fundamentalism. Objections are constantly made to the authorities in Bosnia-Herzegovina over the presence of Iranians. However, in that ideological blindness the Americans neglect two ideological dangers that for us are much more profound. The main agents of Serb and Croat nationalism are the Chetnik and Ustasha movements. Those two Nazisms-Fascisms have experienced a full reaffirmation and pose crucial threats to peace in this region, to the state of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and to democratic processes. They are terrorist movements and are therefore also dangerous in a wider international framework.

We will best recognize U.S. intentions by the methods applied to save the peace process. We are mostly given the observers' position, although it is our own destiny that is decided. But that is the way it is. Only when U.S. President Bill Clinton appears in Sarajevo will it be possible to talk about stabilizing peace and the integral state of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

B-H: Krajisnik 'Optimistic' Over Cooperation With IFOR's Lopez

LD0708200196 Pale Srpska Televizija in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 7 Aug 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The first meeting between Serb Republic Assembly Speaker Momcilo Krajisnik and IFOR Commander Vice Admiral Joseph Lopez served as an introduction to a series of meetings on the implementation of the Dayton agreement.

Speaker Krajisnik briefed his guest about the stands of the leadership of the Serb Republic on this issue. He stressed that the implementation of the peace agreement is seen as the most important task in the forthcoming period. On this occasion, he singled out priority tasks:

[Begin Krajisnik recording] That the issue of exhumation of bodies, the issue of prisoners be resolved as soon as possible. And that all prisoners, especially those arrested after and before Dayton, be released.

This was a very important event, because we had the opportunity to get to know Adm. Lopez. And I am optimistic that we will cooperate really well. [end recording]

[Correspondent] The speaker also said that the issue of Brcko, which will be under special supervision by the international community, and cooperation between the Serb Republic and the Hague tribunal were discussed. He said that our state bodies will cooperate with the tribunal in The Hague in the recently outlined manner, i.e., by providing available relevant information.

Vice Adm. Lopez expressed satisfaction with the outcome of the meeting without giving any further details. He voiced hope that future meetings at this level will contribute toward the implementation of the Dayton agreement.

B-H: Pale's Buha Dismisses Reintegration of Serb Entity

AU0708173896 Sarajevo OSLOBODJENJE (Bosnian Serb) in Serbo-Croatian 1 Aug 96 p 4

[Unattributed report: "All on One Matrix"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Speaking on Serb television about the appearance of new political parties in the Serb Republic, foreign minister Aleksa Buha said that "none of them, regardless of their orientation, can get out of the mainstream of Serb history."

Dr. Buha said that "one matrix has been made, from which it is impossible to go, from which no one has the right to go, mainly because of the victims that have been built into it, so many young lives and so much spilt blood." [sentence as published]

Commenting the constant pressure on the Serb side, he said that "the Serbs behave like any other normal people, wanting only what is guaranteed by the documents of the international community."

Dr. Buha, who is also the acting chairman of the Serb Democratic Party, said that the Dayton agreement had largely recognized the Serb Republic as a state.

According to Buha, the term "reintegration into Bosnia-Herzegovina," is not accurate, and is a malicious interpretation of what the international community primarily refers to as the economic reconstruction of the Serb Republic and the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

"There can be no talk of reintegration, not after all that happened," said Buha, adding that since a multiethnic Yugoslavia was not possible, neither was a multiethnic Bosnia.

B-H: Serbs Protest Decision To Transfer Authority for Brcko

LD0708173696 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1620 GMT 7 Aug 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Brcko, 7 Aug (SRNA)—The municipal electoral commission in Brcko has said that Ambassador Robert Frowick's decision to transfer the town of Brcko from the authority of the OSCE regional center in Banja Luka, Doboj office, to the center in Tuzla, with an office in Orasje, amounts to the international community applying pressure on the Serb side and has a direct impact on the elections and on arbitration.

A protest which the Brcko municipal electoral commission sent to Frowick after a meeting today says that Brcko has no communication links with Orasje or Tuzla and that this decision casts unnecessary doubt on the regularity of the democratic elections which the OSCE is organizing. [passage omitted]

At the meeting today, concern was expressed that the existing polling booths [in Brcko] will not be sufficient if 20,000 Muslims turn up in Brcko on election day, although it is still unclear who should provide security for their visit in such large numbers.

B-H: Bildt, Serb Opposition Candidate Discuss Elections

AU0708131796 Belgrade BETA in Serbo-Croatian 1142 GMT 7 Aug 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Banja Luka, 7 August (BETA)—Carl Bildt, high representative of the international community for Bosnia, held talks with Mladen Ivanic, candidate of the Alliance for Peace and Progress and the Democratic Patriotic Bloc member of the Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Mladen Ivanic. This was stated today by Ivanic's campaign staff.

At yesterday's meeting Bildt and Ivanic agreed that the authorities in both entities must show more readiness and practical ability to create a more favorable atmosphere for the election campaign and the subsequent elections, the statement reads.

In the talks it was stressed that the greatest responsibility for recent and possible new incidents lies with ruling parties. Ivanic demanded from Bildt that he use his authority to help resolve the problem of missing Serb fighters and civilians.

B-H: Serbs Ban Mass Grave Exhumations

LD0708172796 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1647 GMT 7 Aug 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Sarajevo, 7 Aug (SRNA)—The [Bosnian] Serb Republic government has decided to ban exhumations in Serb Republic territory, insisting on the international community's equal approach and the right to reciprocity in the process of exhumation.

A statement from the office of the Serb Republic prime minister, dispatched to SRNA today, stresses that the Serb Republic government decided to do this after the Croat and Muslim side prevented the completion of the exhumation from the Serb mass graves in Glamoc and on Ozren on 5 August, despite an agreement with Michael Steiner, deputy to the high representative.

"This has caused justified discontent and indignation among the families of captured soldiers and missing civilians from the Serb Republic," the statement from the prime minister's office stresses and notes that the Interior Ministry has been instructed to implement the ban on exhumation in Serb Republic territory.

"The government demands once again that a meeting at the highest level between representatives of the Serb Republic and the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation be held as soon as possible in the presence of the high representative and Red Cross representatives, in order to discuss the serious crisis caused by the holding of prisoners, the slow pace of tracing missing persons, and the prevention of exhumation," the statement says in conclusion.

B-H: Friend Reminisces About Karadzic

96BA0414A Ljubljana NOVA REVIJA in Slovene May 96 pp 38-51

[Article by Josip Osti: "Radovan Karadzic: Poet and/or War Criminal"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Passage omitted] Not long after he became president of the SDS [Serbian Democratic Party] and later also of the self-styled Republic of Srpska [RS], Radovan Karadzic, a poet and psychiatrist, brought the majority of the Serbs living in Bosnia-Herzegovina into war. He was joined in this, in addition to the former Yugoslav People's Army [JNA], by many people from Serbia and Montenegro, not just Arkan's and Seselj's volunteers, desirous of plunder and thirsty for blood. He thus became responsible for many crimes committed in the last few years in Bosnia-Herzegovina, especially against the Muslim residents, who were subjected to merciless genocide. I am thus talking about a politician who formerly engaged in literature. I do not know whether he is engaged in it today, although in recent years he has received awards for poetry. I am thus talking about the man who was born in 1945 in Montenegro, in the Durmitor village of Petnica near Savnik, was educated from 1960 and spent most of his life in Sarajevo, in the city around which he tightened a lethal circle, together with more than a few writers who had lived in it until the beginning of the siege; about the man who for several years disgracefully destroyed and ruined, in addition to too many innocents, a large number of his former acquaintances and friends, including also many writers. Because of those increasingly more obvious consequences of the fulfillment of the hellish plan of a Greater Serbia, articulated in the memorandum from the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts, which was composed and then also supported by many Serbian writers, I entitled my contribution at the Bled PEN meeting in 1992 "Defend Writers, and Also Defend Against Writers." Among other things, in that article I wrote about the writers who were serving under the Chetnik flag, both in Serbia and in Bosnia-Herzegovina, under a black flag with a skull and crossbones. Some of them, like the professor and writer Vojislav Maksimovic, even played soccer with severed human heads. I am thus talking about how the "lyric poet" Radovan Karadzic and Serbian writers from Bosnia-Herzegovina, gathered around him, tried to fulfill the concepts of Dobrica Cosic, Antonije Isakovic, and many other writers regarding Greater Serbia, with whom they indoctrinated many members of the Serbian population and made it possible for Milosevic to rule with the mass psychology of fascism—in good faith that all Serbs are not Chetniks, and as many people are convinced, that all Chetniks are Serbs. [passage omitted]

The most frequent boiling point of our disagreements and quarrels was our different views of Albanians and Muslims. Just like many Serbian and Montenegrin nationalists I knew in Sarajevo and Belgrade, he considered them people of a different type. He did not agree with talking about them as people, equal to others, especially to members of his people—whereas he, like many Serbs and Montenegrins, recognized Croats as a people in spite of displaying the traditional Serbian intolerance or, more precisely, historical enmity toward them. For me, however, the basic precondition for any conversation was for us to talk about the members of any people whatsoever primarily as people. We often had to cut off our conversations of this kind or else they would end in a quarrel.

I remember that once my friend Norwegian poet Arne Ruste was present at such a conversation with Karadzic; unused to such conversations, he thought that we would come to blows. Of course, neither that conversation nor any other one ended in a fight. This time Karadzic was playing the fiddle. As Ruste told me later, that playing on one string and Karadzic's prolonged heroic monotonal, if not atonal, song did not seem any less unusual and alien to him than our way of talking. Our discussions, association, and encounters ceased, as I said, at the beginning of the 1980's. Today I can place as the focus of our quarreling what was preparing for the collapse of the former Yugoslavia, as well as everything that caused the bloody events after the collapse—the war, fortunately short, in Slovenia, where I was at that time, the war in Croatia, and the bloody and prolonged war in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

I admit that at the time of our association and conversations, in spite of all the disagreements and disputes, I was not even able to foresee that one day some of my acquaintances and friends, especially writers of Serbian and Montenegrin nationality, would relentlessly, relying on the power of the JNA, which had overnight become a Serbian and Chetnik army, which was also joined by a large part of the majority, Serbian part of the police, attack the city where we had lived until then, and kill their former neighbors! But to the extent that writers in Serbia, in agreement and in direct cooperation with Serbian writers from Bosnia-Herzegovina, shaped the plan for Greater Serbia, many writers of Serbian nationality in Bosnia-Herzegovina also carried it out in the past three and a half years in the most savage way. It is not just that Radovan Karadzic—at the head of those who, on behalf of so-called higher national interests, expressed the basest human passions and caused evil in Bosnia-Herzegovina, from the beginning of the war until now, when the Hague court has indicted him for war crimes—was surrounded by a large number of writers. Some of the writers who before the war were at the same coffehouse table and even in the same anthologies, not only sided with the criminals but also became criminals themselves when the war began. Some of them, however, not only sided with the victims but also became victims themselves.

As a native of Sarajevo, I am a witness, in spite of everything that has happened and is happening, of the fact that so-called ordinary people knew how to live and respect each other's differences, both ethnic and religious and every other kind. As a person who participated for 30 years in the public and cultural life of that city and of Bosnia-Herzegovina, I witnessed the ethnic tensions that were also produced by politicians even in the one-party system, under the highest authority of the Communist Party. And in spite of the overall and generalized party condemnations of nationalism, condemnations acceptable with respect to nationalism that does not fight for its own people but rather against another, some politicians, members of all three constituent peoples, supported extreme nationalists among the members of their own people, although rarely in public, but not that secretly. Nationalist consensuses were often concluded among them, just as they have been concluded and are still being concluded today for political purposes between extremist nationalists from different peoples. The politicians not only stood behind the so-called official nationalist poets, but also established them, and if necessary, even invented them. [passage omitted]

During the period from the beginning of the war until now I have spoken and written several times about Karadzic. It is true that I intended to write a letter to him and to some of the writers around him whom I knew, and also to my acquaintances who were writers in Belgrade, who did not utter even a word in condemnation of the deeds of their compatriots that were committed in their names. But I did not do it. I did not finish and publish the letters that I began to write on several occasions. Now that I have decided to say something more about Karadzic, my conscience deters me from spitting in the face of every tyrant who is dead. Or, as they say in Bosnia, no candle has burned until the morning. The end is also coming for him, because of the expected mutual settling of scores among the Serbian rulers. He will be taken care of—I was convinced of this even before the beginning of the war's suffering—by the one whose orders he was following and with whose blessing he did what he did, forgetting that power and rule have been achieved and maintained throughout history usually through the sacrifice of followers and their associates. This erases the traces of their own responsibility for the crimes with which every road to a ruler's throne is paved, and at the same time also eliminates the danger of possible pretenders to the throne. In spite of his new threats of war, the roaring of a wounded lion who has the bone of an integral Sarajevo lodged in his throat, the kind of Sarajevo envisioned by the Dayton peace agreement, while a mouse is hidden in his heart, rightfully frightened by the Hague tribunal's indictment for war crimes, it seems to me that he is himself moving the hand by which I write this. [passage omitted]

In an interview with Karadzic published on 21 November 1991 in Sarajevo's SVIJET, which I read after four years, he wrote in regard to his last visit to Sarajevo, "If the tables at Istra and Parkusa could talk.... Sidran, Josip Osti, Rajko Petrov Nogo used to sit there for days and nights...." That is one of the smaller and harmless lies uttered in that interview, and not just by virtue of the fact that he gave it as a party leader and the imagined Messiah of the Serbian people in Bosnia, and not just Bosnia, since he later even compared himself and equated himself with Christ. We can agree with his statement "It is enough to have five friends in one's whole life" and a little less with his claim that "he preserves and cherishes his friendships," since among his five friends he also counted Vesovic and Sidran, with whom he split up long ago, in addition to Nogo and the Koljevic brothers. Even if he had not split up with them, however, for three and a half years he has been shooting at them and their families, which proves how he "preserves and cherishes his friendships." In that interview he emphasizes his immemorial religiosity, about which I previously did not even know as much about as the intimate secrets he confided to me. Likewise, his saying that he was "the son of an ardent anticommunist" conceals what was known in Montenegro, where everything is known, and what Vesovic later published in his articles. Marko Vesovic—his father was a partisan and then a victim of the new regime, and in that regard there is a considerable difference between him and Karadzic—writes about how Karadzic "boasted to him that his father was a dangerous partisan." And furthermore: "From which I understood that Vuk was one of the tradesmen who went to join the Chetniks and came back from the partisans.... And he became a partisan, worse than many of the original ones." And he adds that Karadzic's father Vuk, who was a Chetnik and was later put on trial because of incest and not for political reasons, even "tried to win a partisan memorial for himself." Radovan also continued that kind of double life. I do not know whether lying is a hereditary disease, but I know, better today than ever before, that Radovan Karadzic is the kind of liar that his father was. All sorts of things that he said publicly and promised as a politician in past years turned out to be lies, just as theft motivated his fellow fighters "for the Serbian cause," especially the volunteers from Serbia and Montenegro. Ultimately, someone else's territory that has been taken away by force of arms is nothing more than theft. Through this kind of theft he has grabbed 70 percent of Bosnia-Herzegovina's territory, in the name of the fewer than 33 percent Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina before the war. Under pressure from the defensive forces of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army and the world public, especially the United States of America, he agreed to a 50:50 division, although reluctantly; that theft, although certainly smaller, has thus been officially recognized. [passage omitted]

Within that generation, Radovan Karadzic, with his two books by that time, *Insane Spear* (1968) and *From Time Immemorial* (1971), that is, with a few of the best poems in *From Time Immemorial*, was a poet who was neither at the top nor the bottom in the 1970's, but rather one of those in the second rank. When he devoted himself to the medical profession, he dropped out of that rank in time, and published little. [passage omitted]

It is increasingly obvious that the evil that he has committed to date is more a consequence of a desire for literary recognition and property, and not a devotion to higher national interests, which he frequently cites, and which, of course, cannot be an excuse for even one human life lost, much less for thousands of people dead. This is demonstrated by his unsated thirst for laurels and insatiable plundering, since it is known—and a great deal more has yet to be found out—that the first big machinations at the beginning of the war associated with the purchase and sale of oil and so forth filled not only his pockets but also the safes of Cypriot and possibly other banks as well.

Let me go in order, as much as possible, in this memoir of mine, as chaotic as the time we live in, about that frequently dual personality of Karadzic's. Like a lot of other former acquaintances, he was a person with dual depths—for a long time concealing even from us who knew him for several years his real face and his dark side, which in recent years have been recognized by many people not only in Bosnia but also throughout the entire world.

It happened that I came to know him considerably later than most of our common literary fellow travelers. It was partly because I was born in Sarajevo, and he only enrolled in secondary school in Sarajevo and then studied at the medical school, whereas I studied at the school of philosophy, because we had different interests and spheres of movement, different circles of acquaintances and friends. We probably used to encounter each other at the 08 literary forum, as part of which we young writers used to gather then, and possibly at some common, generational literary events, but we did not know each other. We did not even know each other at the time of the student movement in Sarajevo in 1968, although we were both involved in it. I remember that at that time he was tall and had long thick hair (much later he said in a certain interview that he had long hair allegedly because of his big ears) and a striking appearance; he spoke together with Rajko Nogo from the building of the philosophy school, from which the student demonstrations went through the city, and the police then rushed at the demonstrators who were sitting in the street—including me in the front ranks—and beat many of them with clubs, which also did not spare me. (When I later thought about the student movement and was familiar with the careers of most of the leaders both in Europe and in Yugoslavia, and although I agreed with the ethical and social principles of the student demands, I was more and more convinced that even then some of them displayed a desire for power. As time went by, that belief of mine was more and more justified. Today it has undoubtedly been confirmed.) One day I was introduced to him on Titova Street in Sarajevo by poet and prose writer Andjelko Vuletic, with whom he was then going to a soccer match. (Later Karadzic was a sports physician for the Sarajevo soccer club, and then for a long time at Belgrade's Red Star.) We did not know each other any better even at the time of the ban on the student newspaper NASI DANI, where I was the culture editor and which was banned in 1969, on the first anniversary of the movement, because of the articles by Aziz Kadribegovic and Zoran Djuricic and my poem entitled "Third Person Plural." That issue also had a report on the disgracefully low workers' wages earned in the workers' barracks not far from the athletic field where I trained, written by Radovan Karadzic and by Nagorka Idrizovic, who today is a reporter for Sarajevo's OSLOBODJENJE.

I remember that he told me several times that the newspaper was banned because of their article, but some people claimed later, certainly after any danger of consequences had passed, that it happened because of their articles and not because of the articles that were cited in the order for the banning and confiscation of the newspaper. I considered that and several other things to be one of many human weaknesses and a youthful desire for recognition. [passage omitted]

I would be lying if I kept silent about many of his human qualities in our further association; at that time he was a candidate to be a good psychiatrist, precisely because he devoted so much attention to his patients. We could call him at any hour of the day or night, and not just when I or my family members needed help. It was not beyond him to get out of bed at night and take a person who needed help to the hospital in his car and then visit him several times a day. [passage omitted]

Inconsistent with his figure, which was enormous, Karadzic was not an authoritative figure but rather an authoritarian one; I would even say that he was docile, obliging, and even servile. I do not know how and when his Copernican revolution occurred. I do know that he viewed Nikolo, one of the Koljevic brothers, today next to him the top one among the Bosnian Serbs in Pale, who, as we say here, was a meter and a razor's edge tall, with awe and respect because of his profession as a professor and his doctor's title and his bourgeois pedigree. It was as if he did not reach Nikolo's knees, and not the other way around. Then Karadzic became the superior of Nikolo Koljevic, who has often in recent years acted like his servant, parroting his words and carrying out his orders. Since I have mentioned Koljevic—I think that in his case Karadzic proved to be a good psychiatrist because he made maximum use of his complex as a younger brother, one who tried to compensate in politics for the difference in scientific fame enjoyed by his older brother Svetozar, both at home and abroad, especially in Great Britain.

I would venture to say with great certainty that the ones who are mostly to blame for what he became and what he did are those who established him as a leader, and perhaps most of all Rajko Petrov Nogo, undoubtedly one of the leading poets, and not just of the generation that Karadzic and also Nikola Koljevic belong to. [passage omitted]

I remember how he mentioned several times that a wrong had been done to him because he did not receive the Ducic Poetry Evening award in 1969 for his first book. [passage omitted]

At that time and for several years afterward I was not aware of the unsteadiness of the Bosnia-Herzegovina ground, which kept trembling in countless small shakes, which predicted the great catastrophic earthquake. When the maps, especially the nationalistic and chauvinist ones, were put on the table, the fog with which a great many things were concealed and hidden just began to disperse. Just as many solid and deep links between causes and effects in events at that time in Bosnia-Herzegovina were becoming more clearly visible, so today there is a clear link between the attempts to establish Ducic Poetry Evenings and the granting of the award of the same name to Radovan Karadzic, and what is happening today in Trebinje, the center of the Serbian conquest of eastern Herzegovina, where a former bus driver, the notorious Vucurevic, is in power, who several times threatened the complete destruction of Dubrovnik, and events in Bosnia-Herzegovina in general, since we must be aware that for a long time many poets of Serbian nationality from Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia strutted around for years in Trebinje. Among them there were many, from both sides of the Drina, who had been forging their plan of a Greater Serbia for a long time, and also many who were changing those dreams into a nightmare and a bloody reality.

Even if we are only superficially familiar with the historical situation, we should not overlook the connection between the Sarajevo assassination and the assassination attempt against Sarajevo 70 years later, and not just as two extremes of the realization of Greater-Serbian national or nationalist aspirations, since it is also not possible to neglect the considerable similarities between the assassins then and now. In both cases, they are a group of intellectuals, primarily writers, who have been the igniters of a destructive, all-destroying detonation. [passage omitted]

Radovan Karadzic also identified himself with the young Bosnian assassins, and not just as a poet. The last two facts deserve a few words more about his convertitis and immaturity, which cost many people a great deal, even their lives. I repeat: both Muslims and Croats, and Serbs as well. In this regard we must not forget that the main Greater-Serbian ideologue in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the historian Milorad Ekmecic, stated that they, i.e., the leaders of the Serbian people, were prepared to sacrifice even several hundred thousand Serbs for the higher national goals. One cannot help asking how many members of other peoples. Although the discovery and excavation of mass graves has just started, the slaughter to date has partly answered that question as well. Although he himself is a Montenegrin and one of those who have been trying to convince not just me for years and years that Montenegrins are different from Serbs in their physical constitution, which one can see at first glance, because as a rule they are tall and strong, and that they have a different mental constitution, which one had to believe from him as a psychiatrist, that they had their own state earlier than the Serbs, which is a historical fact, and that they had a greater poet—thinking of Njegos—than the Serbs, which is also true, Karadzic, before the establishment of the SDS in Bosnia-Herzegovina, also became a bigger Serb than many Serbs. His obsession with the Serbian national myth and with the young Bosnian assassins crowned with a mythic aura became public and even unusually demonstrative, which is typical of converts, who have no choice but to constantly convince themselves and others of the credibility of the role that they have adopted. He also adopted that role for different reasons, for literary and financial reasons. That is also proven for us by his poetry, into which we should of course not read things that are not there. Admittedly, in his case, as in that of Dobrica Cosic, the author of "Time of Death," whose Memorandum project of a Greater Serbia he is implementing through destruction and violence, we can find written some of what they are doing. There is no doubt that Karadzic, as he himself says in his poem "Morning Bomb," is "carried away by the formula of nothingness." I do not know how much truth there is in his assertion in the poem "Goodbye Assassins": "History has turned its back on us." I do know that he found an answer to his own question, posed in that poem: "What to shoot at?" I also know that he did not miss the opportunity that he talks about: "That last chance to bloody myself, I am leaving it, let it go," since his hands are already so bloody that there is no water that could clean them. When we talk about the Sarajevo assassination and the assassination attempt against Sarajevo, we must note that the SDS in Bosnia-Herzegovina, which has been headed the whole time by Karadzic, also formed the Young Bosnia organization, which was supposed to bring together the young Serbian intelligentsia.

I have already mentioned the manuscript of his novel—I no longer remember its title—which was not published. For the critics, it was a description of an old man who will never die, an allusion to Tito. That argument, which was not founded in the text, could be disputed, but it seems to me that the fate of that novel was decided by a political background that was hidden from me at that time—something that the regime at that time, the party and the police, knew about Karadzic's ties with the Serbian and pro-Chetnik nationalists and their illegal activities, something that he himself concealed skillfully from his closest friends, including me during the period of our association. As time went by, it became more and more open. Because of the obscure and sinister background, the trial during which Karadzic spent a year in investigative detention because of suspicions of criminal machinations in connection with the building of his weekend cottage in Pale, which was also intended as a chicken farm and mushroom farm, was even more mysterious; he ended up being acquitted because of a lack of evidence. Momcilo Krajisnik, who was employed at the enterprise that built Karadzic's weekend cottage and is today the president of the RS Assembly, was also in jail at the same time and on the same charges. Perhaps it is a coincidence. The suspicion of their guilt was perhaps also unfounded, but not necessarily, since we must not forget that most of the leading personnel in the Sarajevo and Bosnia-Herzegovina police, and also the command of the JNA, were of Serbian nationality, and that the JNA turned into the Serbian army overnight, and was also joined by many people in the Serbian part of the police, both in Croatia and in Bosnia-Herzegovina. At the beginning of the war most of them went over to the side of the attackers, along with their weapons. The manuscript of Karadzic's novel, however, talks about the filming of a movie about the Sarajevo assassination and at the same time about the events that caused World War I, about contemporaries dressed in historical uniforms, about a bloody masquerade of Balkan vampires, the kind that was staged not long afterward by Karadzic and all those who follow him or consent to have him lead them. A giant lizard that from time to time pops its head from behind the peaks of Trebevic and looms over Sarajevo gives the novel a fantastic dimension. At a time when an evil fate has overtaken that city and it is being fired upon precisely from Trebevic by its former residents, who are killing their fellow citizens, acquaintances, and friends there, what once seemed unusual and fantastic in this novel has become extremely real and an everyday matter.

Many examples confirm that in many respects the costuming and scenery of this masquerade have been staged. These examples include not only the most illustrative ones, his turning his skin inside out and his transformation from a Montenegrin into a Serb, which gained the aspects of a farce and a grotesquerie in Lazar Stojanovic's film "Serbian Epic," filmed in Serbia and the parts of Bosnia conquered by the Serbs. In that film Radovan Karadzic repeated several times on the TV screen, to me, who knows what he once said, and to many others, looking us in the eyes, that he was from the old Serbian family Karadzic. It was filmed in the house of Vuk Stefanovic Karadzic. He lit incense below an icon and crossed himself, which he has done several times recently, as he is often in the company of dignitaries of the Serbian Orthodox Church, many of whom, including Patriarch Pavle, support all means that would lead to the goal of a Greater Serbia and win a victory for Orthodoxy against Islam on the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Even when I phoned my mother, who still lives in Sarajevo, toward the end of 1991 and asked her what she was doing, she answered that she was watching a Christmas TV program from Radovan Karadzic's apartment, where there were incense and icons. At the time when I used to visit him in his apartment, I never saw either icons or incense there.

There has thus been either a big transformation or else an even bigger simulation, a false one, and a politically profitable costuming and game. He goes on acting in Stojanovic's film, and points a finger at a portrait of Vuk Karadzic on the wall, and then at the dimple in his chin, which is supposedly irrefutable proof that they are related. Then he takes Vuk's fiddle, sits down on his bed, and starts to play it. The next frames show the eating and drinking of Serbian soldiers, while precisely at that time in Sarajevo and many other cities people were dreaming of a little piece of bread and a drop of water, and in the next frame he is walking along mountain paths and reciting his love poems. Although I am inclined toward observation and assessment of a work and an author separately, Karadzic, with this and with many other things, almost forces us to link his poetry and him. It seems that he is convinced that what he is doing as a politician and a warlord he is also doing for his poetry; I myself am deeply convinced that he is working against it, just as I think that everything that he is doing for the Serbian people—although it is questionable how sincerely—is actually against it.

Radovan's mother, a short and frail old woman, also appears in the film. I also knew her (as well as his younger brother, who, if memory does not deceive me, I can recognized among the armed gorillas who surround him at every step). She is looking with joy and unconcealed pride at her Rasa, who has become "someone" and "something" and who, with his raised head and double chin, so corpulent that his clothing is bursting at the seams, does not conceal his own pride, as if it were something that one can be justifiably proud of.

At one time political power on the conquered territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina called the Republic of Srpska was too little for Karadzic, and he was also proclaimed the supreme military commander. He appears in military uniform and with a revolver at his belt. Few people know that he was never even in the army at all and that in spite of the Montenegrin and Serbian cult of weapons and soldiers he was excused from the army thanks to a Montenegrin doctor who knew him and—as he claimed—entered a false diagnosis that he had a stomach ulcer. I myself am one of those who were not lucky enough to avoid the army, but I am happy for anyone who managed to do so, including him. But his frequent tasteless "Serbifying" as a new-made Serb deserves to have one remember him for this and add, cynically, of course, the well-known saying: "The Serb gladly wants to join the army." Although I am deeply convinced that everyone, even a Serb, especially one who is forcibly mobilized, would much rather leave the army. I myself have said several times how good it is to join the army, since there is nothing more wonderful than leaving it.

What is happening in Bosnia and how Karadzic has been behaving in recent years indicate how times and people can change rapidly, more rapidly than our adjustment to their changes, so that sometimes it is difficult for us to recognize them. Although it is the same person, when we talk about Karadzic it also seems to me that I am talking about someone else, a stranger, or someone who once was different. It is difficult to believe that, and it is even more difficult to believe that he was the same as he is today, always prepared to have a person killed in front of him or with his blessing just because he is a Muslim or a Croat and not a Serb, and not just one, but thousands, not to mention the other evils. [passage omitted]

The tragedy of Sarajevo, in fact, was caused primarily by newcomers, those who lived in the city, but never came to adopt it, and thus not just Karadzic, but also a whole series, who surround him in Pale and who have committed inconceivable barbarisms along with him. The Shakespeare scholar Dr. Nikola Koljevic, for example, the vice president of the RS, Dr. Aleksa Buha, a professor of classical German philosophy, the RS foreign minister, Dr. Vojislav Maksimovic, who taught the world novel and is now the rector of the RS university and the mayor of the Serbian part of Sarajevo, the prose writer Miroslav Toholj, the RS minister of information, the poet Todor Dutina, the director of the Serbian news agency SRNA, and then the RS representative in Russia, and many others. [passage omitted]

December 1995

Translated by Barbara Subert [as published]

Croatia: Tudjman Announces Accord on Diplomatic Ties to Serbia

LD0708175996 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 7 Aug 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Croatian President Franjo Tudjman returned to Croatia from Athens this afternoon. Silvana Fable has a report on the president's arrival at Pula Airport:

[Begin recording] [Fable] Upon arrival at Pula Airport, President Franjo Tudjman made the following comments about the talks with Slobodan Milosevic:

[Tudjman] As you have heard, the meeting with President Milosevic was held in Athens at the invitation of the Greek prime minister and attended by the Croatian and Yugoslav foreign ministers. The statement which has already been issued says that we agreed to normalize relations in all spheres, which includes establishing diplomatic ties. The foreign ministers will sign definitive agreements about this later this month, on 23 August I think.

There was talk about both sides immediately supplying all available information about missing people. There was also talk about the problem of Prevlaka—which is a problem for some people, but not for us—being reviewed from the viewpoint of security in the area, which means in both Boka Kotorska and Dubrovnik, in the spirit of joint efforts toward a peaceful resolution of all problems, including that one.

Briefly, you will understand that it all boils down to us having agreed to normalize all issues [as heard], all outstanding problems, ranging from transport links to economic issues, which will of course facilitate and speed up the completion of the peaceful reintegration of the Croatian Danubian area—Baranja, eastern Slavonia and western Srjem. It will certainly have a positive impact on resolving the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina in the spirit of the Dayton Agreement, and it will also be a buttress of peace in the whole region, in eastern Europe. [passage omitted]

Croatia: Tudjman Statement on Normalizing Relations With FRY

AU0708140496 Belgrade BETA in Serbo-Croatian 1137 GMT 7 Aug 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Zagreb, 7 August (BETA)—Croatian President Franjo Tudjman stated today that in intensive diplomatic-political activities following the signing of the Dayton accord, the main question has been the normalization of relations between Croatia and Yugoslavia.

Tudjman made the statement at Zagreb airport before his departure for Athens, where he is meeting with Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic.

"With the Dayton accord we accomplished an armistice. Since then, at all levels, from the EU to the United States, intensive diplomatic-political activities are continuing, the aim of which is to create conditions for peace and lasting stability of the new world order," Tudjman said.

"It is clear to everybody that in this respect the main question is the normalization of relations between Croatia and Serbia; that is, their Yugoslavia. That is the purpose of this trip. Additionally, it ought to be said that since the very beginning Greece is the country that has been contributing to our achieving the normalization as soon as possible," the Croatian president said. [passage omitted]

Croatia: Reactions to Resumption of Ties to Serbia Gauged

AU0708170696 Paris AFP in English 1651 GMT 7 Aug 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Zagreb, Aug 7 (AFP)—Croatians in Zagreb Wednesday [7 August] expressed mixed feelings about the news that Croatia and Federal Yugoslavia had agreed to establish diplomatic relations by the end of this month.

Relations were broken off between Belgrade and Zagreb when Zagreb declared independence in 1991 and Belgrade backed a brutal rebellion by Croatian Serbs.

But Greek Prime Minister Costas Simitis said Wednesday that Federal Yugoslavia and Croatia had decided at a summit in Greece to establish diplomatic relations at the end of the month.

"It was time to settle the question (of relations with Belgrade)," a 45-year-old sweetcorn seller who identified herself only as Haki, told AFP here.

The war "had made so many people unhappy ... we have to rebuild the ties ... they have to be rebuilt now," she said.

Drazen Kocijan, a 25-year-old working for an import-export business, agreed that it was a good thing to move towards full relations.

"Every step towards a peaceful solution has to be applauded," he said, but the questions of the people still missing from the 1991-1995 war between Croatian and breakaway Serbs, should be settled "before there is a full normalisation of relations," he added.

Stevo, a 48-year-old Croatian Serb, one of 10,000 remaining in Croatia, was more enthusiastic.

"I think it's great," he said. "I'll be among the first to go there to see my family and friends."

A young woman, who asked not to be named, was more cautious.

"One day, probably, there will be real relations, but I think it is too early now, the wounds are too fresh. For the moment, I think its best to stay as far from them (the Serbs) as possible," she said.

Having fought against Serbs in the war, a 20-year-old soldier was not now willing to see Serbs in Zagreb.

"A Serb embassy, a Serb flag in Zagreb, I can't believe it. We cannot allow it to happen," he said.

For Jadrankra Cigelj, a 48-year-old Bosnian Croat who said she had been held in the Serb-run Omarska detention camp in 1992, no deal could be made with the Serbian president, Slobodan Milosevic.

"The (Croatian) president has to have his reasons but, for me, I think you cannot do this while Slobodan Milosevic is still president," she said.

Mara, a 72-year-old flower seller, was more philosophical.

"It's normal. We need each other. We suffered a lot in this war, but our future is tied to the Serbs," she said.

Croatia: International 'Ultimatum' on Herzeg-Bosnia Criticized

AU0808090396 Zagreb NACIONAL in Serbo-Croatian 2 Aug 96 p 3

[Commentary by Roman Majetic, editor and commentator of NACIONAL: "The European Union Will Withhold DEM [as published] 350 Million to Croatia, Forbid Imports of All Goods, and Infinitely Postpone Admission Into Institutions of the Council of Europe!"]

[FBIS Translated Text] As Croatian media reported on Wednesday, 31 July, President Tudjman received Dr. Ejup Ganic, the vice president of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Although the President's Office reported that Dr. Tudjman held a meeting with Vice President Ganic, it was, in fact, much more than that. Kresimir Zubak, the president of the Federation; representatives of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Croats; Michael Steiner, the European Union representative; and Peter Galbraith and James Menzies, U.S. ambassadors to Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, were also at that meeting.

Although one expected the main subject of the meeting to be the crisis in Mostar, the basic request of Ejup Ganic—supported tacitly by the presence of the representatives of the European Union and the United States—was the dissolution of Herzeg-Bosnia!

The crisis in Mostar, precipitated by the refusal of the Herzeg-Bosnia leadership to accept the election results, was used only as a pretext to apply additional pressure on Croatia for its policy toward Bosnia-Herzegovina, which has resulted—for the first time since the Croatian-Muslim conflict began in 1993—in threats of sanctions!

An official in the President's Office, with whom we spoke immediately following the Tudjman-Ganic meeting and the Council for Defense and National Security [VONS] session which followed that, claims that the representatives of the international community issued an ultimatum demanding Croatia agree to a compromise in Mostar in obvious and completely disregard for the illegitimate aspects of the elections.

"It is not true that the Croatian side does not accept the results of the elections in Mostar. We have only insisted, as we did again today, on repeating elections in certain electoral units where there were major violations of law. I am thinking specifically of the case in Bonn.

"Although a concrete agreement has not yet been reached, I think that in the next few days, the solution to the Mostar crisis will be sought among the representatives of the national parties, that is, the HDZ [Croatian Democratic Community] and SDA [Party of Democratic Action]."

Ejup Ganic's ultimatum regarding the dissolution of Herzeg-Bosnia and the unrealistic plan for the implementation of such a decision clearly show that Mostar was not the main subject of the meeting. Such demands were also supported by EU representative Michael Steiner. The Americans asked that an agreement be reached without setting any "ultimatums."

Immediately after the Ganic-Tudjman meeting, a VONS session took place, dedicated exclusively to the previous meeting. Although that session once more confirmed that "there undoubtedly were legal mistakes and manipulation of election results regarding the municipal administration in Mostar," pressure was put on the Croatian side to create relations among the states in the region which are unacceptable for Croatia. It is, however, clear now that the Croatian leadership is ready—at least in a declarative way—to fulfill the demands.

The Croatian side requested that, during the session of the Joint Council for Cooperation, the Bosniak side be asked to make additional efforts to affirm the rest of the departments of the federal government in order to—and in line with the Dayton agreement—carry out the transformation of the institutions of Herzeg-Bosnia.

The council emphasized the special responsibility of the Croatian leadership in Bosnia-Herzegovina to protect the interests of the Croats there, which includes eliminating all illegal and politically corrupt procedures and actions, which are simply additional means of putting pressure on the Croatian side.

The representatives of the Croatian Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia [HR HB] received approval to initiate the procedure of transformation of HR Herzeg-Bosnia into a political community of the Croatian people at the next session of the House of Representatives of the HR HB, according to a communication from the VONS session.

Although the communication uses diplomatic vocabulary—so as to emphasize the nonexistent distance between the leadership of Croatia and the leaders of Herzeg-Bosnia—President Tudjman openly said that he was ready to dissolve Herzeg-Bosnia!

Admittedly, this is not the first time that President Tudjman, under international pressure, "agreed" to dissolve Herzeg-Bosnia. The last time he did it was under U.S. pressure; however, although the Croatian Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia was renamed the Croatian Community of Herzeg-Bosnia (this quasi-state was thus given its original name), this little state of Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina did not disappear.

All the Croatian organizations continued to exist: the army and police continued to operate; the official currency was still the Croatian Kuna; and the HR HB state budget continued to be filled exclusively from Croatia's budget except for the poll tax collected by the Herzeg-Bosnian "customs officers" on goods sent to the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Moreover, only a couple of weeks after the alleged dissolution of the HR HB, the reconstruction of the Government of Herzeg-Bosnia was announced pompously in the Croatian media, thereby recognizing its sovereignty, but at the same time, unnecessarily provoking the international community again.

Will President Tudjman really dissolve Herzeg-Bosnia this time, or will there will be one more transparent change to the name of this Croatian quasi-state?

It seems that this time President Tudjman will, nevertheless, be forced to take some kind of a concrete step, so that he can regain the faith of the international community by showing his devotion to the idea of the Federation.

Threats to Croatia

This time requests for sanctions have not come from the countries traditionally unfriendly to Croatia—France and Great Britain—but from Germany, which until recently was Croatia's main European ally and sponsor. This is, perhaps, the best proof that the momentary international position of Croatia is more tragic than in 1993.

The threat of sanctions was publicly mentioned by Hans Koschnick, former administrator of the European Union in Mostar. Scandalous behavior by Herzegovina Croats toward Koschnick—including two assassination attempts—is blamed for this extreme chilling of relations between Germany and Croatia. One German diplomat openly said to the editor of NACIONAL that Germany will probably never forgive Croatia for its treatment of Koschnick.

The confirmation of Koschnick's threat of sanctions arrived through official, diplomatic channels. Admittedly, Croatia is not threatened by sanctions applied against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, but measures to be taken against Croatia in response to noncooperation in Bosnia-Herzegovina were clearly presented to President Tudjman. First of all, approximately DEM350 million of aid would be denied—the amount the European Union intended to send to Croatia in the fall, as part of the DEM1 billion aid package granted to countries devastated by war.

At the same time, the European Union would forbid its members to import goods from Croatia. Finally—and does it really need to be pointed out again?—Croatia's request to be admitted into the Council of Europe would be rejected!

Radical Changes

The president's associate with whom we spoke immediately after the VONS session on 31 July assures us that European Union pressure on Croatia is not the consequence of Croatia's noncooperation in the implementation of the Federation, but of the persistence of the international community to reestablish some kind of Yugoslav state through Bosnia-Herzegovina.

"I think it is completely wrong to assume that President Tudjman opposes the establishment of the Federation. On the contrary, he sincerely believes that he signed a good agreement in Dayton, and he really supports the establishment of the Federation but based upon the principles of the Dayton agreement.

"I am not saying that the president was not more supportive of the Vance-Owen plan, that is, the Owen-Stoltenberg plan, which, in fact, divided Bosnia into three parts, but he believes that the Dayton agreement—although it envisages the establishment of a common state of Croats and Bosniaks—has certain advantages over previous plans. By dividing Bosnia-Herzegovina into three entities, the Bosniaks, as one of the constituent nations, would have access to the sea, while according to the Dayton plan, the coast remains part of the common state.

"It is completely irrelevant whether or not he see the establishment of the Federation as a lasting solution or only as a temporary one, after which it will be divided into two entities.

"The problem lies in the way in which the establishment of the Federation is imposed on the Croats, which is in total opposition to Dayton. First, the Croats are asked to dissolve Herzeg-Bosnia but are offered a simultaneous dissolution of the bodies of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina—that is, a transfer of authorities of those states into the Federation. At the same time, the Muslims would gain dominance in the Federation, which—without having established Croatian authorities in the cantons with the majority of Croatian population—would, in fact, be a centralist state. That means the Muslims would succeed in turning Bosnia-Herzegovina into a civic state in which they would dominate," the President's associate explained.

So what is to be expected in the next couple of weeks? First of all, according to the instructions of President Tudjman, in the next few days the House of Representatives of the HR Herzeg-Bosnia will set a deadline for the dissolution of Herzeg-Bosnia. Unlike previous pretended attempts, this decision on dissolution will probably mean dissolution of the ministries of Herzeg-Bosnia and formal transfer of their authorities into federal bodies.

Nevertheless, one can hardly expect that a real dissolution of Herzeg-Bosnia would occur—that is, that the Federal MUP [Ministry of Internal Affairs] would take control of the Herzegovinian police or that the well-organized Herzegovina police would be arrested. It is even less likely that the economic and political structures in Herzegovina, which are a very important part of Croatia's economic and political system, would dissolve. Such a scenario necessarily implies radical changes in Croatia, and it is hard to imagine that, for example, Herzeg-Bosnia would really disappear, and Gojko Susak, its governor and the second most powerful man in Croatia, would retain his authority.

So there is only one dilemma. Will the international community accept this formal dissolution of Herzeg-Bosnia as a sign that the Croats want to establish the Federation with the Bosniaks, or it will apply sanctions so that Croatia will, for the first time, find itself in a worse position than Serbia?

Croatia: Zagreb Said To Prevent Return of Krajina Serbs

LD0708200896 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1936 GMT 7 Aug 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Beli Manastir, Aug 7 (TANJUG)—The Helsinki Human Rights Committee for the Srem-Baranja region under Transitional U.N. Administration Saturday said that by changing the ethnic structure in large areas in Croatia, the Zagreb regime was preventing the return of Serbs expelled in last year's Croatian aggressions on Krajina.

The warning is contained in a letter addressed by the committee to the embassies of the big powers in Zagreb, the president of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia Zoran Lilic, the presidents of Serbia and Montenegro Slobodan Milosevic and Momir Bulatovic, the leadership of the Srem-Baranja region and various institutions and figures.

The letter points to the latest Croatian plan for settling Croats from Janjevo, Serbia's southern province of Kosovo and Metohija (Kosmet), in Kistanje, near Knin (Serb Krajina).

The plan has caused justified consternation among the Serb refugees from the said area of the Serb Krajina temporarily accommodated in the Srem-Baranja region, and jeopardizes a peaceful and just resolving of overall relations between Serbs and Croats, the letter says.

The plan is contrary to the Dayton Agreement and violates the fundamental human rights of the people who used to inhabit the area for centuries, the letter underlines.

The letter also appeals to all addressees to do all they can to foil this plan for changing the ethnic structure of Serb areas.

Croatia: Martic Blames 'Regime in Serbia' for Fall of Krajina

LD0408142596 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1316 GMT 4 Aug 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Banja Luka, 4 Aug (SRNA)—The gathering of expelled people of Krajina [former Serb enclave in Croatia] and speeches by Milan Martic, president of the Republic of Serb Krajina [RSK], and Vitomir Popovic, deputy chairman of the [Bosnian] Serb Democratic Party [SDS], at the army club in Banja Luka today ended the celebration of the anniversary of the occupation of the RSK.

Addressing the participants, Martic said that the people of Krajina must not forgive or forget what happened to them, or rule out any forms of struggle for return to their homes.

"The world must finally recognize the basic human right of the Serb people of Krajina, the right to survival in their own country, and secure the return of the Serbs, as well as their political and cultural autonomy," said Martic, adding that there can be no return to Croatia while the fascist regime of Franjo Tudjman is in power.

Speaking about the causes of the fall of the RSK, its president said that "the blame was borne by the regime in Serbia, together with the main headquarters of the Krajina Serb Army which obeyed its orders."

Martic thanked the people and leadership of the [Bosnian] Serb Republic who share the same fate with the Krajina refugees and called on all Krajina people to return to the Serb Republic as a temporary accommodation measure before finally returning to their homes.

SDS Deputy Chairman Vitomir Popovic said that the Serb Republic government will soon provide for equal treatment not only for RSK and Serb Republic citizens, but also for all Krajina fighters, invalids, participants in the war, and their families.

Speaking about the status of Brcko, Popovic, who is also a representative of the Serb Republic in the arbitration commission, said: "It will always be a Serb town and there will be no deals about it."

The participants were also addressed by Belgrade writer Brana Crncevic and Banja Luka actor Nebojsa Zubovic, who recited verses from a poem by Dragan Studen, "Krajina people are marching on."

Croatia: Mikelic Denies Backing KOA

AU0708174496 Belgrade DNEVNI TELEGRAF in Serbo-Croatian 4 Aug 96 p 1

[Statement by Borislav Mikelic to Radio Obrenovac: "The Accusations Against Me Are Mentally Sick; Milan Martic Is The One Who Threatened Guerrilla Warfare"]

[FBIS Translated Text] "The accusation of a certain Dusan Vukojevic, chairman of the Association of Wounded Veterans of the Serb Krajina, that I am behind the alleged KOA [Krajina Liberation Army] is, to say the least, incomprehensible and mentally sick. Why, I was even discharged by the extremists because it is well known that I am an advocate of battle, but only by political means," Mikelic said.

"I doubt that the KOA even exists. I know that last year, after the military fall of the Krajina, Milan Martic said that he would return the Serbs to the Krajina by using guerrilla tactics and destroying facilities in Croatia," Mikelic said.

"I reacted then and said that such an idea was insane and that it would not contribute to the Serbs returning to their homes, nor would it contribute to an improved position of refugees on the territory of Yugoslavia.

"Now I also say that the news of the alleged existence of a Krajina Liberation Army can seriously undermine the implementation of the Erdut agreement and cause significant consequences to the security of the Serbs in Eastern Slavonia," Mikelic said to Radio Obrenovac.

Croatia: Rumors About 'Krajina Liberation Army' Assessed

AU0808092496 Zagreb VJESNIK in Serbo-Croatian 3 Aug 96 p 3

[Article by Fran Visnar: "KOA—Neither 'Liberating' nor 'of Krajina' and Certainly Not an Army"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Does the so-called Krajina Liberation Army (KOA) exist? Is it reality or only a fabrication of the Serb pulp press, designed to spur sales in the summer months on the first anniversary of Operation "Storm"?

Official Belgrade and the political associations of refugee Serbs in Serbia and Montenegro decisively denied the existence of anything like that. Sources close to Serb security services, however, claim that Serb authorities have known for a long time that, among the former "Krajisnici" [inhabitants of Krajina], there heve been meetings that they try to keep secret. Not only does the State Security of Serbia routinely record those "re-groupings" among the refugee clique, but it also pursues them closely. Those are, in the first place, former members of the armed formations of "Krajina"—from various paramilitary groups (in Knin and other parts of "Krajina," there were always five to six such groups with 4,500 to 6,000 people), then professional policemen, and finally officers of the former JNA [Yugoslav People's Army], who, in the period from 1990 to 1995, performed intelligence and counterintelligence activities in the occupied parts of Croatia, trained subversive groups, and cooperated closely with similar groups among the Bosnian Serbs. Generally, it is believed that after Operation "Storm," from 15,000 to 20,000 such people left Croatia. Over half of them ended up in Serbia (a very small number of them have been engaged in the Serbian military and civil services), whereas 6,000 to 7,000 (together with Milan Martic) found refuge in Banja Luka. None of them has been disarmed, although the Bosnian Serbs are sometimes worried about the incidents that such people cause.

There Are Some Who Cannot Reconcile Themselves

Nearly 90 percent of the people described can no longer be used for any serious operative tasks, let alone for new penetrations into the liberated Croatian territories, where they can easily be killed or captured alive by the Croatian authorities. There are still several hundred of the most hardcore and best-trained ones, however, who do not think that they should "throw down their guns away and bury the past." Among them, there are some people who had been trained by the so-called Kapetan Dragan, an employee of the State Security of Serbia and its old collaborator from his Australian days, who are well trained for the performance of sabotage and subversive actions.

Some former "Krajsnici" cannot reconcile themselves to the "horrible and infamous" defeat of last year and the rapid loss of their little "parastate." Some of them publicly say that the Croats (Tudjman) have inflicted a bloody and deep wound on the Serbs—just as the Turks did in Kosovo 600 years ago. Their attitudes are the same as the political activity of the Serbian Radicals and various ultranationalist associations throughout Serbia, which even described that catastrophic defeat as "welcome" because, according to them, "in that way, Tudjman filled the Serbs' powerful batteries of revenge."

Among people with such a profile, there will certainly always be those who will decide to follow somebody who is "ready for revenge." Some of them, on the other hand, are so disappointed (they feel deserted and betrayed by Milosevic and his regime) that the start of a "liberation struggle" in Croatia (the third Serb upheaval) seems the only way for their reaffirmation.

Milosevic Does Not Want To Know

Is the creation of a "Krajina Liberation Army"—a sort of Serb IRA—from the former paramilitary formations from Croatia really possible? Realistically, that is possible only with the knowledge, tacit agreement, and secret support of Milosevic's official Serbia. At this moment, it does not suit Milosevic for those desperadoes to really carry out terrorist actions in Croatia, but he will do little to prevent such rumors: In the midst of a promising tourist season, the Croats should be "shaken." When the ammunition for a classical psychological war is missing, such promotions of the so-called KOA in the "independent" Serb press are also welcome—the press that is not directly supported by Milosevic's regime, but which it uses as additional means to feel the Croatian pulse.

The so-called KOA would have a far more fertile ground for action among the Bosnian Serbs who are still loyal to Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic, that is, to their Greater-Serbian ideas. Therefore it is more realistic to believe that the Serb terrorists would try to return to Croatia (across the Sava and Una River) under the sponsorship of Pale or Banja Luka.

And Where Were They Last Year?

However, the prospects for any sort of recognizable guerrilla war in Croatia are nonexistent—on the territory where there is practically no more Serb population, the infiltrated "guerrilla leaders" ("vojvodas") and "partisan (Chetnik) squads" would be as lonely as space stations on Mars or on the Moon. Even if individual "wolves" appeared (which would be very strange regarding the fact that, in August of last year, nobody from that "Krajina" wolves' pack fought), special units of the Croatian special police and the Croatian Army are excellently trained in modern counter-guerrilla action and tactics.

And if there are no "partisan" actions, then what is left is pure terrorism? But it is easier to proclaim that than to achieve it. The Croatian security-intelligence and protective civil-military system is now on top, and it is mature enough to cut the verbal or real "Krajina" bombers at the root with a number of preventive actions. So will such measures be undertaken, discretely or not, in the future? Of course! What sovereign (Western) state does not undertake them? When it comes to terrorism, not undertaking any action would be like asking a dog not to bark.

Poland: Minister Rosati on Ambassadorial Nominations

WS0708140196 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 5 Aug 96 p 3

[Interview with Polish Foreign Affairs Minister Dariusz Rosati by Kazimierz Groblewski in Warsaw; date not given: "Ambassadors Are Not Only Diplomats"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Groblewski] Who proposes such candidates for ambassadors as, a few months ago, Jerzy Jaskiernia and now Andrzej Zalucki [former director of Prime Minister Oleksy's office—K.Gr.] or Ewa Spychalska? Are these your candidates, or have they been submitted by someone else?

[Rosati] I suggest that first we discuss the system, not individual people. Ambassadors are most certainly not only diplomats. Only people who are able to shape an appropriate image of Poland abroad can be candidates for such a position. To do this, one needs to have various abilities and skills; many of them cannot be demonstrated by producing a few university diplomas. For this reason, ambassadorial posts are usually offered to both professional politicians and professional diplomats, who have already acquired the ability to work in a foreign land. A third category consists of prominent specialists in all kinds of fields, people who enjoy considerable scientific or social prestige. There are no rigid rules here, just like in the political life in the area of appointing ministers or the prime minister.

[Groblewski] That is right. There are no rules.

[Rosati] Of course, there are no formal rules, but we have certain criteria. First, certain knowledge that makes a person a good ambassadorial candidate. Such a person must know a foreign language or even several languages; it must be someone who is able to develop and maintain contacts with other people and has experience in dealing with state-level issues. Another criterion is a readiness to serve the Republic. Finally, the third requirement: We demand a certain amount of loyalty to the foreign affairs minister, the prime minister, and the president; ambassadors should be people who do not have any inhibitions to cooperating with them.

[Groblewski] These are theoretical requirements. However, when one hears candidates at sessions of the Sejm Foreign Affairs Commission, one often gets the impression that, unfortunately, their competence is not very high. One telltale characteristic is the way they express themselves, the way they construct sentences that do not say much.

[Rosati] Although I was not present at all hearings, I must say that I am slightly taken aback by this statement. For this reason, let me now tell you about certain other problems that make ambassadorial appointments difficult. Diplomatic service has ceased to be very attractive, and now we have only candidates who accept the conditions we can offer them. Let me put it this way: There are posts that have been vacant for a long time because we are still unable to find suitable candidates.

[Groblewski] Are there not enough competent people in such a big country? Perhaps you are unable to find them?

[Rosati] I have asked most of the political parties in the Sejm to present me with candidates for ambassadors and candidates for posts in the diplomatic service. The response was very weak.

[Groblewski] This is hard to believe.

[Rosati] It was weak, except for the two coalition parties, which submitted a lot of candidates.

[Groblewski] Do you not think that politicians of the coalition are taking advantage of your lack of experience in the diplomatic sphere and presenting you with candidates whom they, from their point of view, see as good, but who are not really competent?

[Rosati] Generally speaking, I do not rule out such a possibility, but this goes not only for the coalition; it may also apply to the other side. Each time I try to evaluate the candidate, and I am convinced that all the candidates that I have put forward so far will make good ambassadors. Thus, let us not make quick evaluations; let us not get ahead of the facts. I also want to say that ambassadorial nominations reflect all forces and that there are also ambassadors who do not come from the coalition—they come from the opposition; this also goes for lower-level posts, about which you do not write but which you perhaps should not ignore.

[Groblewski] We do write about them.

[Rosati] I mean such posts as consul generals, plenipotentiaries, and so forth.

[Groblewski] Do you not think it would be better if there existed formal criteria for the selection of ambassadorial candidates? Then it would be easier to pick the better candidates and avoid pressure.

[Rosati] Now, you are saying that again. Let me reiterate: The post of ambassador is a political post because it requires the ability to take political action.

[Groblewski] What about people who spent many years working at diplomatic posts abroad as representatives of the Polish People's Republic [PRL]? Do you consider this to be an advantage or a disadvantage?

[Rosati] Long service as a diplomat is certainly to one's advantage. Nonetheless, the period we lived in was very special. There were ambassadors who were very actively engaged in defending the political lines binding at that time; there should not be room for such people right now. This must be said clearly, and I am saying this now.

[Groblewski] At the same time, you present candidates who at that time worked in that apparatus; some even worked at the propaganda department of the Central Committee.

[Rosati] Who exactly worked at the Propaganda Section?

[Groblewski] Your candidate for the post in Algeria.

[Rosati] He is primarily a journalist. I do not think he worked there as a full-time employee; he may have been some kind of instructor.

[Groblewski] He did work there, for nine months.

[Rosati] All right. Now, let us take into consideration the fact that he is going to Algeria. He is not going to Belgium or Paris; he is going to Algeria. Let me assure you that this will not mean a big burden to his ambassadorial functions.

[Groblewski] Most of the candidates proposed by you worked in the PRL diplomatic service for quite a long time.

[Rosati] This is because we have no other candidates. Thus, when we say that experience is important, we can only choose from among diplomats of the PRL period. A similar statement must be true of many other walks of life in Poland.

[Groblewski] This means that a vicious circle is formed. Where should other diplomats come from since....

[Rosati] Wait a minute. We also have other candidates. When Krzysztof Skubiszewski was in charge of the ministry, a great many changes occurred, both domestically and at posts abroad. There are also very many people who have worked in the diplomatic service for five or six years now; they are already diplomats. Many of them have proved themselves. This year, five or six candidates for ambassadorships are people who came to work in the diplomatic service after 1990.

[Groblewski] Does this mean that you do not think there is a considerable imbalance in favor of PRL-period diplomats?

[Rosati] That is right, I do not think so. As I have said, experience is in most cases an advantage. However, if candidates were involved in the defense of the political system, the agreements among the allies, and Martial Law, if they did more than their official duties required them to do, then I believe there are a large number of countries where they are incapable of fulfilling ambassadorial functions.

[Groblewski] At that time, many diplomats were in fact intelligence agents. Are you checking this? Are you trying to find out whether those experienced diplomats were in fact diplomats?

[Rosati] Yes, we certainly are carrying out such evaluation procedures. I want to say that, as far as the premises of the Foreign Affairs Ministry [MSZ] are concerned, generally speaking, people who are working here are not threatened by such discrediting. All over the world the diplomatic service required some degree of cooperation with intelligence. It is true, though, that in our country the degree of intimacy with those services was too great in the past.

[Groblewski] Have I understood you correctly? You are checking things, but this is no reason for you to reject a candidate?

[Rosati] We are examining individual cases. If we deal with people who carried out certain surveillance tasks at foreign posts, in Polonia communities, then we do not employ them.

[Groblewski] Do you think it is possible that someone who worked as a diplomat for 40 years in the PRL, someone who has a lot of experience, may still be a bad diplomat?

[Rosati] Yes, I certainly do. However, you have now brought up a more general issue. There are people who were discredited by serving in that system, people who showed considerable political engagement; they cannot be Poland's representatives.

[Groblewski] One might get the impression that you are not very interested in ambassadorial nominations. You seldom personally present candidates at sessions of the Sejm Foreign Affairs Commission.

[Rosati] I get the impression, in turn, that right now journalists are more interested in this than they have been before because I cannot recall such press debates concerning ambassadors when Krzysztof Skubiszewski was minister.

[Groblewski] There were similar debates.

[Rosati] I do not think so. I would be glad to become familiar with them. Most of the ambassadors who were appointed at that time did not have any experience whatsoever.

[Groblewski] Now that you are minister, the ministry is again sending abroad the old ambassadors whose careers were stopped after 1989.

[Rosati] I do not get such an impression. I simply try to reach for all those who may be useful; I do not even ask them about their political affiliation, although, naturally, I do take a look at their record. Now, you ask me whether the balance, the proportions, have been upset. Perhaps these proportions differ from those in the past. Let me put it this way: I try to reach for people on whom I have a personal opinion. However, I have also asked the leaders of other political parties to propose candidates. It is too bad the reaction has been so weak.

[Groblewski] You have not answered my question: Is it true that you are not very interested in personnel issues?

[Rosati] No, it is not true. I was absent from several sessions of the Sejm commission for important reasons. Nonetheless, I want to assure you that no decision is made without my knowledge or approval.

[Groblewski] Is there a political lobby that is exerting pressure on you and actively supporting candidates who worked for a long time in the diplomatic service?

[Rosati] I can say that there exist all kinds of lobbies that apply pressure on me to support certain candidacies.

[Groblewski] What political forces do they come from?

[Rosati] I will not reveal this. I only want to say that I do not yield to that pressure.

[Groblewski] As you remember, there existed a subcommission that was to examine the cadres at the MSZ. This commission organized the so-called open days, when diplomats could come and make complaints. The results of those meetings with diplomats were then included in the appendix to the commission's report in the form of anonymous texts.

[Rosati] They were denunciations.

[Groblewski] Exactly. Among the candidates whom you are proposing for ambassadorships, there are diplomats who held meetings with the subcommission during those open days. Some of them could have been the authors of those denunciations.

[Rosati] Now, do you deny those people the right to come and talk to such a commission if they are invited? After all, they went there under their own names. What the commission did with that is a different story.

[Groblewski] What about such ambassadorial candidates as Jerzy Jaskiernia, Andrzej Zalucki, and Ewa Spychalska? Who has proposed them?

[Rosati] It is true that the candidacy of Mr. Jaskiernia appeared as a result of a certain suggestion on the part of the Democratic Left Alliance activists; I received this proposal with interest. When journalists who had already known about the candidacy asked me whether I could confirm it, I could only deny, of course. At that time, I still believed that it would have been unfair toward journalists and public opinion. Right now I do not have such reservations or doubts. Whenever I am asked whether "X" is a candidate, I refuse to answer the question.

[Groblewski] All right. Now, let us get back to Andrzej Zalucki and Ms. Spychalska.

[Rosati] There are no such candidates; that is all I can say to you about that.

[Groblewski] Andrzej Zalucki is to appear before the commission.

[Rosati] How do you know? Have you seen anything in writing?

[Groblewski] I do not have to see to know.

[Rosati] I neither confirm nor deny.

[Groblewski] Ms. Spychalska has publicly said on the radio that she is a candidate.

[Rosati] Then go ask Ms. Spychalska. The MSZ neither confirms nor denies this.

[Groblewski] When you were to assume your present office, during a hearing at the Sejm Foreign Affairs Commission, you said in reply to one of the questions that you did not know why Poland had not had an ambassador to Belarus for such a long time; you added that this was bound to change because you already had a candidate. Five months have passed since. Why do we still not have an ambassador?

[Rosati] A candidate for ambassador to Belarus was submitted to the commission a few weeks ago. The commission will convene at the end of August. We thought about both Minsk and Moscow for a long time before making a decision. These were two important posts; especially in the case of Moscow, we needed a candidate who would meet a variety of criteria. If, however, a candidate is criticized only because he worked at the Central Committee for a short time, then I want to say that, even though Stanislaw Ciosek had been a member of the Politburo, he made a very good ambassador.

[Groblewski] Still, if Ewa Spychalska were to be appointed ambassador in Minsk, then what about all those criteria you have talked about—competence, expertise?

[Rosati] Let us not speak about Ms. Spychalska or about any other person. I have already said that these are political posts that require political skills.

[Groblewski] You were a member of the Polish United Workers Party until the end. Do you feel like a prisoner of your own record? Are you a prisoner of the coalition, which has proposed you as a candidate for this post?

[Rosati] I do not feel like a prisoner of my record or a prisoner of the coalition because, when I came to assume this office, I was promised full freedom of action and autonomy on cadre issues. Now, please bear in mind that my cadre proposals must be approved by the prime minister and the president.

[Groblewski] So far, there have not been any visible disputes with the president. Have there been any secret disputes?

[Rosati] I will probably not reveal a secret if I say that I hold consultations about my decisions before they are made.

[Groblewski] Does anyone verify the knowledge of foreign languages among candidates?

[Rosati] Indeed, we do not have a formal requirement that says that candidates for ambassadors should pass the state examinations in a given foreign language. Incidentally, this principle was introduced under Minister Skubiszewski. We have not changed it yet, but new ambassadors, especially those who come from our MSZ circles here, are required to pass language examinations.

[Groblewski] How many ambassadorial posts are vacant right now?

[Rosati] There are two kinds of vacant posts. Some are intentionally vacant, due to the low rank of the relations with a given state. Ambassadorial duties in such countries are performed by charges d'affaires. Other posts are vacant because the ambassadors already left their posts and new ones have not arrived there yet. There are approximately 10 posts that are in the latter situation at the moment.

[Groblewski] You have said that most parties are not presenting their candidates. Does this mean you feel that you have been left to your own devices with this problem and that you can count only on the coalition parties?

[Rosati] I can say that I certainly do not like what some parties are doing, particularly the Freedom Union [UW]; although the UW has the possibility of presenting many candidates, it only keeps making reservations that I am pursuing a very one-sided cadre policy.

[Groblewski] Do you not think candidacies put forward by the UW would be rejected by the Sejm commission? We all know the political composition of the commission.

[Rosati] I do not think they would be rejected. I believe that good candidacies would be approved by the commission. I have submitted candidates from outside the coalition configuration, and they were approved.

[Groblewski] Are you satisfied with the positioning of the offices of trade counsellors, envisioned in the reform of the central government bodies? (The offices are to be subordinated to the Ministry of Economy and Trade, which will be established as a result of the aforementioned reform—K.Gr.)

[Rosati] No, I am not satisfied because I still believe that one diplomatic service with economic and financial sections would be more efficient. I also believe that there should be an efficient promotion service, supervised by government agencies; economic self-governments would get more and more involved in it. Such a service would deal with promotion, not for free, of course. This is what I still think, but, as is known, this view has not been supported either in the government or in the Sejm.

[Groblewski] You are in favor of quick ratification of the Vatican Concordat. Why?

[Rosati] First, *Pacta sunt servanta*, which means that, since we have signed the agreement, we should ratify it. There should be some continuity in state decisions. Second, for many years the state and the church in Poland fought each other. I believe that the Condordat in its present form, especially with the additional, detailed interpretation document, will enable us to normalize our relations on a permanent legal basis and free them of all political disputes. And, finally, I believe that this government, this coalition, ought to ratify the Concordat as a gesture of reconciliation with the church because this group waged a fight against the church in the past, and, therefore, it should normalize relations with it. The Concordat offers such a possibility.

Poland: Sejm to Vote Today on Central Administration Reform

LD0808101696 Warsaw Polskie Radio First Program Network in Polish 0900 GMT 8 Aug 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The Sejm is to vote today on the Senate amendments to the central administration reform. The reform has become a subject of dispute within the government coalition. For this reason, Sejm Speaker Jozef Zych is not ruling out early parliamentary elections. Over to our parliamentary correspondent:

[Correspondent] According to the Democratic Left Alliance [SLD], the Sejm should decide on whether to grant the prime minister more extensive prerogatives than he has now, which would also make it possible to define the remit of individual ministers.

On the other hand, the Polish Peasant Party [PSL] wants the ministerial remit to be defined by law, as is the case at present.

The [planned] government central administration reform envisions in its first stage the abolition of seven ministries: Internal Affairs, Industry and Trade, Foreign Economic Cooperation, Ownership Transformations, and Town and Country Planning, as well as the Central Planning Office and the Office of the Council of Ministers. In their place it is planned to establish the ministries of Internal Affairs and Administration, Economy and State Treasury, and the Central Housing and Urban Development Office. The State Protection Office is to be subordinated directly to the prime minister, and its prerogatives are to be restricted.

Poland: Michnik Replies to Report on Massacre of Jews

WS0808103096 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish 8 Aug 96 p 7

[Article by Adam Michnik: "The Madness of Fanaticism"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *The article by Ms. Yaffa Eliach in THE NEW YORK TIMES arouses not only compassion for the victims and anger against the perpetrators, but also opposition.*

The Chief Commission for Investigating Crimes against the Polish nation most probably learned about Ejszyszki from an article by Richard Chesnoff that appeared in the weekly U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT on 3 April 1995. It is obvious that the commission wanted to interview a witness to the crime and that it asked the U.S. Justice Department for cooperation. It is obvious that Ms. Eliach was the only person who could tell the commission about the existence of other witnesses.

Thus, how did the bizarre idea originate that "people who deny that the Holocaust took place"—representatives of the U.S. Polonia, together with the Justice Ministry of the Polish Republic and the embassy in Washington—are after the author's credibility? The Chief Commission lacks just about everything: money, personnel, time. The only thing it has enough of is the will to examine the circumstances of the crime. Those who really want to see the truth revealed also ought to have enough goodwill.

However, there was clearly not enough goodwill in the report written by Professor Eliach. The article is not only a report on the Ejszyski crime, it is also a general allegation leveled at everyone: the Home Army [AK], the current Polish authorities, and Polonia organizations, which, as the author admits, are marginal, as well as the embassy in Washington. It is an unsubstantiated and unfair allegation.

This report is yet another publication that builds up the image of Poland as a country of anti-Semites and criminals. It is an insult to all those who fought for a free, democratic, and just Poland.

The AK was a Polish underground army, part of the anti-Nazi coalition. The AK filled wonderful and heroic pages in the history of the war with the Nazi system. It consisted of various people, certainly including anti-Semites. However, how can one write and leave without comment that the slogan "Poland without Jews" was popular in the AK, in the entire AK? Then what about the assistance offered during the Uprising in the ghetto? What about sentences passed on Poles who provided shelter for Jews in return for money [szmalcownicy]? What about the AK publications, which were full of solidarity with the persecuted Jews?

It is obvious that, just as in any large community, including the Jewish community, in the AK there were also criminals and murderers; there were also murderers of Jews. GAZETA was the first to make known the killings of Jews during the Warsaw Uprising.

Despite that, it is outrageous and inappropriate for a professional historian to use examples of crimes committed by individuals in order to make generalizations concerning the entire heroic and tragic organization that fought for Poland's independence.

The AK, just like underground Poland, had two primary enemies in 1944: Hitler and Stalin. The People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs [NKVD], a tool of the Stalinist policy of subordination, imprisoned and murdered AK soldiers with exacting cruelty. When I read THE NEW YORK TIMES article, I understood the pain of a person who lost her family. The ashes of nearly all of the members of my family are scattered in places where Hitler was implementing his "final solution." However, my relatives, imprisoned by the NKVD, suffered and died in Stalinist camps. I must find room in my memory for the sufferings of both. Prof. Eliach does not seem to know what the NKVD and its courts were really like.

A year ago Mikolaj Wollejko wrote in GAZETA POLSKA about the tragic death of her family members: One example of a well-coordinated operation was the raid on Ejszyszki on the night of 19 October 1994. The purpose of the operation was to liquidate a troublesome spy. Local AK posts were selected to carry out this operation.

Mikolaj Babul ("Gaj") took command. It was not easy to carry out the task, given the presence of a several-hundred-man strong Soviet garrison in Ejszyszki (prison guards, police, NKVD-NKGB, troops).

Prior to the action, local conspirators conducted reconnaissance. While a part of the AK detachment secured the return route, others captured a cooperative and seized leather for shoes and food. A Soviet warrant officer was killed in the battle. Meanwhile, a special task group broke into the house of a Soviet informer. In fact, it turned out to be Russian counterintelligence Captain Smiersza (from the abbreviation Smert Shpionom [Death to Spies]), according to another NKVD document.

A shootout broke out during the attempt to liquidate him. As a result, the Soviet captain was wounded. Unfortunately, Mrs. Sonenson and her small son fell as accidental victims to the shootout. Officer Smiersza was taken away with his secret archives (sekretno-operatsionnyye dokumenty), according to the NKVD report. After interrogation, he was sentenced to death by a field court martial of the polish underground state. The verdict was executed.

I am unable to say to what extent this report is precise. It does not question the tragic death of Mrs. Eliach's mother and little brother. Only the circumstances may become a topic for controversy. However, the circumstances may have a decisive impact on the assessment of these tragic events: An accidental and tragic death is something different from the premeditated murder of a woman and small child.

Let us presume, however, that what took place in Ejszyszki was an anti-Semitic homicide. This would be in line with what we already know about the fate of many Jews in Poland in the period 1944-46, after Soviet troops entered Poland. Much was written about this at that time: Suffice it to recall famous statements by [Polish writers and poets] Jerzy Andrzejewski, Mieczyslaw Jastrun, Kazimierz Wyka, Stanislaw Ossowski, and Stefania Skwarczynska. Later, the communist censorship thrust on Poland by Stalin and the NKVD smothered the possibility of assessing these tragedies and crimes fairly. Today, 50 years later, the dramatic truth about those times returns to us. And we must confront it head on. We owe this to Yaffa Eliach's slain mother and brother. We owe this to her suffering. We owe this to ourselves.

It was a good thing that Bishop Tadeusz Pieronek and Prime Minister Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz told the truth about this issue in Kielce [at the 50th anniversary of the Kielce pogrom].

Every nation has black pages in its history—moments in which reason goes to sleep and specters awake. One can then accuse one's own president of being a Jewish sidekick and assassinate him. This happened to the Poles [reference to the assassination of President Narutowicz after World War I].

One also can accuse one's own prime minister of being a traitor and assassinate him. This happened to the Jews [reference to the assassination of Prime Minister Rabin].

Fanatic hatred always results in tragedy. Let us beware of it in public polemics.

Romania: Clinton's MFN Bill Called 'Signal of Encouragement'

AU0708165296 Bucharest COTIDIANUL in Romanian 5 Aug 96 p 2

[Interview with Mircea Geoana, Romanian ambassador to Washington, by the RADOR News Agency; place and date not given: "For Us, the Gesture of the U.S. President Is an Encouragement"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [RADOR] U.S. President Bill Clinton has signed the law on granting most-favored-nation [MFN] status to Romania on a permanent basis. Therefore, the event that we all expected to happen every year has finally come to pass: The MFN has become a permanent law in the relations between the United States and Romania.

Mr. Ambassador, I would like you to elaborate on the implications of this event—aside from it being a diplomatic gesture required for the validation of the promulgated law—since, I would like to point out that, in the absence of a veto by the U.S. chief executive, the law would have become valid within a matter of days regardless. But President Clinton not only signed the document, but also insisted on making a political statement about Romanian-U.S. relations. Is this a common practice at the White House?

[Geoana] Indeed, I would also like to point to the significance of this gesture. It is not always that President Clinton—when he is promoting some law—feels the need to supplement the moment of the validation of the respective law with a political statement. I think I can read in this gesture a very clear desire on the part of the U.S. Administration to display its unequivocal support for our country.

I believe that this is a signal of encouragement for Romania to persevere along the road it has embarked upon very seriously and consistently, namely the road of reform, democracy, and the European and Euro-Atlantic integration. I also believe that the U.S. Administration wanted to show us that we can count on U.S. support, since, as you know, this law is a bipartisan one, as they call it here in the United States, that is a law endorsed by both Republicans and Democrats, a law also supported by the Democrat administration. I believe that—by signing the law, rather than simply allowing it to become valid automatically, as he could have done—the U.S. President wanted to mark the fact that the support for Romania meets the approval of the administration, the Congress, and the United States in general.

[RADOR] Were you surprised by the speed with which this decision was adopted and by the strong support of the Congress and the executive branch?

[Geoana] I must confess that I was pleasantly surprised this time. Before coming to the United States to fulfill my mission as Romania's ambassador, there was a certain perception that, while we enjoy the administration's support, there are still certain reservations from the legislative branch, that is the Congress. I now believe that we must be more aggressive, assertive, and active in the U.S. political and public life to display our achievements and prove that we deserve to be encouraged.

[RADOR] What do you think of the fact that the U.S. President chose to stress this aspect, which he referred to as a turning point in the relations between the United States and Romania?

[Geoana] I would say that, from a formal and political viewpoint, a certain stage in Romanian-U.S. relations as well as in the relations between the United States and Central and Eastern Europe has come to an end.

The very procedure of granting MFN status to certain countries belongs to the Cold War period. Hence, I would say that we are dealing here with the conclusion of a historical cycle. We are at a historical turning point, I would say, not so much because of the MFN clause per se, but rather because Romania is now entering a new stage, where very serious matters pertaining to the future of our country and of the whole region are being discussed.

The fact that, in his statement at the signing ceremony, the U.S. President mentioned Romania's reintegration in the Western world is a signal that our country is in an accelerated phase of joining the Western world. In this respect, I am primarily referring to Romania's adherence to NATO, which is a fundamental target for the entire Romanian society.

[RADOR] In his statement, President Bill Clinton also referred to Romania's excellent record. However, at the end of his statement, he voiced certain hopes about our country's evolution: the integration in the community of Western democracies; progress in the democratic and economic reforms; observation of human rights; an open attitude toward granting minority and religious rights; and finally the restoration of Romania's good ties with its democratic neighbors. Should one interpret this as indicating that the U.S. authorities will monitor these aspects with regard to our country?

[Geoana] No, I believe we are dealing here with the reiteration of some basic principles which the United States is constantly promoting in the international arena. This does not apply only to Romania.

There is a set of principles and values which the United States sincerely believes in and, if we examine a little more carefully the few ideas and directions which President Clinton underscored in his statement on Romania, we can ascertain that these elements are in practice the criteria for adherence to NATO.

We are talking about democracy, the market economy, human rights, and good neighborly relations. I would say that when we talk about a very good record for Romania, we mean that the Romanians have made significant progress toward fulfilling these criteria, but that there is still some distance to be covered, as is the case with other countries with which we compete for NATO admittance.

I would interpret this passage from President Clinton's statement as a signal of recognition for the progress made and as a signal of encouragement for continuing the process of adjustment to the NATO adherence criteria. To this, I would add that these criteria are also valid for our adherence to the EU.

Romania: IMAS Poll: Iliescu Leading in Presidential Race

AU0808113296 Bucharest ZIUA in Romanian 6 Aug 96 p 12

[Article by Anca Hriban: "The IMAS Poll Shows That One-Quarter of the Population Does Not Want To Vote This Fall"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The IMAS [Applied Media Research Institute] has delivered to its customers the results of the public opinion poll it conducted in the 16-23 July period among a sample of 1,021 citizens.

Regarding the ranking of the political parties, the results were as follows: CDR [Democratic Convention of Romania]—33.5 percent; PDSR [Social Democracy Party of Romania]—27.5 percent; USD [Social-Democratic Union] 13.7 percent; UDMR [Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania]—5.8 percent; PUNR [Romanian National Unity Party]—4.1 percent; PSM [Socialist Party of Labor]—4.1 percent; ANL [National Liberal Alliance]—3.3 percent; PRM [Greater Romania Party]—3.1 percent; PDAR [Democratic Agrarian Party of Romania]—2.9 percent; and MER [Romanian Ecologist Movement]—1.1 percent. The number of those who stated that they do not intend to go to vote is alarmingly high, namely 26.2 percent.

Regarding the popularity of the presidential candidates, the data offered by IMAS shows that Ion Iliescu can count on 37.1, Emil Constantinescu on 31.6, Petre Roman on 18.7, Corneliu Vadim Tudor on 4.7, Gheorghe Funar on 4.3, while Adrian Paunescu on 2.1 percent of the votes.

Romania: Accident Reported at Cernavoda Nuclear Plant 3 Aug

AU0708115996 Bucharest ADEVARUL in Romanian 5 Aug 96 p 8

[ROMPRES report: "Freon Tank Explodes at the Cernavoda Nuclear Reactor"]

[FBIS Translated Text] On 3 August at 1610 a freon tank exploded inside the building that shelters the thermonuclear plant in Cernavoda. The accident did not affect the functioning of the plant in any way and no one was hurt. The causes that led to the explosion are currently under investigation. The environmental radioactivity level remained within the limits of normal natural radioactivity, even in the close vicinity of the plant, according to the Romanian Ministry of Waters, Forests, and Environmental Protection.

Romania: Incident at Hungarian Presbyterian Mass in Cluj

AU0808101996 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 0400 GMT 8 Aug 96

[FBIS Translated Text] According to the ROMPRES news agency and the Budapest Kossuth and BBC radio networks, an incident occurred just before the beginning of the [Hungarian Presbyterian] religious mass in Cluj, when they tried to raise the Hungarian flag in the church. The order-keeping forces of the Presbyterian Church tried to seize the three persons who caused the incident, but they merely managed to catch one of them, whom they then handed over to the police.

According to the BBC, at the police station, he declared that his name was Csaba Kiss. He was fined for having disturbed the public order.

The British radio network also interviewed two UDMR [Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania] leaders about the incident, Csaba Takacs, executive president of the party, and Gyorgy Frunda, the UDMR candidate for Romania's presidency. Mr. Takacs asked for Csaba Kiss to be released and pointed out that, due to the existing atmosphere, the organizers interpreted the gesture of that citizen as an attempt to disturb the festivity. In turn, Mr. Frunda pointed out that the laws allow for the raising of the Hungarian flag at such events, and illustrated this with the fact that the flag had been raised during similar events organized in various stadiums. Frunda then added that Csaba Kiss has been arrested illegally.

Slovenia: Kacin Interviewed on Armament Plans, NATO

AU0608152896 Ljubljana DELO in Slovene 3 Aug 96 pp 31-32

[Interview with Defense Minister Jelko Kacin by Janko Lorenci; place and date not given: "Hesitant Boy and a Manly State"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Lorenci] We have obtained the first recent Slovene military vessel. Did you personally take part in the choice of the model?

[Kacin] I participated insofar as I demanded that the choice be made by the experts. A special working group, Morje [sea], was formed, in which two groups of officers had the main say. The first group consisted of officers who had served on patrol boats of the former Yugoslav navy and had experience with that type of vessel; the second group consisted of the submarine officers, that is, the men who swear by technology and nothing else. For that reason, their opinion was the decisive one. Once the decision was made it was only forwarded to me for approval.

[Lorenci] How much does this little ship cost?

[Kacin] The contract value is $3.5 million, to which one must add the value-added tax, and everything that the state demands and pours from its left pocket back into the right. Then one must also add all the costs of the Morje project, salaries, apartments for officers, mooring costs, overhaul capacities, and so forth. This is, therefore, a wider project that provides us with an answer as to how to defend Slovene territorial waters.

[Lorenci] Did you have any concrete say in naming it Ankaran?

[Kacin] The Slovene Army aircraft and vessels as a rule bear the names of the Slovene towns. There were some ideas to name the first vessel after Koper. We rejected this because in its size it cannot compare with its predecessor (a big patrol ship named Koper) and also because the ship with this name performed a dishonorable mission in the last throes of the former Yugoslavia.

[Lorenci] You concretely favored Ankaran?

[Kacin] Yes. There were three choices.

[Lorenci] I ask this because the technical and expert decisions are probably not the incumbency of the minister.

[Kacin] Definitely because the minister is not a technical expert.

[Lorenci] However, if he is a powerful personality and nevertheless familiar with military issues, especially in a country in which military experts are very much in short supply, then he probably has quite a lot of say?

[Kacin] He definitely has some say. However, my say is chiefly geared at experts being able to say their bit. We will continue to work this way in the future.

[Lorenci] So we got our first military vessel. The military air force will come next, and so forth. In short, will the Slovene Army soon get all the classical army branches?

[Kacin] The Slovene Army branches are laid out by the law and the military defense doctrine. The transformation of the Slovene Army from an armed force based on the doctrine of the SLO [Splosni ljudski odpor—General People's Defense] and DS [Druzbena samozascita—Social Self-Defense] (mass-scale, general resistance in case of a total war) into an armed force that follows the NATO doctrine and primarily performs the role of the deterrent of an aggression, is a process. It can be observed at several levels. Currently at the forefront is the strengthening of the branches that the army has lacked so far or have been insufficiently developed. These are being strengthened at the expense of the infantry. As a result of the development of the technical branches, there is less and less infantry in the modern armies.

The other consequence of these changes is the shrinking of the total scope of the Slovene Army. At the moment the Slovene Army, if it is to carry out a full mobilization, numbers a little more than 60,000 men. In the next two years this figure will no longer exceed 40,000. This rationalization is implemented in an organized and gradual fashion. One of the powerful arguments for it is the recently signed associate membership agreement with the European Union, which improved Slovenia's security position considerably.

Within the Partnership for Peace plan we maintain increasingly intense cooperation with the partner states and NATO members. We approach the matters more globally and in the long term hope to ensure our security on the principle of solidarity and collective responsibility. In the long run, the need for such a large Slovene Army is waning.

[Lorenci] Can you give us a concrete answer? Will the Slovene Army in the foreseeable future also get a modern military air force? Has this decision been made already?

[Kacin] The Slovene Army is already acquiring a modern air force. Everything that we have purchased so far matches NATO standards and the long-term role that the Slovene Army will play in Slovenia's defense. Concretely, our first training squadron is based on Czech aircraft which, however, are equipped with U.S. engines and U.S. avionics—that is, the instruments in these aircraft are identical with instruments in other Slovene Army aircraft. The Bell 412 helicopters that we purchased are very modern aircraft indeed. Our helicopter that recently participated in the big NATO partners' maneuver in Hungary headed a group of other helicopters because it was the only one equipped with satellite navigation. The combat training aircraft that we have purchased so far—Pilatus PC 9—are currently the most up-to-date aircraft in their category. We have been using them actively for two years and the United States decided to purchase more than 7,000 of these aircraft after us. You, of course, want to know when the decision on the multipurpose fighter plane of the Slovene Air Force will be made. This decision is not envisioned for this year. However, we are creating the basic infrastructural preconditions which will facilitate making this decision this year....

[Lorenci] ...however, not necessarily its adoption....

[Kacin] A decision is never a must. This decision was not possible this year because of the arms embargo and because the country would not have much to choose from. The decision must be coordinated with our allies and our long-term orientation. When the Slovene Army purchases the fighter plane, it will not purchase it merely for use over the territory of the Republic of Slovenia but all over Europe....

[Lorenci] ...if it purchases it. For many this is still a controversial decision.

[Kacin] Any decision can be controversial. However, it is up to those who have the mandate to make them.

[Lorenci] We are, therefore, reducing our army numerically. Does this mean that we are in the middle of a change of the military system, that we are slowly abandoning the conscript model and moving to the semiprofessional model?

[Kacin] The decision to abandon the conscript model is still very far away. Not a single Partnership for Peace country is capable of abandoning the conscription system. The conscription system has been abandoned by the countries that are far from areas of instability, for example, Great Britain, also, the United States and Canada, which are no longer threatened by a Russian invasion. The only threats to them are air attacks or star wars—and this requires professionals. The trends in Europe were different for a long time. Spain and France are now also moving toward professionalization. Germany did not adopt such a decision yet. The countries bordering on the Balkan region of instability cannot renounce the conscription system either.

Regarding Slovenia, we concluded that there is a series of obligations and options that we cannot realize without the professional units. That is why the government decided to allow the employment in a professional unit of the 1st Special Brigade, which will be designated for international cooperation. This mission abroad can only be carried out by professionals. A seven-month training course is not sufficient for this type of training.

[Lorenci] Does greater professionalization also require shifting the attention from the infantry to the technical branches?

[Kacin] That is correct. We have very positive experiences here. At the moment we are introducing the unified military service. From now on a soldier will not change to two teams—that is, a training center and a combat unit, but will serve all seven months in a combat unit. This brings a series of qualitative changes along. The officers will no longer be divided into those who commanded in the training centers and those who commanded in the combat units all the time. Both categories will be equalized. Soldiers will not need to adjust to the officers twice, to undergo the stress situations connected with the change of environment twice. Among other things we will, therefore, also gain the possibility of training "rapid response units," but only for the interventions on our territory.

[Lorenci] In the future the Slovene Army is supposed to be organized into corps. However, military expert Teodor Gersak says that we have merely reached the organization at the company level and that the corps structure is completely out of reach. We would, among other things, require considerably more funds and also a longer national service for it.

[Kacin] Gersak is a peculiar phenomena. Above all, this man very rarely recognizes any expertise to anyone else. He is constantly sowing mistrust against the Slovene Army officers. He has written on several occasions that we will not have an officer who would be able to take part in the NATO command structure on an equal footing by the year 2,000 and after. We have such officers today. Also, his claims that we are merely trained for the tasks at the company level are blatantly exaggerated, and above all unfair to the Slovene Army officers. The Slovene Army performs tasks at the battalion level without any difficulty. We had a series of officers who underwent brigade courses and training abroad, and this knowledge is now disseminated at the brigade level. Right now we are reorganizing the Slovene Army to facilitate the next stage—the corps' development. We are reducing the number of brigades, infantry; we are strengthening the artillery units and the communications units so that the things could proceed normally at the corps level.

All in all, territorial defense is evolving in the Slovene Army. What I will say now will sound very critical. There is not one country in the world that would have 2 million inhabitants and have 7 provincial and 27 district commands—altogether 34 commands in a country of 2 million.

[Lorenci] Therefore, militarily speaking, we are too fragmented?

[Kacin] This structure is unnecessary and it must be substituted with the classical command structure—with the corps organization. I assess that on the territory of the Republic of Slovenia exist conditions for no more than two ground forces' corps, which means that we will have two such commands which will control the entire territory and oversee the subordinated directly linked operative units. This also means a great rationalization. We are cutting back on the military administration which is currently present in all commands. At the same time the officers have the chance for professional development pursuant to the dynamics in NATO countries. With the reorganization of its defense system Slovenia will become comparable to other NATO countries. At the same time we formed a special corps command of the military air force and air defense. I am referring to the 15th Air Force Brigade, armed with tubular rockets and missile weapons, and the 16th Battalion, equipped with radar to supervise our air space.

[Lorenci] This will involve major organizational and cadre shifts, which will probably trigger internal tensions in the army. Many people will lose their command positions. When will this demanding operation be completed?

[Kacin] This process will be completed in two years.

[Lorenci] Do you anticipate internal resistance?

[Kacin] I primarily expect that the officers who were on training abroad and the officers who are currently attending the first Slovene Army General Staff training course will take over the new duties and in the shortest possible time achieve a deep and qualitative progress in the development of the Slovene Army. This is the development that some may try to obstruct; however, it can no longer be stopped.

[Lorenci] All this is taking place in close cooperation with the General Staff?

[Kacin] Definitely.

[Lorenci] Where does the basic initiative stem from?

[Kacin] The basic initiative lies in the minister's demand for the adaptation of the Slovene Army to the altered international political circumstances and the position of the Republic of Slovenia.

[Lorenci] The Slovene military defense doctrine stipulates that "our army must technologically and organizationally be en par with the army of a potential adversary." Is this requirement not perhaps a little too ambitious?

[Kacin] Definitely not, why should it be?

[Lorenci] Looking at things from a practical point of view, the adversary is usually a neighbor....

[Kacin] Not necessarily...

[Lorenci] Most often, and the majority of our neighbors are militarily far superior to us.

[Kacin] The Republic of Slovenia has so far signed seven cooperation agreements in the military and defense sphere, among others, also with Hungary and Austria. The government approved a draft of this agreement with Italy. A similar job still awaits us with our southern neighbor [Croatia]. In the long term, Slovenia is placing itself in all European global associations. And this facilitates my answer as to who can potentially endanger us. We must primarily monitor carefully the situation on the volatile territory of the former Yugoslavia and strengthen our capacity to, pursuant to the prevailing doctrine, deter potential aggression against Slovenia. However, if such an intervention does take place, we should respond instantaneously and ensure that our political establishment uses the conditions thus created for cessation of combat and lasting peace. This, therefore, involves a change of doctrine. The Republic of Slovenia can no longer afford a doctrine of the general people's defense and self-defense, by which following a long and exhausting war we would force the aggressor on our territory to withdraw.

[Lorenci] By the way, some believe that the rescue and protection system is a sort of revival of the SLO.

[Kacin] So far I have read only one such article, and it appeared in the DELO Saturday supplement, precisely. Therefore, this is the only....

[Lorenci] ...which you reject with disgust and indignation?

[Kacin] Rescue and protection is the system within the Defense Ministry. We have two equal systems—defense and rescue and protection. They compliment each other, however, they in no way substitute each other or merge. Rescue and defense is a demanding system that follows international trends. For example, the system of fire fighting, which grew into fire safety and then into many other things. There are increasingly more prevention measures in other departments and increasingly less actual fire fighting. The same applies to rescue. It no longer involves hundreds of thousands of people, who must all be incorporated into civilian defense, but increasingly more professional teams.

[Lorenci] I am not convinced it is good that this system is located within the framework of your ministry. Does this not make the whole apparatus much too big? On the other hand, one would say that your ministry and the military sphere in general is simply gaining too much influence through such expansion?

[Kacin] Had our country had 200 million inhabitants, I would agree with your reservations. However, because we are a country of 2 million, the principle of rationalization must be taken into account very much. Because both systems are under one roof, many things can be organized in a more rational way. For example, the helicopters purchased for the military requirements were used successfully for the first time to put down forest fires, and so forth. This is dual-purpose equipment. A typical case of this is also the realm of communications.

[Lorenci] The arguments of rationalization doubtlessly support it. However, it seems unavoidable that the organizations from rescue and protection systems will come under your influence, that is, the influence of the mentality in the military sphere.

[Kacin] None of these organizations is a victim or forced to assume anybody's line of thought. It would say rather on the contrary.

[Lorenci] However, are you, the army, the big brother who will to an extent work, think, and take care of them?

[Kacin] On the contrary. It is precisely the coexistence of these two systems that allows a speedier and more rational transformation of the defense system. On Friday I returned from the joint military maneuvers in Hungary, where NATO countries staged an earthquake. Our team was the most professional one because on one side it featured the military helicopter crew and on the other the rescuers who were simultaneously also the members of the mountain rescue team. Their thought pattern is completely different to the typically military approach demonstrated by some other countries.

[Lorenci] Therefore you think that the system of organization of rescue and protection will have a positive effect on the army?

[Kacin] Precisely, and we will prove this on two occasions. This October we will organize maneuver Potres [earthquake], for which we are actively linking both systems already. A major maneuver in cooperation with the Partnership for Peace and NATO countries will take place in Slovenia next year. It will involve a study of measures to be taken in the case of a major military operation in the direct vicinity, when a great number of injured men must be attended to and evacuated deep into the NATO hinterland. This maneuver will be organized with a considerably greater reliance on the civilian institutions. Slovenia is preparing this as a case study for others.

[Lorenci] The merger of the two systems still remains a subject of debate. What if a man who will try to take control of the entire sphere is appointed as the defense minister?

[Kacin] Regulated civil-military relations are one of the five criteria on the basis of which a country is judged whether it can take part in the Partnership for Peace and NATO. Slovenia has these matters regulated. In any case the entire state cannot be the hostage of the fear that somebody who might abuse the post would end up in the defense minister's seat. The state must organize itself so as to prevent the abuse.

[Lorenci] Did former Defense Minister Janez Jansa in this sense abuse the function?

[Kacin] No comment.

[Lorenci] Why not?

[Kacin] Because I do not wish to politicize an episode that is a part of history.

[Lorenci] Why is the military defense doctrine a classified document?

[Kacin] This is a very comprehensive document. We prepared it in two parts. One was published in SLOVENSKA VOJSKA, is public, and answers all the questions. The other speaks of the doctrine of the use of individual Slovene Army branches, is classified and considerably longer.

[Lorenci] Because only a summary was made available to the public, some claimed that this constituted an intolerable secrecy.

[Kacin] Let me make a little comparison. Just as any family has its intimacies which are not for the public so too each state has its secrets, which it marks classified. The defense system, too, has documents intended for its internal use only.

[Lorenci] Let us dwell on the military doctrine. Avgust Vrtar wrote that our military defense doctrine is incomplete because we lack the war doctrine. Only these two things together, Vrtar says, can prepare us adequately for the threat of war.

[Kacin] Mr. Vratar is a retired general of the Yugoslav People's Army, with a technical background, and his views are influenced by the overall approach of the former state, which had a system of the general people's defense and self-defense. A general war doctrine was very much needed within this system. Its answer was an all-out war in which all capacities would have to be incorporated and which would compel the aggressor to withdraw via protracted exhaustion. We in the Republic of Slovenia today advocate the blitzkrieg doctrine, that is, to shorten the war to the minimum and create a favorable negotiating position for the domestic political establishment, for successful political negotiations and the conclusion of the war. In brief, today we do not speak of the war as the goal but as the means of establishing peace as quickly as possible. In my assessment we do not need the war doctrine. However, we do need the military defense doctrine and, of course, the civilian defense doctrine, which we will prepare shortly.

[Lorenci] Was this blitzkrieg war doctrine not developed only on the basis of some abstract, hypothetical calculation, but on the basis of concrete possible situations that originate from the situation in our neighborhood?

[Kacin] Our strategic goal is that the state that we have had for only five years does not become involved in a single war and that the we exploit the chance we got with the independence to the maximum. A war is not a tool of development. This is why we only ascribe the significance it merits to combat and war. We do not wish to exaggerate, my duty as the minister is to advocate the solutions that will allow a lasting peace and that this peace will in terms of cadre, money, and time cost as little as possible.

[Lorenci] An objective contradiction probably arises here between the professional army, which by the virtue of its nature constantly strives to expand and strengthen, and yourself as the minister who is not a soldier.

[Kacin] This is a sign that we are normal.

[Lorenci] Is our military system also changing as a result of our adjustment to NATO?

[Kacin] Yes, but primarily due to changed objective circumstances. These altered circumstances also facilitated our rapprochement with NATO. Slovenia simply fulfills the five basic criteria: democracy, observation of human rights, regulated relations with neighbors, regulated civil-military relations, and a successful market economy. Slovenia meets these five criteria fully and that is why it is allowed the things that many are not, and it is allowed this to a much greater degree and faster than others.

[Lorenci] Saso Gazdic from the peace institute in the last issue of SP [expansion not given] addressed a general criticism at your expense. He says, roughly, that your ministry has created a fait accompli, which is all rooted in the premise that we will definitely become a NATO member. However, this, Gadzic says, is not definite and, on the other hand, in Slovenia we did not carry out a comprehensive study of the advantages and shortcomings of NATO membership. At the same time the fait accompli which you are creating is already having an affect and is pushing us toward NATO. Essentially this means rushing ahead of a political decision which still awaits Slovenia. Your ministry is, therefore, usurping for itself rights which it does not have.

[Kacin] Everything that our ministry is doing, it is doing on the basis of a mandate that it won in the State Chamber on 11 April this year. It was clearly stated there that we can continue the individual dialogue with NATO. Within this dialogue we must clarify a series of questions, so that ultimately the 16 in NATO and Slovenia would know what NATO expects from us. That is why we are definitely are not rushing ahead in this dialogue.

Furthermore, such a decision always also requires the adoption of principled guidelines and their defense. This is the story of a hesitant boy who has never slept with a girl because he just could not make up his mind. It is simply a decision of that boy and if he goes for it he becomes a boy and from a boy a man. Things are roughly the same with a country. Each country must at a certain point decide on its basic subjectivity and on such a basis adopt long-term decisions. Once the decision about NATO is made, it will be made bilaterally, by Slovenia and by the 16. Judging by the personal meetings and everything else I can easily state that Slovenia is definitely among the most serious candidates for NATO.

As for the principled objection that many things should be studied first: One always finds people who are not willing to accept the consequences of their own decision and are trying to disperse the mandate across the board. Instead of the political establishment clearly defining its strategic interest, it organizes a referendum and is asks people, simply so that it does not have to decide on the long-term guidelines itself. This is the case in all democracies.

[Lorenci] In you opinion, has a sufficiently thorough debate on the advantages and disadvantages of NATO entry already been made?

[Kacin] Let me put forward my personal opinion. Speaking about our entry into NATO I find very few disadvantages, but I can cite quite a lot of advantages.

[Lorenci] Two things matter—cost and security. Will the military expenditure grow considerably as a result of it?

[Kacin] Expenditure must not increase.

[Lorenci] Can you guarantee that it will not?

[Kacin] Mr. Lorenci, if you take a look at a comparison analysis of the cost in the NATO countries you will learn that these are divided into three categories. First, there are the cornerstone NATO members—the United States, Germany, France, and Great Britain. These give a very high percentage for the military expenditure. Then there are the extreme cases (Greece, Turkey) where an equally high percentage of the national income is earmarked for defense. Then there is the vast majority or the members who intend as much or even less for defense as Slovenia does. I really do not know why the Republic of Slovenia would need to intend any more.

[Lorenci] You, therefore, guarantee that the military expenditure will not increase as a result of NATO membership?

[Kacin] No, I cannot guarantee this. What I am telling you is that we advocate such a view and we will advocate it in the individual dialogue with NATO.

[Lorenci] The second essential issue is security. Will the Slovene security increase with NATO membership?

[Kacin] Only collective security on the basis of solidarity is acceptable for Slovenia. This means that aggression against us would in the future equal aggression against NATO. This fact in itself has a very strong deterrent effect. Collective security is definitely cheaper than individual defense preparations.

[Lorenci] However, NATO can enforce its arbitration if one is its member?

[Kacin] This is possible. However, Slovenia has relatively good relations with all its neighbors and I see no realistic need for NATO arbitration in the relations with any of its members.

[Lorenci] Why, according to you, would we be of interest to NATO?

[Kacin] There are several reasons. First, we are economically a very successful and politically stable country without any major problems with our neighbors. Second, we are so small that our membership does not alter the present structure of NATO. Third, we are the success story on the territory of the former Yugoslavia. Also, we never, not even as a part of Yugoslavia, were a member of the Warsaw Pact. For the first time in history a possibility of acting as a subject is opening us. Looking back ten years, we were a potential battlefront, the territory through which the front line of NATO or the Warsaw Pact would run. Now we have the chance to enhance of our own accord this role imposed on us to the role of a link in the NATO south wing and allow NATO's expansion to the Mediterranean and Central Europe, that is, the east Adriatic coast, which is very important.

[Lorenci] Therefore, we still play an important strategic role for NATO.

[Kacin] Definitely.

[Lorenci] And is that our chief trump card for admission?

[Kacin] No, it is not, but it is one of the important ones.

[Lorenci] Would we become a NATO member without it?

[Kacin] Slovenia meets the five preconditions. Our geographical position is not among them.

[Lorenci] The army in whatever form is not the condition either. Iceland was admitted to NATO although it does not have an army at all.

[Kacin] We have our army already. It proved its worth during the 10-day blitzkrieg; we are modernizing and downsizing it now and with each day we operate more like the NATO 16.

[Lorenci] The U.S. Congress has just voted in favor of quick NATO enlargement and for the first time explicitly mentioned Slovenia among the first four candidates. Do you find this significant?

[Kacin] With the signing of the associate agreement, Slovenia promoted itself in Europe and appeared in all the statistics of the economically successful countries in transition and immediately rocketed to the very top. By overcoming the differences with Italy one of the five preconditions was fulfilled, namely, the relations with neighbors. Due to all these facts Slovenia definitely ended up in the final selection of the candidates who will become NATO members in the first circle.

[Lorenci] The Americans, of course, have the main say in NATO.

[Kacin] Definitely. However, it is the final say that counts and that final say lies with all 16 parliaments of the member states.

[Lorenci] Do you think that a referendum on NATO membership will be held in Slovenia?

[Kacin] If need be, yes.

[Lorenci] If I understood you correctly, you do not find it necessary?

[Kacin] In the current dialogue with NATO all things crystallize as we go. A referendum question is generally important if there are great doubts. Slovene policy will not embark on such a decision as long as great doubts exist. That, precisely, is why this individual dialogue is required. Once the answers are given and are clear, the decision can be made quickly.

[Lorenci] Do you think that any significant political party will choose an anti-NATO policy as its electoral leitmotif?

[Kacin] Yes, one important party is already stepping on this break.

[Lorenci] Which one?

[Kacin] The United List.

[Lorenci] Are the Slovenes potentially good soldiers?

[Kacin] The Slovenes are primarily Europeans and we are European more than we would sometimes admit to ourselves. That is why we can act professionally and professionals are also good soldiers.

[Lorenci] In Slovenia the Yugoslav People's Army was—at least toward the end of Yugoslavia—despised and underestimated and professionally o no interest to the Slovenes. What is the interest in the Slovene Army now?

[Kacin] The research on Slovene public opinion says that the Slovene Army elicits respect and trust among Slovene citizens and the military profession is rather cherished and respected in Slovenia.

[Lorenci] How great is interest in available posts?

[Kacin] Great, even though industry competes for highly skilled and educated cadres to a great extent.

[Lorenci] Which social classes are represented the most among the candidates? Do you have any information about that?

[Kacin] I cannot give ad hoc answers. I cannot not say that we have self-conscription as this used to be the case in the Spanish Army. The structures are well represented. However, the regional representation is very uneven. The Styrians, for example, are very numerous while there are few men from Primorska.

[Lorenci] This is probably also linked to the economic crisis in Styria. The army is probably also attractive because in uncertain times it offers reliability and security, just as all other state services.

[Kacin] Perhaps this is one of the aspects. From this moment on the army is becoming more attractive also as an international institution, as the establishment that offers service abroad. The NATO perspective makes the military profession of even more interest.

[Lorenci] The manpower shortage is considered one of the biggest drawbacks of the Slovene Army. The Slovene Army emerged out of nothing, which can also be an advantage but which automatically means a shortage of experts and professionals. How would you reply to the exaggerated and nastily worded, rather popular opinion, that there are still a lot of smithies in numerous important posts.

[Kacin] The lack of basic education is definitely one of the handicaps. Also, a limited ability to communicate in a foreign language which is a precondition for training abroad. On the other hand, a generation of increasingly well-educated young officers is coming who are free of any inferiority complexes. These young and ambitious officers will be the moving spirit for developing the Slovene Army in the future, while for the generation that lacked opportunities for appropriate expert education there will be increasingly fewer opportunities. Above all, we must be aware that the military profession is no longer a job for life. This is a contract job just as in all other modern armies.

[Lorenci] The personnel problem has probably been additionally aggravated by the personnel reshuffle that the Slovene Army is undergoing. Regarding this, according to Mr. Gersak, whom you do not hold in very high esteem, we cannot be compared wtih NATO countries. Is the consequence of the frequent replacements, especially between 1991 and 1995, instability and poor morale in the army?

[Kacin] Here Mr. Gersak again perpetuates lies. In every normal army promotion and reassignment of officers occur at least every two years. In Slovenia, in the Slovene Army when it was still the territorial defense, any reassignment of an officer 30 to 50 km away meant political degradation or manipulation. Therefore, we will have to set up a normal army where the officers will understand their rights and also their duties. Each of our officers, upon returning from training abroad, in the interview with me, when I ask something, replies: "As you will decide, minister...." "Yes, Sir," are the conclusive words of an officer, a professional, in a NATO army. However, here it is still believed that somebody who was employed in the territorial defense will over the next 15 year keep his chair warm in his command, in his place of abode. We do not need such an army at the end of our millennium and there will be no place for such officers in the Slovene Army in the future.

[Lorenci] And, henceforth, resistance to the transformation of the Slovene Army into an army itself.

[Kacin] This is normal and human. My task is that the army develops in the right direction and grows increasingly more professional.

[Lorenci] I am returning to the name that you refused to comment upon earlier. Rather substantial cadre changes in the ministry occurred in the connection with so-called de-Jansevization....

[Kacin] I do not know what you mean by this.

[Lorenci] Janez Jansa as the defense minister in terms of staff subjugated this department to himself a little bit too much; he created a sort of his personal praetorian guard. They were appointed to this post and you made some personnel changes.

[Kacin] Along with the former minister a group of people departed who were the officials of his Social Democratic Party. You will not find a single official of the Liberal Democracy at my side. The entire present structure of the Defense Ministry's leadership consists of the professional cadre without a political orientation or background. As regards the officers of the Slovene Army who were transferred, all the transferals were carried out at the proposal of the General Staff commander. In some cases I supported his proposals, in others not.

[Lorenci] Your ministry is a relatively big apparatus especially in comparison to the number of soldiers who serve in it. This ratio is considerably more out of proportion—at the expense of the soldiers—than in other countries which we like to compare ourselves.

[Kacin] The Defense Ministry currently employs 6,000 people. There are 6,000 people who serve the military service at once, making it 12,000 soldiers in a year. There are very few armies in the world where military service is only 7 months. Our military training is intensive and that is why we have more professionals dealing with these soldiers than in other countries. I speak comparatively with regard to the duration of the military service. The system is, of course, another story. I have already said that the total scope of the Slovene Army entails more than 3 percent of the population. That is why we need so many cadre if we wish to maintain such an army structure for the period of war. With downsizing the Slovene Army this ratio will, of course, also change. In these terms we are also making rapid and long strides toward NATO.

[Lorenci] The army is not analyzed enough; it is dissected and criticized. The reason for this probably also lies in the fact that the army and the related spheres absorbed nearly everything, so to speak, that had some idea about it. A critical audience cannot exist without a least a handful of experts.

[Kacin] A part of the answer perhaps lies in what you say. The second part of the answer hides in the fact that the development of the Slovene defense system is moving in the right direction and to the right amount. We are prepared to answer to all questions and dilemmas, however, in the manner that does not harm the interests of the state of Slovenia. The defense cannot be discussed in the same manner the fruit sellers on the market do it (and I mean no offense to them), we cannot base it on blah, blah, blah.... When somebody writes for the tenth time that we purchased Kfirs and we deny it for the eleventh time but the media nevertheless refuse to publish it, then it is really difficult to maintain a dialogue. For an illustration, let me put forward as an example the work of the [parliamentary] defense committee. If this committee concludes that we should provide it with the original documents then we will provide them with the original documents, in English, and then as the defense minister I have no intention of blushing and sweating because somebody, for example, Mr. Hvalica, tells me off like a schoolboy for deceiving them and avoiding clear answers to the questions asked.

[Lorenci] Is the shadow of the former arms trafficking still hovering over Slovenia?

[Kacin] This shadow never hovered over the Slovene Army. It lingered over individual officials who were involved in it.

[Lorenci] It appears as if the government is hiding individuals' names here.

[Kacin] The government is not hiding anything. It acted pursuant to its authorities—individual ministries and prosecutor officers acted, by filing all sorts of charges. The rest is up to the courts.

[Lorenci] Do you expect any more scandals in connection with this?

[Kacin] Scandals are eternal.

Slovenia: Army Purchases Viewed, Data on Spending Requested

AU0808081496 Ljubljana DELO in Slovene 31 Jul 96 p 2

[Article by Blaz Zgaga: "Most of the Weapons Are From Israel"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Ljubljana, 30 July—The first high-speed patrol boat of the Slovene Navy arrived in Koper today. The boat is a Super Dvora Mk II of Israeli manufacture. Israel is, considering the purchases of arms, obviously the largest exporter of arms to Slovenia after the lifting of the embargo.

The first large purchase made by the Slovene Army was the deal made with Steyr-Daimler-Puch, from which the Slovene Army, as well as the police, have purchased several hundred rough-terrain vehicles. Neither the exact number of Puch vehicles that the ministries had bought after the Liberation War nor the cost is known today.

The second large deal was the purchase of seven helicopters from the U.S. company Bell Helicopter Textron, worth $27 million. For this amount, Slovenia bought five multipurpose transport Bell 412 EP helicopters, as well as two training helicopters (Bell 206 Jet Ranger). All these were civil purchases, therefore without military equipment, since the arms embargo against the republics of the former Yugoslavia was still in effect at that time. Recently the 15th Airborne Brigade received another Bell 206 helicopter, which has taken the place of the Italian Augusta 109, in order to consolidate the navy and to lower maintenance costs.

In 1992 the then director of the Republican Department for Air Flight [RUZP—Republiska uprava za zracno plovbo] signed a contract regarding the purchase of AN/TPS 70 military long-range radar, which is produced by the U.S. multinational company Westinghouse. The radar was prepared to act as a reserve in the operation Desert Storm. Since this is a mobile radar system, which can quickly be moved on two trucks, the relevant committee of the U.S. Senate had to approve its sale. This was why the RUZP signed the $20 million contract, and not the Ministry of Defense. At the end of the year another such radar system was purchased for $18 million.

A while ago there was a lot of talk about the purchase of the tactical communication system from the Israeli company Tadiran. This was because the Americans and the British protested against the signing of the deal with the Israelis. Even Malcolm Rifkind, the British defense secretary, visited Ljubljana at that time. The contract was worth $10 million. Apart from Tadiran's communications system, short range Elta 2106 radars, 155-mm howitzers, and the patrol boat were also bought.

The Prices of the Weapons Are Not Known

The number and price of the ordered and purchased short-range radars is not known. Neither is the number or the price of the 155-mm howitzers. The howitzers were first presented on Slovene Statehood Day. As four artillery [topniski] battalions are foreseen to exist in the Slovene Army—two in Postojna and two in Slovenska Bistrica—we can deduce that these howitzers will be bought for at least two battalions, and that would amount to 36 weapons.

The Slovene Army bought 30 Mercedes Unimog 2150L terrain trucks for the artillery battalion in Slovenska Bistrica, which is armed with 18 105-mm howitzers. These trucks are among the best in the world. Their price is not known.

The Slovene Army aviation has three Swiss Pilatus PC9 training military planes, which belong to the world elite in regard to their capabilities. The taxpayers paid a little over $9 million for them. The purchase of the fighter planes, which is foreseen in the future, will also show the need for more Pilatus planes. This is why the number of Czech Zlin 242L planes has increased: Five new planes were added to the older three, as well as two Zlin 143 planes. Their price is also not known, nor is the price of the high-speed patrol boat.

Since these are taxpayers' billions and since there is no convenient excuse, such as the arms embargo, the Ministry of Defense should clearly state what they are purchasing with the taxpayers' money. Especially because Defense Minister Jelko Kacin told DELO some time ago that "they have, so far, made decisions regarding 40 percent of the means that are available. The actual amount spent is much lower."

[Box, p 2]

At the Ministry of Defense, most of our questions were answered with the statement that all the information will be given in the report to the delegates of the State Chamber and that the ministry would not like to hear comments about how everything can be found out from the newspapers first. Last year's report on realizing the basic developmental programs of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Slovenia from 1994 to 2003, which the government took into consideration on 25 January this year, is still labeled "top secret." In it, one can only find the total value of all the contracts from last year. There are no details regarding the decisions of purchases made, the types, prices, producers, etc.

Slovenia: Electoral Referenda Planned for Spring 1997

AU0808101696 Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network in Slovene 1700 GMT 7 Aug 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The State Chamber ruled that the referendums on electoral systems will take place next spring. Following the morning session and a majority decision, this proposal was forwarded to the deputies by the parliamentary committee for internal policy. The Social Democrats, the People's Party, the National Party, the National Right, a group of independent deputies, and the Christian Democrats supported the referendums being organized on 15 September. Rudi Medved reports from the parliament:

[Begin recording] [Medved] The vote saw 26 in favor of the earliest possible organization of referendums, and there were also 26 who were of the opinion that due to numerous open issues such referendums would be counterproductive directly prior to the elections. That is why this appendix [by the Social Democratic Party] to the decree did not win sufficient support.

After the vote on this appendix it became questionable whether the balance of forces in the parliament would allow the decree to pass at all. Ultimately, the State Chamber, with 31 votes in favor and 26 opposed, passed the proposed decree. With a considerable majority the deputies also passed a proposal by Ciril Ribicic that the government draft changes by 15 September to the referendum law to clarify the manner of voting and the way results are ascertained in situations where several rival referendums are being held simultaneously.

The Social Democratic Party and the Slovene People's Party in the debate literally implored the drafters of the above decree not to violate the Constitution and the laws and not to drag out the issue to avoid making fools of themselves before the political public. We asked Ivo Hvalica from the Social Democratic Party whether a dispute in the Constitutional Court was now in store:

[Hvalica] I guess so because the parliament has evidently again passed a decree that, as I have said, is contrary to the Constitution. Therefore, we have no other choice but to start a constitutional dispute. As I have said, the party presidency will meet tomorrow to decide on it. For the time being, I do not yet know any details.

[Medved] The cosignatories of the appendix that altered the decree radically were the United List of Social Democrats, the Liberal Democracy, and the Democrats of Slovenia. Tone Anderlic, chief of the club of deputies of the Liberal Democracy, explained where they had found the basis for the proposed solution:

[Anderlic] Actually we followed the warning of the Constitutional Court dating from April, when the court ruled that major changes to electoral legislation cannot be implemented directly prior to elections. Subsequently, the court changed its mind—I do not know why and under what circumstances—and ruled that the referendums must be carried out.

[Medved] The Christian Democrats voted first in favor of the appendix by the Social Democrats and afterward also in favor of the decree itself. Ignac Polajnar, chief of the club of deputies, explains:

[Polajnar] We supported it for a very simple reason. We are convinced that even if this decree did not win support today we would have to meet again tomorrow or next week, and the outcome would not be considerably different, we believe. Perhaps it would be even more favorable for those who favor holding these referendums only after the elections. We supported the Social Democratic appendix because we believed it was right and proper to abide by the will of the people as soon as possible. [end recording]

Federal

FRY: Communists Endorse Milosevic-Tudjman Meeting

AU0808131796 Belgrade BETA in Serbo-Croatian 1141 GMT 8 Aug 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade, 8 August (BETA)—Ratko Krsmanovic, president of the Yugoslav Committee of the League of Communists-Movement for Yugoslavia (SK-PJ) stated today that the meeting between Presidents Slobodan Milosevic and Franjo Tudjman represents "a strong impetus and hope in the overall peace process."

"It represents the continuation of the intensive political-diplomatic activities to create the basis for peace, to normalize life, and to overcome tragic consequences of secessionism and nationalism in the former Yugoslavia," Krsmanovic said at a news conference.

He drew attention to the "hypocrisy and cynicism of the international community, which supported secessionism, but today, in broken up Yugoslavia, insists on an integral Bosnia and normalization of relations among the newly created statelets."

Krsmanovic said that "it was encouraging that the two presidents have met for the first since the beginning of the conflict at the bilateral level."

"Our relations and support to further activities in this respect will depend on the realization of the agreement in practice and on the results," he said, adding that "it was a big surprise that Tudjman, the main protagonist of the Yugoslav drama, is appearing in the role of a factor of stability in the Balkans." Krsmanovic expressed the belief that "the time has come when the West needs a different Tudjman."

FRY: Kontic Advocates Normalization of UN Relations

AU0808101896 Vienna DER STANDARD in German 8 Aug 96 p 2

[Interview with FRY Prime Minister Radoje Kontic by Andrej Ivanji in Belgrade; date not given: "We Are a Factor of Peace"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Ivanji] When will the FRY be fully readmitted to the international community?

[Kontic] After the conclusion of the Dayton agreement and the suspension of the international sanctions, the cooperation of the FRY with many countries and international organizations was quickly renewed. The agreements on economic and financial issues are encouraging. However, we are disappointed that the organizations connect the signing of political agreements with the elimination of the so-called external wall of the sanctions. We expect the final suspension of the sanctions immediately after the elections in Bosnia-Herzegovina, as planned in the Dayton agreement. If one wants the FRY to continue to be a factor of peace and stability, it is unavoidable to normalize its relations with the United Nations, international political, financial, and trade organizations, and other organizations.

[Ivanji] Is the FRY treated in the same way as the other ex-Yugoslav republics on the international stage?

[Kontic] No. Part of the international community has developed a one-sided and negative relationship with the FRY. This is shown by the rash recognition of the secession of some former Yugoslav republics, the wrong point of view of the Badinter Commission in 1991 that the SFRY had "fallen apart," although neither Montenegro nor Serbia had seceded from it, the Security Council resolution on the introduction of the sanctions against the FRY because of wrong prerequisites, and so on. This unequal treatment is still shown today. All ex-Yugoslav republics have become members of the United Nations and other international institutions, while the FRY made several conditions, such as the establishment of relations with the former Yugoslav republics.

[Ivanji] What was the result of the recent visit of a delegation of the Muslim-Croat federation in this respect?

[Kontic] It was stated that there are good conditions for a gradual development of cooperation, which will be especially stimulated by the constitution of Bosnia-Herzegovina after the elections in September. An agreement in principle on the opening of road, rail, and air traffic and telecommunications was achieved. The possibility that Yugoslav firms participate in diverse ways in the reconstruction of the Bosnian economy and the creation of long-term cooperation was discussed. The FRY has a strategic interest in the normalization of the relations with all former Yugoslav republics.

[Ivanji] How are relations between the FRY and Austria?

[Kontic] After the suspension of sanctions, significant progress has been made here. Austria lifted the sanctions that had been unilaterally introduced against the FRY. The diplomatic representations in Vienna and Belgrade were raised to the status of embassies. The political dialogue has been renewed. Our recent talks with Austrian Chancellor Vranitzky and Foreign Minister Schuessel in Salzburg confirmed the mutual preparedness for the renewal and normalization of the bilateral relations. There FRY attaches special importance to the large number of

Yugoslav citizens who are living and working in Austria.

FRY: Negotiations on Division of SFRY Assets Noted

AU0808094296 Belgrade BETA in English 29 Jul-7 Aug 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade—International mediator for succession of the SFRY's [Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia] assets and liabilities, Sir Arthur Watts, submitted on July 17 to the inheritors of the former Federation a Memorandum on understanding, containing a few compromising, even contradictory proposals on which the republics should state their mind in the beginning of September. In the Memorandum, published on August 5 by the Belgrade NASA BORBA daily, Watts suggested to the republics not to split the assets which they had brought into their common state at the time of its founding in 1918, but, at the same time, offered an alternative proposal according to which all the assets of the SFRY, including the para-state and public assets should be subject to division. In the first case, the better part of the gold reserves, estimated at $660 million, would be allotted to Serbia and Montenegro, as they belonged to them at the time of the founding of the common state.

The SFRY's foreign real estate and all financial assets which the former Yugoslavia had on December 31, 1990, would also be subject to division. These include the assets deposited to the accounts of the Federal Government, of the National Bank of Yugoslavia (NBJ), of the NBJ's Military Service, of the Yugoslav Bank for International Economic Cooperation (YBIES), along with the liabilities of the foreign banks, mainly Soviet, towards the NBJ.

The federal debt with the known ultimate user and with the unknown ultimate user, financial obligations of the NBJ Military Service and the YBIES are included in the Yugoslav liabilities total. The cooperation among the inheritors would consist in sharing the data on the Federation's assets on December 31, 1990 and in identifying the accounts in the banks outside the SFRY which do not belong to the Federation. The cooperation would start within a month after the signing of the Memorandum on understanding.

Also, the republics would be obliged to provide access for the independent financial organizations to their respective financial documentation, including the documents of the current National Bank of Yugoslavia, so that the international experts could assess financial balance sheets of the SFRY with foreign countries and its gold reserves. The implementation of the quota system of the International Monetary Fund for the former Yugoslavia is envisaged as a formula for the division of the former Yugoslavia's assets.

FRY: Registration of Refugee Voters Carried Out

LD0308151896 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1506 GMT 3 Aug 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, Aug. 3 (TANJUG)—Yugoslav government officials met on Saturday with the executive assistant chief of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe Bosnia mission to discuss the upcoming elections in Bosnia.

Chairman of the Comission for the Rights of Refugees in Bosnia's September elections Bratislava Morina and Jonathan Moore expressed satisfaction at having successfully registered eligible refugee voters in Yugoslavia, said a statement issued by the commission.

Morina said Yugoslavia did not make the election rules and could only abide by the rules made by the OSCE.

It was agreed that an appeal be sent to the head of the OSCE Mission for Bosnia, U.S. diplomat Robert Frowick, that the aged, ill and wounded by enabled to vote in Yugoslavia, though the rules require voters to travel to Bosnia.

Morina sent an invitation to Frowick to visit Belgrade.

About 150,000 voters have been registered so far, and 650,000 out of the 850,000 registered voters have turned to the OSCE to obtain whatever was necessary to vote, said Frowick.

FRY: Party Coalitions Prior to Elections Analyzed

AU0808092996 Belgrade BETA in English 29 Jul-7 Aug 96

[BETA commentary: "Opposition Turmoil in Serbia: The End of the 'Together' Coalition?"]

[FBIS Transcribed Text]

A Possibility of a New Coalition Between the SPO [Serbian Renewal Movement], the SPS [Socialist Party of Serbia], the YUL [Yugoslav Left] and the ND [New Democracy] Is Intimated

On the eve of the forthcoming federal elections in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia there are growing indications that the opposition coalition "Together," consisting of the Serbian Renewal Movement (SPO), the Democratic Party (DS) and the Civic Alliance of Serbia (GSS)—the only serious rival to the ruling socialists in Serbia and Montenegro—will fall apart owing to mutual bickering and discord, thus delivering a serious blow to the Serbian opposition at the time when its at least partial unification seemed possible.

Only a month after the president of the Popular [People's] Party of Montenegro (NSCG), Novak Kilibarda, called the democratic opposition parties of Serbia and Montenegro to form a coalition which would prove capable of defeating the socialists in the federal elections, the political opposition scene in Serbia experienced a serious scandal, which subsequently threatened to irreparably damage the still fresh alliances of the traditionally disunited opposition. The initially successful negotiations between the Serbian and the Montenegrin opposition parties, which had promised to result in a first serious and more durable opposition coalition on the federal level, failed to improve the opposition unity.

After the commentary of Danica Draskovic, the wife of the SPO leader, Vuk Draskovic, published in the party's magazine SRPSKA REC, the latent disputes between the SPO and the Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS) reached the point of opened hostility; in addition, on 6 August, in the Belgrade NASA BORBA daily Vuk Draskovic seems to have buried down all hopes of the opposition voters by publicly expressing his doubts regarding the survival of the "Together" coalition.

The message was quite clear: The opposition political scene of Serbia and Montenegro will not only fail to grow in strength and numbers; instead, there is now a real danger that even the "Together" coalition, which since the last spring has managed to organize a series of rallies calling the voters to turn to the opposition and thus bring down the regime of Slobodan Milosevic, will completely break down.

In her regular weekly commentary in the SRPSKA REC magazine, its director, Danica Draskovic, has revealed a number of details from the family past of the DSS leader, Vojislav Kostunica, denouncing his wife as being a daughter of a police official and a "regime's executioner." As at that time the negotiations with the DPS on its joining the "Together" coalition were in full swing, Kostunica estimated that the article was a clear enough message sent by the SPO and broke the negotiations. All the SPO coalition partners—the DS, the GSS and the NSCG—have denounced the article.

After her attack against Kostunica, in her interview with BETA, Mrs. Draskovic announced the publication of an even "stronger" article on the DS leader, Zoran Djindjic, adding that she was also "quite displeased with the behavior of Vesna Pesic and Novak Kilibarda" (respective leaders of the GSS and the NSCG).

The SPO coalition partners rejected the interpretations of the SPO officials according to which Mrs. Draskovic's article was not aimed at subverting the opposition, being instead only a "private opinion of a journalist expressed in an independent magazine." Namely, except for being a wife of the SPO leader, Mrs. Draskovic is also a member of the SPO Central Council.

In the meantime, the SPO has announced new rallies throughout Serbia, starting with Lapovo. Contrary to the past opposition rallies of the still officially existing "Together" coalition, at these rallies only the SPO leader, Vuk Draskovic, will appear.

As BETA has learned from the sources of the New Democracy (ND) party, which is the coalition partner of the ruling Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS), the dispute within the opposition coalition could be a result of a plan for creating a new political coalition under the auspices of the authorities. According to the same sources, a creation of a coalition group "For Europe," consisting of the SPS, the ND, the Yugoslav Left (YUL)—the extraparliamentary party actually led by the Serbian president's wife, Mirjana Markovic—and the SPO.

According to the ND sources, the coalition would be created shortly before the federal elections, while the ND would serve as a mediator between the until recently irreconcilable adversaries—the SPS and the SPO.

For analysts such a coalition should not be much of a surprise: Leaving aside not so well-defined ideological differences, those parties have gradually reached almost identical positions regarding the national question. Officially, all of them advocate peace and deny having played any role in the recently finished war in the former Yugoslavia. In addition, all of them claim themselves as supporters of the concept of private ownership and national tolerance. Despite all that, however, a possibility of all this being only a preelection maneuver of the actual government should not be excluded. Such a move could prove very successful in subverting the opposition unification at the moment when for the first time since 1991—when the first multiparty elections were held in Serbia—their unification seems quite feasible.

According to the surveys commissioned by the ruling party from the Institute of Social Sciences at the three-month intervals, not a single political party in Serbia has a chance of scoring a landslide victory.

The BETA's source claims that the socialists intend to use a trick in order to win the elections. In the first place, they intend to hold the federal elections apart from the elections in Montenegro, and also to form a serious coalition of an alleged European orientation.

According to the sources close to the authorities, the federal elections may be held in the end of October, that is, before the elections in Montenegro scheduled for 3 November. The sources say the socialists are hoping that the voters of the Liberal Alliance of Montenegro (LSCG) will abstain from casting their ballots in the federal elections as it seems that this party will not run in them, being against the federal state and in favor of an independent Montenegro. If both elections were held at the same time, the LSCG voters might decide to vote for the NSCG, that is, for one of the opposition coalitions.

Answering BETA's question about prospects on the founding of the coalition "For Europe," the SPO MP [member of parliament] and Vuk Draskovic's aide, Milan Bozic said those were only rumors.

"These are only hearsay coming from the ND's kitchen. A coalition with the socialists is possible only if the opposition wins a large number of seats in the federal elections. However, I do not believe that even under such circumstances we will discuss the ministerial positions; rather, we will discuss the changes of the political system," Bozic said for the BETA Agency.

Bozic confirmed that the talks with the ND were held, but denied that the creation of any coalition was discussed at them.

The DS leader, Zoran Djindjic, declined to comment on the accusations launched by the SRPSKA REC magazine. Observers say that he still has hopes that a stable opposition coalition is feasible, and that the DSS will join it, despite everything.

Since 1991, the opposition in Serbia has unsuccessfully attempted its unification on several occasions. It happened for the first time during the student demonstrations in 1991, when the then-actual DS leader, Dragoljub Micunovic, denounced "the resolution of the problems in the streets" and asked the opposition to return to the Parliament. At that time, the SPO was in favor of the confrontation with the regime, and during the demonstrations Vuk Draskovic appeared as an undisputed leader of the masses.

The other serious attempt for unification was led by the SPO in 1992. Then, the DEPOS [Democratic Movement of Serbia] coalition was established consisting of the SPO, the ND, and the DSS, a party created from the DS members. The DEPOS coalition is the second strongest party in the Serbian Parliament.

Even before the DEPOS was created, certain opposition parties started negotiations with the socialists, with Zoran Djindjic being the first one to start such deals. The negotiations allegedly failed because Djindjic asked for too many ministerial positions. In his negotiations with the Serbian president Milosevic, Vuk Draskovic fared more or less the same, later on publicly regretting for having ventured onto negotiations with the authorities at all.

The DEPOS coalition also had its share of bargaining with the socialists. The negotiations ended with the ND entering the Serbian Government after the elections, and its abandonment of the DEPOS.

FRY: Economy, Foreign Investments Assessed

AU0808093796 Belgrade BETA in English 29 Jul-7 Aug 96

[BETA Commentary: "Racing the Time"]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Milosevic Promised Hurd That in the Yugoslav Privatization To Come, the British Companies Will Play an Important Role [subhead]

The Yugoslav authorities are attempting to postpone the economic collapse until the times when the much needed foreign capital reaches the country. The ruling nomenclature shares the view of economists that the foreign capital is necessary, but differs in holding that the influx of capital is a condition for a structural reform, and that of a kind which will keep them in power.

In the meantime, the current economic policy boils down to buying time, and shows a clear absence of any long-term economic concept.

"All this appears to me so gloomy to a degree that is hard to describe. The state is not functioning at all," says the leading Yugoslav economist, Stojan Stamenkovic.

The Inventory of Failures

Since the ousting of the National Bank of Yugoslavia's (NBJ) governor, Dragoslav Avramovic, last May, and the abandonment of his post-Dayton reform-oriented economic program, so far the Government has failed to bring a single measure aimed at containing the acute diseases of the domestic economy: The growing foreign trade deficit, the shortage of the export goods, the slow economic growth, the general insolvency of companies and banks, the decline of infrastructure, the drastic shortage of the working capital and the enormous interest rates, which every six months are doubling the internal debt and forcing all free capital to flee to the speculative financial market.

As misfortunes never come singly, this year the FRY had the worst harvest in 20 years, with less than 1.5 million tons of wheat (according to the preliminary estimates), and was affected in the end of July by foot and mouth disease epidemics, with a potential damage of several million US dollars owing to the five-year ban on export to major foreign markets.

In the meantime, the government officials keep repeating that they will not abandon the restrictive monetary policies, as a sole prescription for salvation from inflation.

"Whatever the policy we opt for, be it restrictive, moderately restrictive, or expansionist, we will end in a collapse," says Ljubisa Igic, director of the largest state bank, Beogradska Banka. "We can achieve nothing by changing the monetary policy; we need a structural reform."

For the up-till-now moderately restrictive monetary policy under the conditions of a $120 million foreign trade deficit per month, the NBJ has paid by a large decline in the foreign currency reserves, reduced from $250 million in June to the present $100 million. The NBJ gold and foreign currency reserves turned into gold reserves only, sources close to the NBJ claimed requiring anonymity.

Survival of the Unfit

However, even the "restrictive policy" was, in fact, selectively restrictive, economists claim. Through its July decree on approval of "export incentive credits," the NBJ opened a serious inflatory breach. With these credits, and through occasional direct "injections" from the primary emission, the bankrupt socialist giants are kept alive, such as is the Zastava car factory, which, according to the Serbian Government's announcement of the beginning of August, will have its production of 15,000 vehicles per year financed by the state.

If the production cost of one vehicle is $6,000, than the financing of Zastava's car production would mean the emission of $90 million, that is, of 450 million dinars. The monetary mass would thus be increased by 12 percent. Miroljub Labus of the Economic Institute of Belgrade estimated in mid-July the monetary mass as being slightly over 4 billion dinars. The official data on the monetary mass hasn't been issued since the dismissal of the NBJ Governor Avramovic.

In the beginning of April the Government failed to reach a deal with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) on reentering that crucial international financial institution, preventing thus the influx of the foreign capital to the country.

Analysts hold that the essential cause for the failure of the negotiations with the IMF was the unwillingness of the Government to adopt sound economic policies based on rapid and overall privatization. Such privatization, however, would prevent direct control of socialists (former communists) over the economy, thus shaking the very foundations of their power.

"In all socialist countries in which privatization was carried out, the authorities have also been changed.... We will not accept such an outcome," said last year Oskar Kovac, the eminence gris among the economists of the Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS).

Direct Trade

"The only way out for the Yugoslav economy lies in direct investments, primarily in concessions," says Stojan Stamenkovic. However, in the absence of the agreement with the IMF, and therefore in the absence of the IMF certification that the conditions in the country are to a certain degree regular, there are also no conditions for such investments.

Therefore, the authorities have ventured onto finding ways to artificially rise the Yugoslav investment rating, without the risk of an overall privatization. The first step in such a direction was made during the negotiations with the London Club of commercial creditors, held on July 24-26 in London. Then, the international banks were offered debt-equity swaps, but they failed to show much interest in such deals.

The negotiations of Serbian president, Slobodan Milosevic with the vice-chairman of the British National Westminster Bank (NatWest) and former British minister of foreign affairs, Douglas Hurd, on 24 July in Belgrade proved much more successful.

BETA's government and diplomatic sources claim that Milosevic promised Hurd that after the autumn federal elections, the FRY will start with more rapid privatization, that is, with the sale of domestic companies to foreigners, especially in the field of infrastructure, and that the British companies will play the most significant role in such privatization.

"NatWest will simply cash on the favorable British political rating in the FRY and on its detailed knowledge of the Yugoslav market," says BETA's diplomatic source.

The first indirect confirmation on the pending increased British participation in the Yugoslav economy came last week. The representatives of the Union Bank of Switzerland, who last November have started negotiations with the Serbian Government regarding the deals involving the telecommunication monopoly of Serbia and electrical energy production, could not obtain any information on the present status of the negotiations. "They were completely baffled," said BETA's banking source.

"It is only natural that NatWest does not wish the Swiss to skim the cream. What other reason would they risk their prestige for?" concluded the diplomat.

FRY: Energy Situation in First Half of 1996 Surveyed

AU0808100696 Belgrade BETA in English 29 Jul-7 Aug 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade—In the first six months of 1996 Yugoslavia consumed 52 percent more natural gas, 40 percent more oil derivatives, and 10 percent more electrical energy than in the corresponding 1995 period, while coal consumption fell.

In the same period, 19.7 billion kilowatt hours of electrical energy were produced, while 20.8 billion were consumed. Around 1.8 billion kilowatt hours of electrical energy were imported, while 660 million kilowatt hours were placed through other systems. By the end of June, 19.4 million metric tons of coal had been produced. During the six months, 25,000 metric tons of coal were imported, while 88,000 metric tons were exported. Oil production amounted to 500,000 metric tons during the first six months of 1996, to which 100,000 imported from Angola should be added. Only 96,000 metric tons were imported, while the export of an additional 900,000 metric tons of oil is expected by the end of the year. Domestic production of gas is around 350 million cubic meters, while consumption in the first six months amounted to 1.3 billion cubic meters. Around 955 million cubic meters of gas were imported.

At the end of May the energy sector was 2 billion dinars ($411 million) short for the electrical energy already delivered; the unpaid amount was twice that owed to the energy sector at the end of 1995. Natural gas consumers owed 800 million dinars ($164 million), while for oil derivatives, consumers owed 600 million dinars ($123 million). At the same time, the energy sector itself owed to various creditors around 1 billion dinars ($205 million).

Serbia

Serbia: DSS Opposes Unconditional Recognition of Croatia

AU0808131896 Belgrade BETA in Serbo-Croatian 1005 GMT 8 Aug 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Belgrade, 8 August (BETA)—Mirko Petrovic, vice president of the Democratic Party of Serbia [DSS], stated today that President Slobodan Milosevic "should not recognize Croatia nor any other country that does not respect elementary human rights and freedoms."

In a statement for BETA Petrovic said that the meeting between Croatian President Franjo Tudjman and Milosevic should be viewed in the context of the their joint policy, which "has left grave consequences for the Serb people."

Milosevic should have made the recognition of Croatia dependent on respect for the basic rights of the Serbs in Croatia and the settlement of the issue of the Krajina refugees, Petrovic said, adding that the Croatia of today is very reminiscent of the fascist Independent State of Croatia. [passage omitted]

Serbia: DS Questions Outcome of Milosevic-Tudjman Meeting

AU0808134296 Belgrade BETA in Serbo-Croatian 0934 GMT 8 Aug 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade, 8 Aug (BETA)—Slobodan Vuksanovic, spokesman for the Democratic Party (DS), described yesterday's talks between Presidents Slobodan Milosevic and Franjo Tudjman in Athens as "traditional, as they were held behind closed doors and were semisecret and semiprivate."

"Our public has never received any information on their meetings, and we can only speculate about what they agreed on in Athens," Vuksanovic told BETA.

"If the talks were about the FRY and Croatia recognizing each other, then Slobodan Milosevic should be asked if he has solved the problem of Eastern Slavonia through its reintegration into Croatia," he said.

"If the FRY and Croatia recognize each other, then the public should be informed on the agreement and the borders, as these were the main problems and cause of the conflict," Vuksanovic said, adding that such talks will "hardly lead to the normalization of relations in the Balkans."

The DS spokesman stressed that the normalization of relations "requires the settlement of the problem of a large number of refugees in this country."

Serbia: Seselj Vows To Return Serbs to Krajina, To Form One State

AU0708143096 Bad Vilbel VESTI in Serbo-Croatian 7 Aug 96 p 4

[Unattributed report: "Serb Krajina Will Once Again Belong to Us"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Vojislav Seselj, president of the Serbian Radical Party [SRS] said at a rally in Ljubovija that the Serbian people will never ever renounce their right to the territory of the Republic of Serb Krajina [RSK].

On the occasion of the anniversary of the Croatian offensive on the RSK, Seselj said that the territory "has only been temporarily occupied and seized from our people, and we shall use democratic and peaceful means to liberate our land and return our people to their ancestral homes."

If the French had the patience to wait almost 50 years for Germany to return Alsace and Lorraine to them, we Serbs have to wait for a more favorable constellation of forces in international relations to achieve our national goal, that is, the forming of a single Serb state, Seselj said.

Serbia: Belgrade OSCE Reports on B-H Voter Registration

AU0308165996 Novi Sad DNEVNIK in Serbo-Croatian 2 Aug 96 p 2

[Report by Dragan Milivojevic: "Large-Scale Refugee Response"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Belgrade, 1 Aug—Refugees from Bosnia-Herzegovina currently residing in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia will be able to register for the forthcoming elections until 5 August. The earlier deadline was extended due to the large-scale response from refugees, which has created a lot of work for the OSCE Provisional Election Commission's Belgrade office. We asked Zivota de Luka, head of the OSCE office, about the flow of work.

[Milivojevic] Mr. De Luka, can you give us the latest data available to your office?

[De Luka] The latest data shows that a large number of people, 55,241 to be precise, have so far registered for the Bosnian elections. These are the figures for Belgrade only. Of these, 20,466 potential voters have filled out form no. 1, while 34,775 have opted for form no. 2. Between 20 to 25 percent of the forms have been discarded as invalid. A great number—20,000 for Belgrade—are still being processed. The numbers are much greater in the remaining 15 regional centers throughout the FRY, and we hope to have the final figures tomorrow. We are trying to finish the job in as short a time as possible, which is why we have rented additional computers and put more people on the job. [passage omitted]

Montenegro

Montenegro: Bulatovic, UN's Rehn Discuss Dayton, Human Rights

LD0708171496 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1635 GMT 7 Aug 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Podgorica, August 7 (TANJUG)—Montenegrin President Momir Bulatovic and U.N. Human Rights Special Rapporteur Elisabeth Rehn agreed here on Wednesday that the Dayton Agreement had ended the civil war and brought about a gradual normalization of life, which was a prerequisite for an effective protection of basic human rights in the region.

The Yugoslav Republic of Montenegro is a civil state in which citizens are the protagonists of sovereignty, Bulatovic said during a lengthy and cordial meeting with Elisabeth Rehn who is in Podgorica on a one-day visit to Montenegro, Bulatovic's cabinet said in a statement.

Their meeting focused on the realization and protection of human rights in the F.R. Yugoslavia in the light of developments in the former Yugoslavia, the statement said.

Bulatovic said that inter-ethnic relations in Montenegro were good and that respect for national and ethnic characteristics was a traditional value and way of living.

He said that the Yugoslav Republic of Montenegro had preserved high-level mutual understanding and tolerance even during the fiercest nationalist euphoria in the former Yugosalvia, which had been decisive for the stable political situation in Montenegro during the civil war in its vicinity, the statement said.

Rehn showed interest for present democratic processes in Montenegro and upcoming republican multi-party elections, scheduled for November 3.

The two officials ageed that the situation in the field of respect for human rights was the most exact indicator of success in the overall process of democratization and development of all transition states, the statement said.

Respect for human rights in Montenegro is far beter than in war-stricken areas, Rehn told a news conference in Podgorica. That does not mean, however, that everything is perfect, Rehn said, adding that efforts should further be invested to reach international standards in human rights and even upgrade them.

During her first stay in Montenegro since her appointment last September, Rehn also met with Montenegrin Interior Minister Filip Vujanovic, Justice Minister Miodrag Latkovic and representatives of non-government organizations.

Montenegro: Serb, Montenegrin Ruling Parties 'Similar'

LD0808110496 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1041 GMT 8 Aug 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Podgorica, Aug. 8 (TANJUG)—The ruling parties of Serbia and Montenegro understand each other fully and hold similar views on all important questions, which is a guarantee of Yugoslavia's peaceful future, said a Montenegrin official.

In an interview to the Podgorica journal POLIS, a senior official of Montenegro's Democratic Party of Socialists (DPS) said it was important that the Socialist Party of Serbia had clearly opted for Yugoslavia at its congress last March.

Regardless of the fact that SPS and DPS had held similar stands on Yugoslavia, there were times when our relations were affected by activities of ultra nationalists at the top of SPS, said Predrag Bulaovic.

These ultra nationalists saw Montenegro merely as part of a project on greater Serbia, without respecting our identity, history and statehood, which was detrimental to our relations, said Bulatovic.

The situation has changed since the SPS congress, said Bulatovic, the party whip in the Montenegrin parliament.

Asked about the functioning of the Federation, Bulatovic said he was dissatisfied with the way the federal state had assumed its functions. I am dissatisfied about many things in Yugoslavia and its republics, he said.

This is, however, a matter of process, not a demand for destroying what we have in order to build something new. Yugoslavia's Constitution has a good foundation and many possibilities for a solid Federation, which should be made use of, said Bulatovic.

Montenegro: Fewer Than 25% of B-H Refugees Register To Vote

AU0708164696 Paris AFP in English 1632 GMT 7 Aug 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Podgorica, Yugoslavia, Aug 7 (AFP)—Less than a quarter of Bosnian refugees in Montenegro eligible to vote in the forthcoming Bosnian elections have registered, a Montenegrin government offical said Wednesday [7 August].

Some 2,900 refugees out of 13,500 old enough to vote have registered for the September 14 election, Djordjije Scepanovic told AFP.

Almost one third of those who have registered said they wished to vote in Montenegro itself, while the remainder will vote in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The latter group roughly corresponds to those who said during a recent census of Bosnian refugees in the rump Yugoslavia that they wished to return to Bosnia, and "influence the political situation by their vote."

Montenegro, which together with Serbia forms the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, is home to some 28,300 refugees, the majority Montenegrins and Serbs.

Scepanovic said around half of these refugees are now fully integrated in Montenegro, and have no intention of returning to Bosnia, Croatia or Slovenia.

Around 100,000 Bosnian refugees throughout the rump Yugoslavia, mostly Serbs, have registered on electoral lists according to the Belgrade bureau of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe, which is in charge of the elections.

The number of eligible voters among the Bosnian refugees in the rump Yugoslavia is estimated by Belgrade officials at 215,000.

Montenegro: Parliament Passes Law on Privatization

AU0808095596 Belgrade BETA in English 29 Jul-7 Aug 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Podgorica—The Law on Privatization, passed by the Montenegrin Parliament on July 25, will enable more than 200,000 citizens of Montenegro to become owners of 25-30 percent of the privatized capital through a distribution of the free-of-charge shares. The citizens will be given vouchers, that is, the capital which was transferred to the Fund for the Development of Montenegro. The employees will be given 3,000 ECU or 5,500 German marks coupons, while the pensioners and the unemployed will be given 1,500 ECU coupons. The shares of companies could also be purchased by the frozen foreign currency savings. The foreign currency debt of Montenegro to its citizens is officially estimated at $150 million.

Montenegro: Parliament Declares Republic 'Off-Shore Zone'

AU0808095496 Belgrade BETA in English 29 Jul-7 Aug 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Podgorica—On July 24, by adopting the Law on Founding of Foreign Companies which will operate under specific regulations, the Montenegrin Parliament declared Montenegro an off-shore zone. In the first five years, the registration of between eight to 10 thousand off-shore companies is expected in Montenegro. It is officially estimated that the revenue from tax, registration and annual fees, along with various service fees, will amount to $140 million. Montenegro also expects a secondary income through the employment of local workers, and investments in new technology and infrastructure.

Foreign legal entities would be able to found companies with foreign capital only, and will not be allowed to have relations with domestic enterprises. Foreign companies will be completely independent, and their only obligation will be to pay the capital gains tax of 2.5 percent. The companies will be allowed to deal in international trade, in giving non-financial services, in management and consulting, in giving services in trade and production of information technology, in trade of real estate, and other fields. Within the project the establishment of the free shopping and yachting zones and free ports are envisaged, as well as ship registration is envisaged.

Kosovo

Kosovo: Ethnic Albanian Party Urges Demilitarization

AU0808143996 Belgrade BETA in Serbo-Croatian 1534 GMT 7 Aug 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Pristina, 7 August (BETA)—Following the recent, still unsolved bombings in Podujevo, Kerimpeh, Luzani and Pristina, the Parliamentary Party of Kosovo has stated today that it is against any political violence in Kosovo and believes that "the best way of avoiding violence is the demilitarization of Kosovo."

"These incidents testify that the Serb authorities in Kosovo are using new methods of violence," reads the statement issued by the Parliamentary Party of Kosovo, which is rallying the ethnic Albanians and is considered to be the second most influential party there after the Democratic League of Kosovo.

The party assesses that the situation created in Kosovo after the bombings and violence requires urgent measures to resolve the issue of Kosovo.

"Otherwise, such scenarios may cause conflicts of unforeseeable proportions in that region," the ethnic Albanian party warns.

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